Review of “frozen conflicts” in the EU neighbourhood: Rearrangement of the regional security chessboard

The transformation of “frozen conflicts” in the EU-Russia common neighbourhood around the Black Sea region is in full swing in some cases, and somewhat intact in others. The central factor in the changing geopolitical environment surrounding post-Soviet territorial conflicts remains the 2022 Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Since 2014, Russia – by rejecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and continuing its attempts to occupy new territories in order to defeat Ukraine on the battlefield to impose political control – has eroded its authority as the gatekeeper of the old geostrategic balance of power in the Black Sea region. Consequently, past asymmetries present in certain “frozen conflict” dynamics that favoured Russia have shifted in the opposite direction.

Where Russia has lost influence, other “rising powers” in the region (Azerbaijan) are filling the void, while in other cases Russia is struggling to preserve its positions in the face of the growing geopolitical weight of the EU.

The analysis of this bulletin aims to present the key elements of the current situation of “frozen conflicts”, and prospects for their transformation into conflict-free parts of the EU’s securitized neighbourhood. Russian aggression against Ukraine changes the prospects for a future resolution of conflicts by altering the balance of power. Where Russia has lost influence, other “rising powers” in the region (Azerbaijan) are filling the void, while in other cases Russia is struggling to preserve its positions in the face of the growing geopolitical weight of the EU.

As of the end of 2023, there were four “frozen conflicts,” excluding the hot war in Ukraine territories. Before entering 2024, the conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh definitively lost its “frozen conflict” status due to a special military operation carried out by Azerbaijani forces to reintegrate territories that had been under Armenian control for more than three decades. In parallel, as a consequence of the actions of the EU and the United States to sanction Russian military revisionism at the expense of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, the region of Transnistria (Transnistria) has been isolated from Russian economic and financial ties. This also led to a situation where the breakaway region of Moldova was cut off from access to traditional trade routes through Ukrainian transport infrastructure. Two other “frozen conflicts,” the Georgian separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which are self-proclaimed states recognized by Russia and a small number of its allies, have not faced serious consequences as a result of Russia’s declining geopolitical influence in the South Caucasus. The immediate proximity of these two Georgian regions to Russia, and their political and military gravitation around Russian geostrategic interests, makes them the most resistant to transformation among the “frozen conflicts.”

Table. The status-quo of “frozen conflicts” in 2024

Source: Author’s assessment

The analytical overview provided below presents the current situation of “frozen conflicts” in the Black Sea region, indicating how the large-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine, which began in February 2022, has influenced the prospects for conflict settlement and territorial reintegration in the region.

Ukraine: “hot” War with Uncertain Ending

Against the backdrop of delayed U.S. military aid to Ukraine, as of the beginning of 2024 Russia intensified offensive action in the eastern theatre, which was marked with the capture of Avdiivka, with both sides taking heavy losses in man-power and equipment. The escalation of military aggression by the Russian army in the East (Kharkiv region) and South-East (Donetsk region) of Ukraine highlights fundamental weaknesses in Ukrainian military capability, which Russia is attempting to exploit.

During the spring campaign, Russian armed forces began a new offensive ground operation in the north Kharkiv region. Vladimir Putin boasted about the need to create a “sanitary cordon” to prevent the infiltration of Ukrainian forces. Although the main aim of this campaign seems to be of a shaping nature before a major Russian campaign in the summer – to stretch and fix already thin Ukrainian forces and exploit weakness in Ukrainian planning and execution of effective defence. Simultaneously, Ukraine faces slow ammunition production and supplies due to insufficient defence production capacity in Europe, and reluctance  from Western allies to allow  long-range missiles  strikes against targets inside Russia (the Taurus case). Russian armed forces have also learned and adapted to changing circumstances on the battlefield, e.g. the jamming of Western-made weapons such as M142 HIMARS MLRS rockets, which limits their use and precision. This is further aggravated by an acute shortage of the manpower that Kyiv needs to replenish its national military forces.

