

NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT 2022: A LOOK FROM THE LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE





Content

New NATO Strategic Concept: Baltic States Perspective	03
NATO and the Black Sea region: security challenges and solutions	14
Baltic Sea Region security: Nordics, Baltics, and NATO	20



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New NATO Strategic Concept: Baltic States Perspective

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In the eight decade long history of NATO, 2022 will be marked as a year of the new Strategic Concept. It will be the eighth NATO Strategic Concept, and the fourth in the post-Cold War period. The NATO Summit in Madrid will finalize the process of strategic reflection, which started a few years ago. The Strategic Concept is “an official document defining NATO's purpose,

nature and fundamental security tasks in the contemporary security environment²". Indeed, the strategic environment has fundamentally changed since 2010, when the previous Strategic Concept was adopted. So, along with the environment, the Alliance has to review its major goals, tasks and strategic directions.

In fact, the Allies are looking for the right balance between NATO as a collective defence alliance and a political international organisation. The threat perception and the very principles of defence, as well as the security environment have changed. So, the Alliance has to address the military threat stemming from Russia along with its close integration with Belarus, while it also has to evaluate the rising challenge of China. And those challenges and threats are accompanied by a broad range of smaller, yet equally important challenges that might have direct impact on NATO's reaction, evaluation, and decision-making.

It has to rethink the future collective defence and military force structure, reconsider the role of partnerships, and take into account emerging disruptive technologies, hybrid security challenges, "a range of policy competences in cyber, resilience, outer space, capacity-building and more is indeed a tall political order. Strategy is about priorities, however, and NATO's priorities must bridge the political– military divide."³

By looking for the right political and military balance, NATO has to review and rebrand its major core tasks, focus on the principles of collective defence and deterrence and its

approach to deterrence and defence adaptation. The Eastern European Allies naturally highlight the strong transatlantic bond and US security assurances for the Allies, along with sound collective defence as essential elements of the security and stability in the region. The set of normative democratic principles along with the commitment to collective defence and credibility of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty should remain pivotal and unquestionable.

Historically, NATO Strategic Concepts had multiple goals. They provided strategic directions for the Alliance, "prioritized threats, fundamental tasks and geographical points of concern, and established guidelines for the force posture of tomorrow"⁴, also they institutionalised, summarized the decisions taken by the Alliance during previous Summits. So, the Strategic Concept is to provide future directions of the Alliance, to define the Alliance in the context of contemporary security environment, to give tasks and guidelines to political and military structures. It should correspond to the existing strategic environment, provide guidelines and suggest means for Alliance adaptation.

The Strategic Concept of 2010

The strategic environment in 2010 was absolutely different to the one of today. However, at that time, it was perceived as complex as never before⁵. In Lisbon, the strategic environment was defined as rather peaceful, major challenges were perceived as stemming from regional disputes and unconventional threats such as terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The perception that "an effective defence against these

unconventional security threats must begin well beyond the territory of the Alliance”⁶ was predominant. The future directions and expectations were quite optimistic. The Strategic Concept underlined that:

“ *The Euro-Atlantic area is at peace and the threat of a conventional attack against NATO territory is low. That is an historic success for the policies of robust defence, Euro-Atlantic integration and active partnership that have guided NATO for more than half a century.*”⁷

So, the complex but relatively peaceful strategic environment called for a flexible Alliance focusing on non-Article 5 out-of-area operations.

In 2010, NATO defined three core tasks, namely, collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. By that, the collective defence was in principle downgraded, as it became one out of 3 core tasks of NATO and it was supposed to be achieved by the lowest level of forces. In fact, collective defence was almost overshadowed by crisis management. The Strategic Concept focused on expeditionary forces and out-of-area operations. It highlighted „robust, mobile and deployable conventional forces to carry out both our Article 5 responsibilities and the Alliance expeditionary operations”⁸. There was a predominant perception, that NATO needed “improved expeditionary capabilities not only for crisis response operations distant from alliance territory but also for collective defence itself.”⁹

In 2010, the Alliance introduced missile defence as the third element of deterrence and underscored its role in the NATO defence and deterrence posture. The Allies took the

decision to develop ballistic missile defence capability, and in 2012, the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR) stipulated that a sound mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities

“ *Underpinned by NATO’s integrated Command Structure, offer the strongest guarantee of the Alliance’s security and will ensure that it is able to respond to a variety of challenges and unpredictable contingencies in a highly complex and evolving international security environment.*”¹⁰

However, the inclusion of missile defence was not perceived as a substitute for other capabilities that the Allies deem essential to deterrence and their security.¹¹ D. Yost observed similarly that the “missile defences and contingency plans and exercises involving conventional military forces are no substitute for retaining US nuclear weapons in Europe as a key element of the Alliance’s deterrence posture”¹².

The Baltic States and other Eastern European Allies argued for more attention to collective defence and realistic evaluation of the security environment, as they observed the increasingly assertive Russia. The Munich speech of Russia’s president Vladimir Putin in 2007, the suspension of implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe along with Russia’s military aggression in Georgia in 2008, violating territorial integrity and undermining its sovereignty were especially worrisome. Russia continued its claims for zones of privileged interests disregarding the major UN Charter and Helsinki Founding Act principles.

Notably, the Alliance reaffirmed its open-door policy with regards Ukraine and Georgia and in 2010, agreed “to prepare contingency plans for the defence of the Baltic states”¹³, but NATO-Russia cooperation after a short suspension period was back to business as usual and further developed. The Strategic Concept underscored that NATO poses no threat to Russia.

In addition, the Strategic Concept distinguished cooperative security as a third core task, which was seen as the means to ensure a stable, transparent, and predictable security environment. Despite the fact that “since 2007 Russia has become increasingly assertive¹⁴” against the Alliance, in 2010, NATO sounded quite optimistic with regards to NATO-Russia partnership. Russia was perceived distinctively as a partner of strategic importance and the agenda of the NATO-Russia Council was expanding to include a broad set of issues related to regional and global security.

Evidently, the 2010 Strategic Concept is outdated and does not correspond with strategic contemporary realities. Actually, it was outdated few years after its inception. In 2010, NATO attempted to transform from “old-style regional perceptions of security to a more recent global perspectives of security¹⁵”, after 2014, this transformation proved impossible, as traditional military threats to collective security and the need to focus on collective territorial defence reappeared. Russia continuously pursued the old-style regional muscle flexing approach based on building zones of so-called privileged interests and claiming distinctive rights in the region and in this aspect NATO’s Strategic Concept of 2010 might even seem naïve.

