Results of the NATO summit in Washington

Henrik Larsen

While NATO at the Washington Summit predictably affirmed its biggest reinforcement of collective defence in a generation, the less foregone issue was how it would design support for Ukraine in the face of continued Russian aggression. NATO was able to fully agree on a first deliverable, namely assuming the coordination of lethal aid to Ukraine. The establishment of the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU) will enable the alliance to coordinate the delivery of military equipment and trainings. This leaves NATO prepared for the scenario where the United States (in case of a Trump return to the White House) would abandon its existing coordination role within the Ramstein format.

NATO was partially able to deliver on a second deliverable, namely a financial commitment for the long-term delivery of weapons. Allies pledged a minimum of $40 billion within 2025, which corresponds roughly to what they have provided annually since 2022. NATO aims to meet the pledge through contributions proportional to GDP, which allows it to apply soft pressure on allies to meet their commitments. However, although NATO also pledged long-term security assistance for Ukraine, it did not specify a concrete minimum pledge for the years beyond 2025. Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg had originally proposed a dedicated multiyear NATO fund for Ukraine, which (depending on the size) would have been a stronger signal that NATO would not allow Russia to succeed through military outproduction.

Overall, the Washington Summit ties NATO’s credibility to Ukraine more than ever, not only by agreeing to lethal aid but also by describing this as a ‘bridge’ to membership. NATO has given Ukraine a further linguistic update in underlining its ‘irreversible path’ to membership, although it is unlikely to extend an invitation as long as the country is at war and perhaps even as long as it territorial integrity is violated.

Tomas Janeliūnas

NATO leaders released this year’s Summit Declaration practically after the first day in Washington. In contrast to last year’s summit in Vilnius, this year NATO leaders were not under much pressure and did not have to rewrite important points of the Declaration. Many things had already been agreed in advance, and there was no lack of new things in the Declaration, which may be why there was no element of surprise.

One of the main areas of focus was the commitment to Ukraine’s long-term support, which is set out in an additional annex, with specific points. It stipulates that a minimum of €40 billion will be maintained for Ukraine for the next year, irrespective of domestic political developments in NATO countries. The reference here is, of course, to possible changes in US policy after the presidential election. It was also underlined that the next summit, to be held in The Hague, the Netherlands, will review the scope of support.

This commitment was to counterbalance another important part of the NATO Declaration for Ukraine – Ukraine’s still vague NATO membership prospects. The same phrase from the Vilnius summit was repeated: ‘We will be able to invite Ukraine to become a member of the Alliance as soon as the allies agree on it and the conditions are met.’ This year, however, more promising epithets have been added to this provision, which include terms such as the ‘irreversible path’ and the ‘bridge’ (to a faster NATO membership). However, as Andriy Yermak, Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, pointed out at the NATO Public Forum, ‘We live in different worlds; Ukraine lives in a world of war every day and you live in a world of words.’ Although ‘empty words’ were not mentioned, one can sense the frustration of the Ukrainians that NATO leaders continue to be more concerned about the accuracy of the words to be included in the Declaration to the satisfaction of all delegations than about allowing Ukraine to attack targets on Russian territory. It is this limitation, according to Mr Yermak, that is currently preventing Ukraine from adequately seizing the opportunities it has to stop Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also urged Western leaders in Washington to lift any restrictions on Ukraine’s ability to strike Russian targets beyond Ukraine’s borders. These decisions are severely delayed and cost Ukrainians their lives every day.

Another reminder that Western countries are late in taking the necessary decisions is the provision in the Declaration that it will be next year when recommendations will be made on NATO’s strategic approach to Russia. The question inevitably arises – why wait another year to define such a ‘strategic approach’? This is significantly at odds with the constant phrases repeated in the NATO Public Forum, and probably also in closed-door meetings, that Russia is already at war with the West by every means possible other than direct military means.

However, this NATO meeting also focused on NATO’s possible response to new types of Russian attacks against NATO countries, including diversion, assassination, sabotage, cyber-attacks and other highly damaging Russian actions. The Declaration even announces that NATO leaders have decided on further response measures and will continue to coordinate the monitoring of these types of threats. What exactly has been decided and what measures will be taken is unclear, probably due to the non-public nature of the decision. However, it is almost certain that these decisions were driven mainly by pressure from the Baltic and Nordic countries and Poland.

More importantly, the Declaration states that ‘hybrid operations’ could reach or equal the level of armed attacks, forcing allies to activate the famous Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.  In other words, it is acknowledged that the Alliance may react to this type of Russian – practically terrorist – attack as a typical kinetic attack on a NATO member. This corresponds well with the thoughts expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Gabrielius Landsbergis, at the NATO Public Forum that these are not just ‘hybrid’ or ‘grey zone’ attacks – they should be considered state-sponsored terrorist attacks against NATO members. The only time in NATO’s history that Article 5 has been activated was during the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001.

What was not agreed at this NATO summit? One of the more important points is the unchanged recommendation on allies’ defence spending. This year’s Declaration merely repeats that there is a need to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence and that even this may not be enough to plug the gaps created by the long-term underfunding of the armed forces and the changing security needs. However, on a positive note, more than two-thirds of NATO members have now reached or exceeded the 2% threshold.

The NATO summit and Public Forum in Washington were full of optimistic and resounding statements about NATO’s importance and impact on global security over the past 75 years. The need to maintain unity among allies, to adapt and to act faster was also underlined. But it is the speed and responsiveness to the threat posed by Russia (as well as China, Iran, North Korea and non-state actors) that is the alliance’s weakness. The bigger and more important NATO becomes, the slower it is to manoeuvre in the stormy security waters. However, the course is clear and no one is using the term ‘brain-dead NATO’ anymore – what matters to everyone is to make NATO as viable and strong as possible.