Apart from supporting Ukraine’s legal measures to return eligible men among the refugee population, some EU and NATO states do not rule out the participation of their national armies in certain military activities on Ukrainian territory, e.g. limited training missions or guarding the norther Ukrainian border. The first such signals came from French President Emmanuel Macron, who, discussing “strategic ambiguity,” introduced the idea of an eventual deployment of French troops if Russian armed forces achieve a major breakthrough. Furthermore, news has already emerged about the planned deployment of French instructors, probably as early as this summer.

While the prolonged war is devastating for Ukraine, it also has negative consequences for the aggressor, as Russian geopolitical authority as a leading ‘stabilization’ power is further declining, which impacts its leverage over “frozen conflicts” in the Black Sea region.

This June’s Peace Summit in Switzerland represents a critically important opportunity for Ukraine to refresh the West’s engagement and to involve others, including those in the “Global South” (such as India), to commit in various ways. Ukraine’s defence against Russian aggression requires significant financial resources, sustainable military aid, and enforceable sanctions coercion. These types of support, both separately and together, are shaping the current and future dynamics of the war. While the prolonged war is devastating for Ukraine, it also has negative consequences for the aggressor, as Russian geopolitical authority as a leading ‘stabilization’ power is further declining, which impacts its leverage over “frozen conflicts” in the Black Sea region.

Distracted by the war, Russia has given in to Azerbaijan’s determination to regain control of all its territories, which reveals to Armenia Moscow’s inability to maintain the fragile balance of power around Karabakh. Another frozen conflict in which Russia has lost its upper hand is the settlement of the Transnistria conflict. The breakaway region of Moldova has never been so superficially covered by Russian guarantees due to the combined effects of Western-designed sanctions concerning Russian aggression, and the war’s destructive impact on land and sea supply chains. These two factors led not only to the isolation of the split from Russia, but also to a forced decoupling from it and a deeper reorientation towards the European market. The only frozen conflict in which Russia has readjusted its posture is related to the Georgian territory of Abkhazia. To counter growing Ukrainian naval combat capabilities in the Black Sea, Russia has consolidated its military presence in the occupied Abkhazia by building a future military naval base in Ochamchire (scheduled to be fully operational in 2024).

Azerbaijan’s reintegration of Karabakh: One “Frozen Conflict” less

Without having the direct proximity of the war in Ukraine, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict suffered the most dramatic transformation of all the “frozen conflicts.” Pressured by the international decapitalization of legitimacy due to military failures in its aggression against Ukraine, Russia’s capacity to react was tested in the geographic areas it considers its geopolitical backyard. In these circumstances, the Azerbaijani authorities found themselves in a convenient position to challenge the post-2020 arrangements brokered by Vladimir Putin, and thus subjected Nagorno-Karabakh to an initial blockade of the Lachin corridor (started in December 2022), followed by an intervention to retake control over the separatist region (in September 2023). Realizing that it could not stop Azerbaijan’s reintegration at an any cost strategy, Russia chose not to interfere, even though Azeri military actions resulted in the (mistaken) killing of several of its peacekeepers stationed in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The former Armenian inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh are now refugees in Armenia, and certain exponents of the separatist regime were arrested by Azerbaijani forces.

As a result of a complex plan to retake control over Nagorno-Karabakh, which included various stages and techniques put in place from December 2022 to September 2023 (environmental protests, economic “blockade”, halting of energy and food supply, etc.) and finally with swift military means, Baku managed to end the separatist regime on its territory. This came at a severe cost for the Armenian population of approximately 120,000 inhabitants, who were forced to leave everything behind, fearing consequences after the reintegration of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan. This caused a silent exodus that was acknowledged but not opposed or prevented by the EU and/or the United States, which chose to offer aid to Armenia to manage the refugee crisis. The former Armenian inhabitants of Nagorno-Karabakh are now refugees in Armenia, and certain exponents of the separatist regime were arrested by Azerbaijani forces.

Since the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh regime ceased to exist at the end of 2023, from January 2024 Azerbaijan has practically completed the reintegration of all its territories which had formerly been under Armenian control for about three decades. The final stage, albeit symbolic, in the full exclusion of the non-Azerbaijani presence in Nagorno-Karabakh is the beginning of the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping forces starting in April 2024.