Security Environment in 2021

While looking at the security environment and NATO adaptation, the Alliance has to evaluate whether the security threats that are relevant today will be actual in the foreseeable future. So, the new Strategic Concept of 2022 will not only have to depict the major changes in security environment, but also to provide the future directions for the Alliance.

Since 2010, the strategic environment has been significantly deteriorating, Russia continued its military aggression against Georgia and Ukraine, annexed the Crimean Peninsula, and carried out military action in the eastern part of Ukraine. Russia actively modernized its military capabilities, started developing new missile systems including *hypersonic* ones, and expanded A2/AD capabilities that can cut off Allied support to the Baltic region, or decouple the US from its European Allies. “Since 2008, Russia has strengthened its quantitative and qualitative advantage in the Baltic Sea region and could potentially muster around 125,000 high-readiness ground forces in the region in 14 days¹⁶”. The NATO Secretary General highlighted:

“ *The Russian regime is aggressive abroad and oppressive at home. It has massively expanded its military presence from the Barents Sea to the Mediterranean. Its military build-up on Ukraine’s borders, with around a hundred thousand troops, heavy armour, drones and missiles, is of great concern.*¹⁷”

In the last decade, Russia has “set up three army commands, five new division headquar-

ters, and 15 new mechanized regiments in the Western Military District (MD). ZAPAD exercises exemplify Russia's ability to rehearse large, combined operations, including live-fire and realistic, unscripted scenarios, and Russia's dominance of the escalation ladder."¹⁸ Russia proved its ability to move large numbers of troops in a short period of time. Its military has been at the highest readiness and preparedness to act quickly since the end of Cold War¹⁹. Russia's military integration with Belarus is especially worrisome, it has a significant impact on transatlantic security.

The military threats stemming from Russia are accompanied by growing challenges from China, which is developing its military capabilities including missile systems that can carry nuclear weapons. Western dependence on China's technologies might have serious impact on NATO security in the future²⁰. Threats from Russia, challenges from a rising China, the spread of terrorism in the South are accompanied by a number of below Article 5 threshold threats that might strengthen the effect of military threats or divert the attention from the real intentions of potential adversaries, to include emerging disruptive technologies, cyber-attacks, terrorist threats, challenges stemming from outer-space, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Indeed, "security needs are constantly rising, and faced with Russia, terrorism, hybrid and cyber threats, pandemics and maybe soon China, NATO's *raison d'être* seems to be as clear as ever."²¹ The contemporary security environment is more volatile, more complex and less predictable, than the one that existed 12 years ago. Despite the fact that the security environment is under constant change, the most challenging and dangerous is the threat stemming from Russia, so a va-

riety of sub-threshold challenges should not divert the Alliance's attention from the real military threat.

The NATO Strategic Concept of 2010 designed on the three core tasks – deterrence and defence, crisis management and collaborative security – does not reflect contemporary strategic realities. John R. Deni argues that the three core tasks model "is outmoded for the twenty-first century, one in which the alliance's primary state adversaries—primarily Russia but also China—employ hybrid tactics iteratively across multiple domains"²².

Indeed, fundamental shifts in the security environment require recalibration of the three core tasks. Conventional military threats to the Alliance are much more acute now than a decade ago, especially in the Eastern flank, so deterrence and defence should be prioritized as the key mission and the essence of NATO. While the other two tasks are significant, from the Baltic States perspective, collective defence should be clearly exclusive compared to the other two.

Collective defence and deterrence after 2014

Russia's aggression against Ukraine was a real wake-up call for the Alliance, as it had to rethink the very fundamental principles of defence and deterrence and adapt to the altered security environment. The NATO mission-specific mobile command structure, as approved in 1994, seemed inappropriate in a post-2014 environment; NATO started adapting its commands, bringing back the principle of territorial defence²³.

NATO shifted from expeditionary defence back to territorial defence, started institutional, political and military adaptation, developed reassurance measures for the Eastern European Allies, established multinational battalion-size battle groups of the Enhanced Forward Presence in the Baltic States and Poland, and started long-term deterrence and defence adaptation. The adaptation is aimed at “reinforcing the Alliance’s presence and military activity in Eastern Europe and introducing substantial long-term changes to NATO’s force posture, enabling it to respond more quickly to future challenges and threats”²⁴. For the Baltic States, the continued Allied military presence in the region is of critical importance, it is an integral part of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, which needs to be strengthened. The Baltics stress viable NATO reinforcement strategy²⁵, and preparedness to react immediately in crisis and conflict.

The deterrence and defence adaptation is marked by responsiveness, readiness and reinforcement. It is closely interconnected with the defence spending pledge, the Allies committed to 2 per cent of their GDP by 2024, the decision was made to “reverse the trend of declining defence budgets, to make the most effective use of funds and to further a more balanced sharing of costs and responsibilities”²⁶. This principle has to be highlighted in the new Strategic Concept, as it is critically important for sustainable collective defence commitments. The NATO Secretary General highlights the need to have the right forces in the right place²⁷, it might be added, and that those forces have to be prepared to react rapidly.

Indeed, NATO needs to strike the right balance between the ability to defend Allied territory and deter major threats. NATO has to focus on collective defence and “confront challeng-

es of coherence and capacity. Two decades of focus on counterterrorism and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan have not left NATO well-equipped, well-trained, or well-postured to confront the new dynamics of great power rivalry. NATO needs to reorient and retool itself.”²⁸ Thierry Tardy, while discussing the major questions of the NATO self-reflection process, underlined the following directions: “continuity; refocusing on collective defence; morphing into a security organization; standing up for China; and marginalization”²⁹. The most relevant and sustainable direction of the Alliance is refocussing on collective defence.

Against the backdrop of the development of the New Strategic Concept, the Allies have to find the best way to meet the contemporary security challenges and adjust the political-military system of NATO. The major focus of this adaptation has to be on credible collective defence system based on strengthened and modernised force structure along with , preparedness, rapid reinforcement and emphasis on swift reaction time. The Baltic States believe that NATO should commit itself to continued adaptation of collective defence and increased preparedness to react rapidly in case of crisis or conflict.

Enhancing resilience – together, but individually?

Part of NATO’s adaptation to cope with emerging security threats is a growing emphasis on resilience. In the 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO leaders agreed to boost resilience by committing to achieve seven baseline requirements for civil preparedness, considering resilience as the first line of defence³⁰. The Brussels Summit Communique notes an even greater commitment to enhancing resilience:

“ *Noting that resilience remains a national responsibility, we will adopt a more integrated and better co-ordinated approach, consistent with our collective commitment under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to reduce vulnerabilities and ensure our militaries can effectively operate in peace, crisis and conflict.*³¹”

Although the consensus is that resilience building is important and should be enhanced³², the level of ambition to deepen its presence in NATO's agenda is still debated: is it an underpinning element that blends into NATO's core tasks³³, should it become a fourth core task, or should it be strictly kept a national responsibility (despite it being a collective commitment)? This question boils down to very practical questions where the devil lies in the details: should resilience goals be more strictly overseen by NATO (similarly to the Alliance defence planning process)? What resources it would require, and would it come from defence spending? And, in the end, will that have a tremendous impact on the calculus of the adversary to really boost the deterrence?

The Alliance will need to answer these and other questions as the political commitment will be operationalized. To that end, the Baltic States' stance on resilience will be supportive in general, cautious of the possibility for the topic to grow too wide and divert resources from the collective defence task, and very vocal about the need to do resilience building work much closer together with the EU.

Emerging challenges in NATO's agenda – a selective and reserved approach

What NATO looks like today is much closer to the ideal the Baltic States in particular and the Eastern European Allies more broadly were thinking off when they were joining the Alliance. Yet, many of the changes that arose during the last 7 years are still half-way and require further efforts, funding and focus. This is the main reason the Baltic States in general are not enthusiastic about the broadening of NATO's agenda.

On the other hand, the strength of the Euro-Atlantic alliance comes not only from its unity and cohesion, but also the ability to adapt to the changing security environment and keep itself at the technological edge. NATO will have to consider how it operates in non-traditional domains, such as cyber or outer space, or what military and non-military tools it possesses to respond to 'hybrid threats'. This seems to be among the US' priorities while looking at NATO's adaptation to future challenges as well³⁴.

In this situation, the Baltic States, who traditionally regard collective defence as the fundamental essence of NATO, need to accommodate support for a 360-degree approach and growing interest to expand NATO's agenda into new areas to ensure the cohesion and unity of the Alliance.

The list of the 'new' possible items in NATO's agenda is rather broad. The NATO 2030 Reflection paper discusses emerging and disruptive technologies (EDT), climate and green defence, human security, energy security, pandemics and natural disasters, cyber and hybrid threats or tackling disinforma-

tion as the topics where NATO's role could be enhanced³⁵. And this is not the end list. It is assumed that the contemporary security threats go far beyond the traditional military domain and, therefore, the Alliance has to step up in addressing these issues.

The NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué recognizes the growing importance of modern threats:

“ *We face multifaceted threats, systemic competition from assertive and authoritarian powers, as well as growing security challenges to our countries and our citizens from all strategic directions. [...] We are increasingly confronted by cyber, hybrid, and other asymmetric threats, including disinformation campaigns, and by the malicious use of ever-more sophisticated emerging and disruptive technologies. Rapid advances in the space domain are affecting our security³⁶.”*

This wide array of new topics or issues of growing concern is, to some extent, a collection of the wish-list of 30 Allies and not all necessarily will become part of NATO's agenda. However, the proliferation of the topics NATO addresses in the Baltics is perceived as a distraction to the focus on the essence of the Alliance – the collective defence pillar. In this regard, the Baltic States will be using a 'red lens' to judge any new initiative – is it relevant in terms of deterrence and defence against Russia?

Russia combined military and non-military tools, such as cyber, disinformation or political subversion, to achieve desired results – the annexation of Crimea in 2014. This was

quickly labelled 'hybrid warfare' and was met with surprise in the West, although others see it as traditional Russian statecraft³⁷. Despite the still ongoing debate if Russian strategy is new or not, hybrid tactics, which could involve kinetic elements at the earliest stages of the crisis, are frequently presented as the most pressing issue of today, especially if they could lead to a *fait accompli* scenario favourable to the aggressor. Hybrid tactics along with reflexive control principles might mislead, misguide, revert the attention of the Alliance and hinder effective decision-making processes.

Therefore, some of the 'emergent' issues are easily passing this exam: cyber, hybrid or disinformation are the topics where the Baltic States are not only vocal, but also trying hard to be the flagbearers in countering these threats. Tallinn is well known for its expertise on cyber, Riga hosts NATO's Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, while Lithuania has activated the Counter Hybrid Support Teams mechanism first and foremost to signal that NATO has a role in responding to hybrid attacks against its members. All three believe hybrid threats are the 'new normal' of today's security landscape, so the Alliance must not only build resilience to such challenges but also develop capabilities to mitigate, deter or respond to these threats properly.

Combined with the notion that Russia is the only challenge, which is threatening NATO existentially, some argue that a broad approach to security should first and foremost be adopted for the Eastern European Allies. Moreover, European security and stability lies also on its ability to deal with aggressive Russian policy towards non-NATO countries in the East³⁸. This should not only be acknowledged in the new Strategic Concept but should also guide the review of NATO's partnership policies.

However, other 'emergent' topics are not received with much hype. That does not mean they are seen as unimportant; they just do not seem to carry much weight when it comes to dealing with Russia.

Although having limited (but not none, as there are some cutting edge technologies developed in the Baltic States) capabilities to contribute much with expertise, all three Baltic States showed their support to the common effort in responding to EDT challenge by joining NATO's first innovation fund DIANA, dedicated to retaining the Alliance's technological edge³⁹. Building relations in the defence industry sector is an opportunity to develop stronger links with key Allies. At the same time, the approach is rather reserved, as there is no general understanding where this initiative will actually lead to and what its impact will be for collective defence and deterrence.

When it comes to issues like climate change, human security or responding to pandemics or natural disasters, the Baltic States are not be enthusiastic about the expanding NATO's role in these issues. Yet they will not be the ones that would start blocking these initiatives.