Paradoxically, even if the Nagorno-Karabakh “frozen conflict” faded, the risks of military tensions remain because the process of border delimitation and demarcation between Armenia and Azerbaijan begun in May. Yerevan’s territorial concessions are already causing political costs for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who faces protests from the opposition, with the religious cleric Bagrat Galstania at the forefront. Without clarifying the borders, a peace agreement can’t be signed, making Armenia vulnerable to territorial contestation and further destabilization attempts by Azerbaijan. On different occasions, President Ilham Aliyev did not hide the interest of establishing a functional corridor to the exclave Nakhchivan, which fuels fears in Armenia, especially in the eyes of the opposition, about the future territorial integrity of its Syunik region. Feeling abandoned by Russia and witnessing a lack of resolve from the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) to support Armenia during reports of alleged illegal border crossings by Azerbaijani forces, Armenia has intensified its dialogue with the EU (which launched the EUMA Mission in February 2023), France (defence cooperation and military supplies), and the US (army modernization proposal).

Moldova’s geo-strategic advantage in the Transnistrian region

Although Moldova is very close to Ukraine, where Russian aggression continues, the “frozen conflict” on its territory is increasingly seen as an argument for a future positive solution. Economically, the Transnistria region depends exclusively on its access to the European market through the constitutional territory of Moldova and with the permission of the Moldovan authorities (customs, regulatory bodies, etc.). Politically, the separatist regime must cooperate with Chisinau to survive in the context of reduced budget revenues caused both by the war (sanctions on Russia and disruptions in supply chains) and by Moldova’s recent reintegration policies that aim to unify customs regulations, in force since January 2024. The enormous external support for the current Moldovan authorities limits any attempt by the political-economic elites of the separatist region to defend their case. The US, EU and Ukraine side with Moldova, leaving Transnistria largely isolated. Russia’s international status is severely damaged by its aggression against Ukraine, which has an isolating effect on all its satellites, including the separatist regime in Moldova.

In spring 2024, the administration of the separatist regime proposed signing a declaration of joint commitment to resolve the conflict only by peaceful means.

The imbalances in the former geopolitical balance of power in the region have put the “5+2” format of negotiations dedicated to the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict on hold. This format was already impaired back in 2019, but now faces “clinical death” due to the events in Ukraine. Neither the West nor Ukraine agrees to conduct business as usual regarding the Transnistrian conflict, and are prepared to revisit it once the war’s prospects favour Ukraine. Specifically, until the war is over a political solution to the Transnistrian conflict will remain unachievable, since one side of the negotiation table (Russia) is conducting a war of aggression against another (Ukraine). Moldova insists on a peaceful settlement of the conflict, which does not prevent it from investing in the modernization of its defence capacities, mainly with the support of the EU (the brand-new Security and Defence Partnership). In spring 2024, the administration of the separatist regime proposed signing a declaration of joint commitment to resolve the conflict only by peaceful means. In this sense, all interested stakeholders show a predisposition only for a peaceful settlement scenario. Despite Russia’s untrustworthiness (as evidenced by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine), Russia’s inability to reach Moldova through a land corridor via Ukraine and the separatist regime in Transnistria’s incapacity to invest in its military capabilities (due to Russia-oriented sanctions and supply disruptions) currently favour non-escalation.

The dynamics of the “frozen conflict” in Moldova in the short-term stem from two exogenous factors. Firstly, the more immediate issue involves energy supplies. Moldova faces risks related to the Russian gas supply to the Transnistrian region, which could cease if no mechanism replaces the current transit gas deal between Ukraine and Russia, which is set to terminate at the end of 2024. Secondly, the situation on the battleground in Ukraine could also impact the present asymmetry in the dialogue with the breakaway region that favours Moldova. If Russia achieves a military breakthrough in Ukraine, this may have repercussions on the separatist regime’s interest in initiating new provocations. In late February, the region asked Russia to intervene to help mitigate the effects of the new customs policy implemented by Chisinau. The likelihood of such events largely depends on the Western combination of political will and industrial preparedness to support Ukraine with weapons, manpower (training), and financial aid.