Partnerships – focus on the closest and like-minded partners

As argued in the NATO 2030 Reflection paper, "NATO's partnerships are crucial instruments of cooperative security, knowledge and information sharing, collaboration, and capacity building"⁴⁰. NATO has a multilayer partnership, from its closest neighbours to the countries far overseas⁴¹. The changing security environment has had an impact on NATO's approach to partnerships as well. The

last two decades were marked by a deep focus on counter terrorism efforts, which was an important basis for NATO partnerships.

The priority partnerships for the Baltic States are Nordic partners Finland and Sweden, along with Eastern European countries, Ukraine and Georgia in particular. From the Baltic States perspective, those partnerships contribute to greater security and stability in the region, they have to be developed and strengthened.

An open door policy, especially with another attempt from the Kremlin to become a veto power in European security architecture, is of crucial importance and will be among the top priorities for the Baltic States in the new Strategic concept⁴².

The changing security environment is driven by US-China competition, whose importance will only grow in the next years or even decades. The US emphasizes that its global power is strongly enhanced by its partnerships across the globe, and this notion is being broadcast to NATO as well⁴³. Increasingly many Allies are voicing the need to build closer relationships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region to counter-balance Beijing's growing power there⁴⁴.

Lithuania is among them, as its incumbent government pursues a 'values-based' foreign policy, where building tangible relationships with democratic and like-minded countries is an important objective to 'diversify' relationships in the region and minimize any possible impact dependencies with China can bring. Such objectives are even enshrined in the newly adopted National Security Strategy⁴⁵.

The partnerships with democratic and like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific could

boost NATO's ability to understand the China threat better, enhance resilience against hostile Chinese influence in the Euro-Atlantic area, and strengthen political ties between democracies across the globe. However, like in any other issue, the calculus for the Baltic States will be: how much time and, especially, resources will this draw from deterrence and defence against Russia? In this vein, the Baltic States will resist any attempt to pursue a NATO military role in the Indo-Pacific⁴⁶.

NATO-EU partnership is the most natural but at the same time one of the most challenging elements. While recognizing its limiting factors, the Baltic States will still be strong proponents of deeper strategic cooperation, especially when it comes to resilience, responding to emerging security challenges and cooperative security. However, in defence matters NATO is the primary and most important security provider for the Euro-Atlantic area, so any EU attempt to expand its military capabilities should be based on non-duplication and complementarity, and openness to practical inclusion of the transatlantic allies.

NATO-Russia relations will also be debated. Although supportive of a dual-track approach towards Russia in principle, the Baltic States usually voice their scepticism towards practical-technical cooperation and moves towards *business as usual* between NATO and Russia, as the decision to suspend NRC cooperation was due to Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. The Baltic States highlight reciprocity as a fundamental principle in NATO-Russia relations. It is not the case for Russia, which mainly used the platform to voice criticism, blame NATO and request without any space for negotiations.

But the heating situation at the Ukrainian border caught the Baltic States in limbo. The Kremlin's 'proposals' to mitigate the situation might have implications to the entirety of Eastern Europe. The Kremlin's proposals might be viewed as divisive and driving wedges between Allies, therefore Allied unity is essential. The Baltic States are concerned that Russia is attempting to limit the sovereignty of Ukraine and create so-called "zones of privileged interests". Dialogue should not legitimize such Russian claims.

Conclusion

The renewal of the NATO Strategic Concept is significant for the Baltic States, they expect a realistic approach towards the strategic environment along with a greater focus on collective defence and deterrence, to include the preparedness of the Alliance to react urgently in case of crisis or conflict.

Indeed, the Alliance has a great opportunity to address the altered and deteriorating security environment in the new NATO Strategic Concept. It has to address the adaptation of the deterrence and defence posture along with Allied defence spending pledges, commitment to allocate at least 2 percent of national GDPs to military expenditures by 2024.

Reaching agreement on the new Strategic Concept is not the easiest task, NATO has to address a great number of complex and inter-related issues. These include, Russia, China, also a number of different topics that are finding their way to the agenda of the Alliance, namely, resilience, hybrid security, emerging disruptive technologies, outer-space and climate change. NATO has to reconsider the role of partnerships so as to include NATO-EU strategic cooperation.

The Baltic States will evaluate the elements of the document in the process using a 'red lens': is a particular item relevant to NATO's fundamental task – collective defence and deterrence – which for the Eastern European Allies first and foremost mean ensuring security from the threats emanating from Russia. Without any doubt their priority will be a consensus, which contributes as much as possible to the strengthening of NATO as a collective defence Alliance and finding the right balance between the broad list of new political issues looming before the NATO agenda.



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NATO and the Black Sea region: security challenges and solutions

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INTRODUCTION

Next year, NATO's nations are committed to redraft the Strategic Concept of the Alliance, which will replace outdated Concept of 2010². Undoubtedly, the future Concept will prioritise collective defence, emphasising it as an essential core task of NATO. Nevertheless, next to the main goal, the security situation within the Black Sea region, including the South Caucasus nations and Ukraine should be reflected in the forthcoming Concept, as the region is of great importance to both European nations and the Alliance in terms of economic growth and geopolitics as well as development of democracy. Geopolitically, the South Caucasus cannot be assessed separately without embracing the Black Sea region as the security of both is indivisible and

complement each other by providing opportunities for economic growth and development. The South Caucasus and Black Sea connect Europe with Asia and the Middle East. Maritime and land transport roads, fibre-optic communication cables, gas and oil pipelines pass through the region.

The Black Sea connects six nations. While three of them – Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey – are NATO members, two – Ukraine and Georgia – are NATO's closest partners and aspirant nations to join the Alliance, and Russia who, after the occupation of Georgian Abkhazia and annexation of the Ukrainian Crimea, illegally expanded its coastline. Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan belong to the broader Black Sea region, as these countries are dependent on the development of this region. Although only 421 km of coastline of the Black Sea legally belongs to Russia out of a total 4869 km³, the sea is considerably controlled by Russia. Having strongly militarised the fortress of Crimea, enhanced by the Southern Military District, the Black Sea is increasingly becoming an internal water of Russian Federation. The Russian military footprint is also enhanced by its militaries in occupied Georgian Tskhinvali region (also known as South Ossetia) and military troops in Armenia and in the Nagorno Karabakh region. Another feature of the Russian posture in the region is that it employs the Black Sea as the launchpad in projecting its military forces beyond the region: to the Mediterranean Sea, Syria and African countries.

How can NATO and the Allies counter the Russian threat in the region and improve the security there, especially in a time when Russia has deployed its forces along the border of Ukraine and escalates the security situation? Having “an elephant” in the region, to answer this question there is a need to understand the nature of this “elephant's” relationship with Western democracies and their policies towards Russia.

Defensive democracy and aggressive revisionism of Russia

Allies and Western democracies in general disregarded Russia after the latter brutally invaded Georgia and annexed part of its territory. Until the invasion of Ukraine the Western countries had carried out policy of appeasement towards Russia. Although the reaction towards Russia has become tougher when it intervened in Ukraine, captured Crimea and started the military conflict in Donbas, in general, they were trying to maintain dialogue and cooperation with Russia, at the same time imposing some sanctions on a number of Russian enterprises and individuals. There have been no major policy changes applied regarding Russia even after the use of chemical weapons on the UK's territory (the Novichok case in Salisbury), its secret services' attempt to poison the opposition leader Navalny and a number of other malign attacks in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, the Netherlands and elsewhere. Western countries have been applying a policy of something of a balance using the “stick and carrot” method, sanctions and leaving some room for a dialogue and cooperation. There are many areas of en-

gaging in cooperation with Russia: on climate change, trade and economics and especially in energy sector. The NATO Allies do not have a unified policy in relationship with Russia. When the United States applies tougher policy on Russia, some Europeans, mostly Germany and France tend to appease Russia, the Nord Stream 2 project can serve as an example of this. As an outcome of such policy, the Kremlin is given an expectation to get some awards in terms of regaining the status of a global power, at least within the perception of the Russian population.

When it comes to the relationship between the democratic world and Russia, the main feature is the difference of behaviour: the Western democracies have been still pursuing the principles set out in the Paris Charter of 1990⁴, supposedly adhering to the post-Cold War order defined by the Charter, which has long been forgotten by the Kremlin. Meanwhile, Russia applies Machiavellian geopolitics, which have been adopted by contemporary Kremlin's policy makers and policy technologists.

Such asymmetry has led to the turning point of a new global era of geopolitics, which commenced on 1st December 2021 when the Russian president demanded Western guarantees to not expand NATO's borders further to the East. Later, on 10 December, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation released an official statement demanding to recall the 2008 NATO Bucharest decision on the future membership of Georgia and Ukraine and adding a list of other demands (suggestion to divide into territories of influence)⁵. Currently, Russia is introducing a military build-up around Ukraine and threatening to launch a full-scale military invasion of this country or at least blackmailing to do so, if

NATO and Allies do not respond in favour of Moscow's demand. Ukraine has become a centre of gravity in Russia's efforts to expand its power. On a broader scale, Russia has launched a new Cold War with the West, but it is still not fully recognized there.

The options of confronting Russia

Facing the threatening Russian challenge, realizing that further continuation of the "stick and carrot" and in many cases passive defence policy towards Russia is hardly possible, the Allies have to build a strategy to confront Russian aggression against its Eastern neighbours, including the Black Sea region. It is high time to introduce containment of Russia and proactively fight for democracy.

Based on open source analysis we can conclude with certainty that from the Kremlin's perspective, control of the Black Sea is a top priority for Russia's national security. The current escalation against Ukraine is supplemented by actions, supporting both Kremlin's policy to force Ukraine to bow down and to gain a foothold in the Black Sea. As Anders Åslund aptly observed in his article, apart from its military muscles, Russia is very weak. Once military force is used, there would be no more trump cards⁶.

What options should the Allies have in place to confront Russia? Firstly, the NATO members Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey have to enhance their defence, while NATO and Allies have to support those nations firstly in building air defence and maritime capabilities. The option to rely on the reinforcements from other NATO countries' naval forces in the Black

Sea is difficult due to the restrictions imposed by the international convention of Montreux of 1936⁷. The movement of warships belonging to non-littoral nations across the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits is limited by the Convention⁸. Therefore, NATO should focus on strengthening its posture in the region based on the three littoral Allies' Naval capabilities, developing NATO air defence and other non-naval military capabilities and on the partnership with the two partner nations, Ukraine and Georgia, which since the 2008 Bucharest Summit, have been aspirants to join the Alliance.

Both Georgia and Ukraine are the closest partners of NATO and their aspirations to join NATO and the Europe Union are based on the will of their societies. A public opinion survey published by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) shows that support for NATO membership in Georgia is 74% of the population, and 82% of the country's society support the EU membership⁹. While 58% of Ukrainians support joining NATO and 62% – accession to the EU¹⁰. The aspirations of both countries to join the Alliance and the EU are enshrined in their constitutions. The will of these nations provides a strong legal and moral basis for admitting these countries to the Alliance and no less important is the fulfilment of the commitments made in Bucharest Summit in 2008. Then Allies agreed that Georgia and Ukraine will become a NATO members, but a consensus on the joining date is still absent. NATO has provided both countries with all necessary programmes and other tools preparing these countries and their armed forces to join the Alliance, although the granting of Membership Action Plans (MAP) to the aspirant countries has been excluded from the partnership agenda.

Admitting Georgia and Ukraine to NATO would be an effective response to Russia's growing threat. Their accession should be supplemented with robust military planning to enhance their defensibility and deterrence against Russia. There is another option to ensure a continuation of democratic development of both countries, that is "boots on the ground" of US and/or other Allies, empowered with bilateral military treaties. This option as a possible case for Georgia was elaborated in a study paper published by the Georgian Institute of Politics¹¹. Although the option of a bilateral Georgian-US treaty was rejected in the study paper as unrealistic¹². However, having a significant change in the security situation, the option of bilateral US treaties with Georgia and Ukraine could be considered again at least for a transitional period until the nations join the Alliance, as a provisional tool to ensure deterrence.