The latest OSCE-mediated “1+1” talks between Chisinau and Tiraspol (the administrative capital of the Transnistria region), held in mid-May, have shown that cooperation is the preferred approach of all parties. This makes this “frozen conflict” different from the rest in the Black Sea region. For example, in one case, the separatist regime was dismantled after a unilateral military operation (Nagorno-Karabakh). On the other hand, Russia’s high degree of control over the breakaway regions of Georgia precludes any direct talks between Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Georgia, even if facilitated by the West.

Georgia’s strategic disinterest to challenge the status-quo

The situation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains one of the most frozen conflicts in the region. Russia unilaterally recognized the independence of both territories after the 2008 war with Georgia. Since then, Abkhazia and South Ossetia international recognition has been limited to a few countries, including Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru and, most recently, Syria in 2018. Despite having a strong partnership with Russia and strengthening bilateral relations with Abkhazia, Alexandr Lukashenko refused to join the group of recognizers. Georgia’s two breakaway regions, representing 20% of national territories with access to the Black Sea (Abkhazia) and rest deep inside the rest of Georgia, pose risks to critical energy transit pipelines (South Ossetia) have developed rather differentiated relations with Moscow.

In the case of South Ossetia, discussions have been held about its possible absorption by the Russian Federation. Although South Ossetian authorities have expressed interest in joining the Russian Federation, no specific timeline had been set as of March 2024. In the meantime, separatist in contrast, Abkhazia’s efforts to avoid an annexation scenario are overshadowed by Russia’s strategic interests. As part of its strategy to avoid Russian annexation, Abkhazia seeks to join the Union State with Belarus and Russia, a process that has advanced since the crackdown on the opposition in Belarus in 2020. There is speculation that Moscow might use Abkhazia as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Georgian authorities. The complications in Georgia’s relations with the West under the Georgian Dream government open new avenues for Russian influence. Sanctioned by the West for actions perceived as contrary to Euro-Atlantic and European values, such as the adoption of the “foreign agent” bill, Georgian leadership may find itself increasingly isolated. Russia could exploit this situation by proposing a formula for “rapprochement” between Georgia and Abkhazia as part of the normalization process. Hypothetically, Russia could even consider a sort of “confederation” between Georgia and Abkhazia, something that has not so far been publicly suggested. Until then, the administrations of the two separatist regions, under Russian occupation, continue to employ hybrid tactics of shifting the borders at the administrative boundary lines, causing various human rights violations for the local population. Although the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM), in place since 2008, inspects these administrative lines, it lacks the tools to prevent this “borderization” from occurring.

With the ongoing war and Ukraine’s enhanced military capability to target the Russian fleet, the naval base/port that Russia aims to operationalize in Ochamchire, the coastline of Abkhazia, by the end of 2024, plays a crucial role in Russia’s long-term strategic Black Sea repositioning.

Regardless of whether Abkhazia remains closer to Georgia or maintains its current state of separation, Russia is keen to preserve its strategic positions in the region due to its Black Sea access. With the ongoing war and Ukraine’s enhanced military capability to target the Russian fleet, the naval base/port that Russia aims to operationalize in Ochamchire, the coastline of Abkhazia, by the end of 2024, plays a crucial role in Russia’s long-term strategic Black Sea repositioning.

Conclusions

The “frozen conflicts” in the EU neighbourhood are undergoing a process of transformation. On the one hand, the advance of Europeanization processes is filling the “grey zone” with the co-ownership of the construction of regional security by the EU. On the other hand, Russia’s power is largely challenged by the West-backed Ukrainian defence against Russian aggression, which can create strategic “historic windows of opportunity” for states with persistent “frozen conflicts,” such as Moldova and Georgia. If used wisely, the emerging opportunities can help restore territorial integrity in the EU’s neighbouring countries. To do this, two conditions must be met: (1) the EU should show the political will to eliminate the last elements of the post-Soviet “grey zone” and (2) Western and local stakeholders must combine efforts to counter and replace Russian influence in the “frozen conflicts.”