As elaborated above, Moscow has been sticking to a policy of aggressive revisionism. The Kremlin reiterated several times about its "red lines" – demands of "legal guarantees" to not accept Georgia and Ukraine into NATO. Moreover, Putin does not recognize Ukraine's right to its independence¹³. It would be naive to expect the situation will suddenly change and the issue of membership for both countries will be resolved. Especially in the context of the approaching date of elections of the Russian president in 2024. The Kremlin desperately needs to continue trying to prove the success of the current regime, and even more necessarily - to prevent, most likely at any cost, the democratic and economically successful development of Ukraine, as well as of other post-Soviet countries (Georgia, Moldova, Belarus). Having taken into consideration all of the above, Western democracies have no choice

but to accept the new reality, introducing a permanent tough stance against the aggressive Russian revisionism. The Allies should take a lead on that. The policy of balancing and conceding to Russia (as well as the absence of unity amongst the Allies) will further strengthen the Kremlin regime. Continuing the current course of action, Georgia and Ukraine will inevitably fall into Russia's sphere of influence, and their democracies will be lost. In the context of the ongoing tensions with Russia, spreading doubts within the West countries about an obscure chance for Ukraine to join the Alliance in the near future means contributing to the Kremlin's efforts. This situation undermines the confidence of the people in both countries in the institutions of the West and in democracy. If Russia achieves its goals in Ukraine, it would be very likely that later, we will have to restrain Russia at the borders of the Baltic States and Poland or Romania.

The most serious challenge is the admission of Georgia and Ukraine to the Alliance without provoking an immediate military reaction from Russia, but rather ensuring the security within the region. This can be possible, applying the complex of actions in advance or in conjunction.

Firstly, strong and clear initiative should come from both capitals, presented to NATO and the Allies as plans (or strategies) on the process to join the Alliance and agreed internally by major political parties. NATO membership should be a top priority within the countries. All positive political, diplomatic and societal forces in both countries should mobilize toward the achievement of this goal, applying their diplomatic efforts in the Allies' capitals, especially in Europe, seeking consensus and implementing reforms, strengthening resiliency

and defence for the sake of the peace and security of their countries. The possible ways and policies of how to overcome the issue of occupied territories should be addressed in the plans. This should not sound like an impossible task. Georgia's independent security experts have already begun discussing various options for resolving the dilemma with the occupied territories¹⁴. Georgia and Ukraine should cooperate bilaterally on the drafting of their accession plans.

Secondly, the Alliance and Allies should provide enormous support to Georgia and Ukraine in reforming their institutions, strengthening their defences and developing the resilience of their societies. The support should also include the economic, financial and judicial sectors. In parallel, the arrangements on strengthening the defensibility of the countries should be prepared and implemented, including the "boots" of Allies' troops. All this support should be clearly driven by the impetus of fighting for democracies.

Thirdly, Brussels and Washington, along with Ankara, should take over the initiative from Moscow in resolving the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. After all, the US and the EU have immeasurably more resources to devote to the countries' development than Moscow can offer.

Lastly, the Western countries should not try "to reinvent the wheel", the main policy elements and lessons learnt regarding the containment of the Soviet Union should be used and adapted in the containment geopolitical foreign policy to restrain the Kremlin regime. Furthermore, a clear message should be sent to Kremlin indicating the clear a clear

NATO “red line” in order to establish deterrence, which should be enhanced with a solid package of preventive measures (including tough sanctions and other means). Once again, it is necessary to point out that doing nothing is the worst solution. Moreover, as we know, Russia respects the strong.

Conclusion

As defined by the founders of the Alliance, NATO was established to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law”¹⁵, or otherwise to defend the values of Western democracies. The NATO Strategic Concept is a key document for the Alliance, which outlines the “fundamental security tasks, and the challenges and opportunities it faces in a changing security environment”¹⁶. The aggressive Russia has been changing the principles of the Charter of the United Nations *inter alia* to maintain the peace and security by militarily threatening the independence and democratic development of neighbouring states. The Allies should cope with this security challenge and focus on taking the initiative from Russia in order to defend democratic values in the Black Sea region. The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept should address the challenge by providing guidance on how to contain Russia’s revisionism. There is no other way to defend democracy than to move from a passive, reactive defensive position to a proactive one, taking initiative and exploring Russia’s weakness.

As the Kremlin regime is determined to deny the right of Ukraine and Georgia to choose their own security arrangements and even Ukraine’s independence, the ultimate goal of the Kremlin is to halt the development of democracy in these countries and in the Black Sea region, as well as to embed Russian power there. The releasing of Ukraine and Georgia from the captivity of the resurgent Russian Empire would pave the way for economic growth and development of democracy in the Black Sea region.



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Baltic Sea Region security: Nordics, Baltics, and NATO

Dorota Sokolovska

In the context of the growing Russian military presence and its increasingly aggressive posture in Eastern Europe and the eastern NATO flank, the Baltic Sea region is once again regaining its strategic importance for NATO, neutral states and Russia. The Russian Baltic fleet's activity in the Baltic sea just few miles away of the Swedish capital, reinforced anti-air and ballistic missile capabilities in Kaliningrad, provocative manoeuvres near allied warships and the already customary sights of violations of NATO airspace by the Russian air force have increased chatter in Stockholm and Helsinki about closer cooperation with NATO and the US. Not to mention Russia's play of coercive diplomacy vis-a-vis Ukraine and the US, using the deployment of a substantial number of its forces next to the Ukrainian border. Hence, "keeping a Baltic focus" must stay on the Alliance's agenda if we are to present a credible deterrent against Moscow and keep the status of regional security stable.

The security puzzle of the Baltic Sea region is characterised by the intersection of the two main Western alliances, NATO and the EU, as each country in the region is a member of either one or both. This complicates common coordination in defence and security – up to this date, there is no comprehensive coordinated response mechanism that could enable all countries on both shores of the Baltics to counter immediate security threats, most notably those coming from Russia. While the Nordic states take advantage of long-standing traditions of mutual partnership in areas that certainly extend beyond (non)-conventional military, the Nordics are still somewhat detached from the Baltic trio and NATO, as there are no robust binding cooperation mechanisms.

However, since the 2014 illegal occupation of Crimea and the Russian incursion into East Ukraine, Sweden and Finland have intensified their ties with NATO and the US. In 2014, Sweden and Finland were recognised by NATO as Enhanced Opportunities Partners. This framework allows for more flexible cooperation between Scandinavia and NATO. Both Sweden and Finland agreed with NATO to host joint training exercises on their soil and allow NATO member states' forces to be deployed on their territory. The annexation of Crimea also changed the outlook of Swedish society on potential NATO membership, as a record 37% of Swedes were in favour of NATO membership in 2014.

Nordic cooperation: long-lasting but reserved

When discussing security cooperation between the Nordic states one of the possible

points of departure could be policy proposals presented by Thorvald Stoltenberg to the extraordinary meeting of Nordic foreign ministers in Oslo on 9 February 2009. In his report¹, he endorsed the mutual declaration of solidarity by which each country committed itself to respond if any other Nordic country was subject to external attack, undue pressure or hybrid threats. T. Stoltenberg put forward the idea of strengthening the Nordic Five's partnership in: peacebuilding, air surveillance, maritime monitoring and arctic issues, societal security, foreign services, and military cooperation. What the document demonstrates is that the Nordic Five pursues security cooperation which cuts across institutional EU–NATO boundaries, as the format includes both non–EU (Iceland and Norway) and non-NATO (Finland and Sweden) members. A clear example of it is The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO), the purpose² of which consists of “strengthening the participants' national defence, exploring common synergies and facilitating efficient common solutions”.

Moreover, not only multinational – as in the case of NORDEFECO – but also bilateral cooperation successfully takes place. In the case of Finland and Sweden, A “Solidarity Declaration”³ was issued in both countries in 2009, declaring that their countries would not remain passive if another EU country or a Nordic neighbour (Norway and Iceland included), was a target of an outside attack or struck by disaster. This statement, although semantically similar to NATO Article 5, seems to indicate underlying similarity between the two countries, namely a particular kind of self-sufficiency and reluctance to join NATO, popularly coined as “non-alignment” and “neutrality”. Nonetheless, the weight of the NORDEFECO

“Solidarity Declaration” is still far from NATO Article 5, as Nordic deterrence does not equal the whole NATO alliance, including the U.S.

However, despite the joint statement, Swedish and Finnish security doctrines arise from strikingly different historical backgrounds, noticed in an Atlantic Council report⁴. Swedish nonalignment is of political nature since it derives itself from the activist Swedish foreign policy pursued during the Cold War. From the Swedish point of view, the two hegemons were seen as morally and politically indistinguishable, despite the radically different ideological systems they represented. Thus Sweden saw itself as a “moral superpower” standing between the U.S. and Soviet Union, actively engaging in overseas affairs and supporting radical, often strongly anti-American, regimes, for instance, Cuba, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, or Vietnam. However, once the Berlin Wall had fallen, what was revealed to the public was that in the second part of the XXth century, Sweden supported several bilateral agreements with NATO countries to assure their assistance in the case of Soviet aggression. Eventually, having supported “double doctrines” rather than neutral policy, Sweden began to be called an “unofficial member”, though this labelling has not resulted in factual membership yet.

Finland, on the contrary, grounds its non-alignment stance primarily in geopolitics. Both historical reminiscences of two wars fought with Russia and a physical 1,300-kilometre-long border with an antagonistic neighbour comprise the essence of Finnish neutrality. This ‘realpolitik’ logic fuelled by fear to be absorbed was best concluded in a statement of then-Finnish defence minister Jyri Häkämies who said⁵ that there are three strategic prob-

lems on which to focus for Finland: “Russia, Russia, and Russia”. Although Russia occupies an important part of both Finnish and Swedish foreign agendas, only for the former is it of primary or even existential importance; moreover, it is essential to understand that the Nordic foreign policy agenda covers topics such as the High North, maritime issues, cyber security and Iceland’s air space. Ergo, for some analysts Russia seems⁶ more like an “elephant” in the Nordic security “room.”

Whatever the differences in security frameworks, both Finland and Sweden have taken advantage of the window of opportunity opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union – in 1995 the two countries joined the EU and, more importantly, reinforced their ties with NATO. They were the first to enrol in the Partnership for Peace program in 1994 and since then have participated in almost every NATO mission as non-aligned partners. At the [2014 Wales Summit](#)⁷, the Allies identified five countries as Enhanced Opportunities Partners, Sweden and Finland, among others. Since then they have obtained a special status to discuss the further deepening of dialogue and practical cooperation with NATO. More generally, the Wales Summit marked a new shift in the Alliance’s strategic orientation – in 2014, NATO started to develop an absolutely new Baltic Sea focus, as well as an agreed upon Readiness Action Plan (RAP) which implies large-scale reinforcement and reorganisation of defence capabilities. Fortunately for the Baltics, collective defence has thus been underlined as NATO’s core task.

Both Nordic countries have also hosted a number of NATO exercises, including air and sea exercises in Finland and Loyal Arrow exercises on the ground in Sweden. On top of

that, these countries show a strong commitment to the European Union Common Security and Defense Policy by providing assistance to EU missions, with Sweden having dispatched land forces in Africa as a part of EU missions in Congo and Chad as well as participating in EU antipiracy operation near the coast of Somalia.

Moreover, security cooperation extends not only to other continents but first and foremost to the Baltic Sea region. In regards to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the tandem of Sweden and Finland have become an important facilitator of peace and stability in the region in the post-Soviet era. Then-prime minister of Sweden Carl Bildt personally participated in the negotiations to withdraw Russian troops from the Baltic states while Finland supported Estonia in securing its political and military transition (Sweden took both Estonia and Latvia under its wings; to a large extent, this was made possible through U.S. aid).

As noted by Dr Ann-Sofie Dahl, “in the new millennium, Sweden has gradually taken on the role of a regional defence organizer”. Sweden is a Framework Nation of the Nordic Battle Group under the EU flag while Finland participates in the Nordic plus the German-Dutch battle groups. However, while these two non-NATO states are rather active actors on the European-level defence stage, their primary focus is on NORDEFECO, which is still reserved for cooperation between Nordic countries with only limited space reserved for their counterparts across the sea.

Nordic-Baltic cooperation and its lacks

Notably, Nordefco has recently enhanced its ties with the Baltic States – in 2020, the joint

meeting⁸ of the NORDEFECO Military Coordination Committee and its partners took place; moreover, as the Chairman of NORDEFECO in 2021, Finland has set the aim to continue enhancing the NORDEFECO cooperation and dialogue with the Baltic States. On a governmental level, Nordic ministers, regularly meeting among themselves, have begun to invite their Baltic counterparts to join the summits. Despite this, Nordic-Baltic cooperation remains at quite a low level and could be described as sporadic as long as there is no comprehensive Nordic-Baltic cooperation framework encompassing all countries in the region - both non- and NATO members.

The need for such a framework is twofold⁹: geographic and geopolitical. First, assurance of Baltic States security guaranteed by NATO geographically depends on cooperation with nonmembers: with its best will the Alliance would face challenges defending the Baltics without the use of Swedish and Finnish airspace and airfields. Remarkably, if a crisis occurs, NATO could not automatically use Swedish and Finnish facilities without their consent. Although the scenario where the Nordics refuse to provide it is hardly imaginable at this time, this exact dependency is indicative of a rather complex security network in the region that requires additional attention, both from decision-makers and analysts.

Second, regional geography poses an additional challenge as most of the countries share long borders with Russia. The problem is not only the length but also specifics of the borderline zone – for instance, the Norwegian border is often difficult to access and nearby territories are sparsely populated; what is more, the Swedish island of Gotland finds itself in an exposed position. In the case of the Baltics, Estonia’s shortest distance from the

Russian border to the coast is only 176 km, virtually as much as the distance from Narva to Tallinn.

Both of these two contextual layers – geographic and geopolitical – are tightly connected with a neighbouring actor perceived as a threat by most of the Baltic and Nordic countries – Russia. For Finland, as it was already stated, Russia comprises a historical and strategic opponent; nevertheless, the two countries foster quite significant economic relations, referring to the fact that Russia has once more become Finland's most important trading partner. In this light, in 2009, the Fins introduced the "Russia Action Plan"¹⁰, which provides guidelines for the management of Finnish relations with Russia in areas like governmental representation, industry and business, and even the academic community.

Likewise, Norway also favours a dual-track approach based on deterrence and dialogue with Russia, which, as it is stated, should help to improve the regional security situation. In terms of Norwegian-Russian relations, 2010 brought a breakthrough in the dispute over their sea border – the signed agreement put an end to nearly four decades of extensive on-and-off negotiations and defined a single maritime boundary in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean; it has also obliged both parties to continue their cooperation in the sphere of fisheries. Although the agreement has lowered bilateral tensions, it was brought up in the context of Russia making territorial claims in the High North.

Russia, common neighbour and a threat

What is imperative to be taken into consideration when examining Nordic-Baltic security

is Russia¹¹, since it shares borders with several countries in the region: Finland, Estonia, and Latvia, along with Lithuania and Poland through the Kaliningrad exclave which deserves additional attention due to the military units concentrated there. Moreover, as it is reported, Russia has placed Iskander missiles in the Leningrad region, leaving the three Baltic capitals and Finland within strike range. Add to it the contested airspace capabilities – especially in light of Russia's anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the region – and such a potential threat next to NATO's borders leaves no doubt on who the main opponent neighbouring the region is. In order to ensure Baltic Sea security, this should be tackled properly, encompassing defence cooperation not only between the Nordic states but also on a Nordic-Baltic level.

The Russian-Ukrainian War, as well as the annexation of Crimea brought about a serious overhaul of defence policies, which resulted in a significant increase in military spending and an acceleration of modernization plans in all three Baltic States. Fortunately, they have strengthened their commitment to NATO through deepening bilateral agreements with their allies, mostly with the U.S. After 2014, Sweden and Finland have similarly voiced concerns about the security of the region, however, it has not brought significant changes in their security and defence policy, as Justyna Gotkowska and Piotr Szymański note.

Luckily, NATO and the US have reacted more firmly: led by Barack Obama, the Americans have strengthened their military presence in the Baltic Sea region as a part of the European Reassurance Initiative (later known as European Deterrence Initiative EDI). Next, it was decided to change the nature of the military engagement of the United States and NATO

from reassurance to deterrence as both the US and NATO recognized that Russia represented a serious and long-term challenge, and thus it needed a tougher response. Moreover, in 2015 NATO member Norway led the two-week exercises named “Arctic Challenge,” which involved more than 4,000 personnel and over 100 aircraft. Non-NATO allies Finland and Sweden (together with Switzerland) joined alongside Germany, Britain, France, the Netherlands and the US. This year, American special forces trained on Gotland under a letter of intent that Sweden and the United States signed in 2016. Since then, the countries’ military personnel have practised together several times.

But, despite all of the regional actors having recognized Russia as a potential aggressor, Nordic and Baltic countries hardly share a common approach to security. Common awareness does not equal common actions. On the one hand, Sweden has bolstered its “total defence” concept, which pays as much attention to civil and psychological defence as it does for conventional military defence. Norway, in turn follows a dual-track approach based on both deterrence and dialogue in order to ensure regional security. Here, the notorious term “Finlandization” fits perfectly, used to describe the skilful manoeuvring of Finnish officials to uphold its non-alignment policy even under dangerous political and military pressure.

On the other hand, the Baltics and Poland advocate for a more military-oriented response in the NATO framework and remain sceptical about dialogue with Moscow. However, there is no common platform that could enable Sweden, Finland as well as NATO members of the Baltic sea basin to coordinate not only their forces but also their outlook on Russia

and therefore unify their response. Having in mind NATO’s geographical dependence on two non-allied Nordic countries, this leaves a gap in the Nordic-Baltic security cooperation picture - it is not without reason that it is often called “fragmented”¹².

Baltics in the Nordic security puzzle

Even though Baltic cooperation is at its strongest in the defense and security fields with all three countries pursuing common interests both in NATO and the EU, former Soviet states remain in many respects more interconnected with Russia than their Nordic counterparts, including energy networks and exposure to Russian media and propaganda. With the Zapad 2021¹³ military exercises having taken place just next to the Lithuanian border, and thus NATO’s border, the “threat from the East” has definitely turned from a mythical entity into a real one.

The Kaliningrad factor is no less important to understand than the regional security landscape. Militarily, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are to large extent isolated from other NATO members: to the north, there are non-NATO countries like Finland and Sweden; to the south and east there is Russia and Belarus; to the west, Lithuania is bordered by the Kaliningrad exclave and, a little further south, the Suwałki corridor. Seeking to maintain or even enlarge the Baltic Air Defence Mission Alliance’s cooperation with non-NATO states is inevitable and thus essential.

Endnotes

New NATO Strategic Concept: Baltic States Perspective |

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NATO and the Black Sea region: security challenges and solutions | Col. (Ret.) Gintaras Bagdonas

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Baltic Sea Region security: Nordics, Baltics, and NATO |

Dorota Sokolovska

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