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Post-2022 EU Assistance to Eastern Neighbours:

Old Practices, New Trends and the
Implications of Russian Military
Aggression against Ukraine

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Summary

The financial assistance provided by the EU to its neighbours is of great importance to both the payer and the beneficiary. The EU wants to stabilise its proximity and foster progress there, while its neighbours need financial support to overcome obstacles in the process of change. Therefore, the issue of EU assistance is of high importance and should be investigated further. This policy paper stems from the demand described above for a broader understanding of EU financial assistance directed to countries belonging to the European Neighbourhood Policy, with a closer look at the Eastern Partnership (EaP) region. The analysis includes financial flows from the EU to its neighbours in the period 2007-2027. In retrospect, the policy document shows data on financial assistance provided to ENP countries through the previous ENPI and ENI financial tools. However, the main focus is on the assistance pledged by the EU to the ENP region through the “Post-2020 EaP Priorities” and, more generally, the NDICI financial toolbox in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021-2027. The policy document also reveals less conventional financial tools that the EU uses to trigger and support policy and policy transformation in the region such as macro-financial assistance (MFA). In the face of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the focus of the paper is also on taking stock of how the EU reacted to support Ukraine through old and new European financial toolboxes. In conclusion, the policy document tables a set of recommendations for EU institutions and Member States aimed at making EU assistance more proportional in terms of geographical distribution (South, East and intra-regional) and the type of assistance allocated (loans, grants, blending, etc.). The differentiation criterion linked to EU membership perspective criteria, which indicate the potential for flexibility of pre-accession funds, is also explored. Finally, EU decision-makers are reminded of the importance of investing in transparency and inclusiveness in the process of establishing the conditionality mechanism towards third countries.

Introduction

The EU attaches strategic importance to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) because of its importance in ensuring stability and the transformation of states on the eastern external borders. On the one hand, due to recurring political fluctuations within the region and the geopolitical revisionism of Russia vis a vis Ukraine (annexation of Crimea and the militarisation of separatism in Donbas and Luhansk in 2014-2022, followed by full-blown war in 2022), Georgia, Moldova and Belarus, the EaP moved up on the EU foreign policy list of priorities. On the other hand, the most efficient way to engage substantially with and within the region is through the implementation of sectoral reforms at the central and local levels. This requires reforms of good governance, approximation of laws and policies, and upgrading the functionality of state institutions. To this end, the EU uses its budgetary resources and procedures to finance *transformation operations* in the EaP countries and across the entire region alike.

The geopolitical ambition to promote liberal values and a greater focus on building resilience against internal and external adversities in the eastern proximity *volens nolens* increases the capital intensity of the EU's neighbourhood policy. This is reflected in the way Brussels mobilises money¹ to support surrounding regions while showing a growing geopolitical predisposition to invest in its visibility and relevance in the closest and most *Europeanisable* region – the EaP.² This policy paper looks at the form, size and other particularities of financial assistance that the EU spent in the past and desires to spend in next years for the region's development and stabilisation, including through the next multiannual budget (2021-2027). It also examines the financial patterns, when the EU applies the principle of differentiation towards the southern and eastern groups of countries of the European Neighbourhood and within the Eastern Partnership alone. In light of the Russian military aggression against Ukraine, launched in February 2022, the policy paper takes stock of some temporary and structural changes in the EU's financial allocation logics towards Russia and Belarus, on the one hand, and Ukraine (mainly), Moldova and Georgia, on the other hand.


The structure of this policy paper consists of four parts. *Firstly*, the major differences between the EU's old and new budget planning are outlined schematically, reflecting the expenditures to carry out in the European Neighbourhood Policy. *The second part* outlines the particularities of the financial commitments that the EU put on the table for the Eastern Partnership region in terms of post-2020 projects. *In the third part*, the focus is only the eastern neighbours most dedicated to European integration (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), to which the EU has made financial commitments over the course of 2021 (including in early 2022). *The fourth part* identifies and describes the changes that the EU adopted in reaction to the Russian military aggression against Ukraine (2022), which includes the cancellation, redirection or increase of allocations linked to three EaP countries and to Russia itself. *Finally*, the policy paper ends with some conclusions and key recommendations aimed at improving the EU strategy on financial assistance provided to its eastern neighbours, bearing in mind the imperative to address current geopolitical volatilities and future climate challenges.

01 **The new EU multiannual budget and its novelty for the neighbourhood**

EU budgeting for external assistance is continually evolving, given internal, regional and international rationalities and urgencies. Among the most recent revisions concerning the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is the 2018 decision of the EU to change the multiannual budget line from “Global Europe” to “Neighbourhood and the world”. This change is accompanied by simplification of the financing instruments that will make up the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), a new financial tool established in 2018. The EU justified the need for this reassembly with the aim of “increasing the coherence, transparency, flexibility and efficiency”³ of the EU’s external activity. Therefore, NDICI merges most of the old instruments and represents the main financing instrument for EU co-operation with partner countries, including ENP countries.


In 2020, EU decision-makers reduced the initially planned budget for the “Neighbourhood and the world” line from €118.2 billion, proposed in 2018⁴, to €98.4 billion, as established by the EU in July 2020⁵. These new changes led to an increase in the financial distribution for “Global Europe”, which represented €58.7 billion during the multi-year budget 2014-2020 to a budget of €98.4 billion to be spent in 2021-2027 as part of the new dimension of “Neighbourhood and the World” (see *Figures 1 and 2*).

The annual financial distribution in 2021-2027 will represent amounts ranging between €12.5 billion and €15.5 billion. This is higher than the money allocated for “Global Europe” on an annual basis in 2014-2020 (see *Figures 3 and 4*). However, the increase is due more to the reorganisation and restructuring of existing instruments than to a massive injection of new money earmarked for the EU’s external actions.



Figures 1 and 2: EU Multiannual Financial Framework represented in total commitments (left) for 2021-2027 and 2014-2020⁶ respectively (right), € million (calculated in 2018 and 2011 prices respectively)⁷

Source: Author’s compilation of the EU’s Multiannual Financial Frameworks for 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 based on data available at <https://ec.europa.eu/>



Figures 3 and 4. Representation of the EU’s long-term budget for the Neighbourhood and the World in 2021-2027 (left) and Global Europe in 2014-2020 (right), € million (calculated in 2018 and 2021 prices respectively)

Source: Author’s compilation of the EU’s Multiannual Financial Frameworks for 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 based on data available at <https://europa.eu/>

In line with the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027,⁸ the NDCI absorbed the financial resources previously operated by the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) in 2007-2014 (€15.4 billion). The NDCI will serve to finance the EU’s external actions. Its budget constitutes €70.8 billion (€79.4 billion in 2020 prices⁹) or approximately 72% of

the total amount under the heading “Neighbourhood and the World” (€98.4 billion). The “Pre-accession assistance” (€12.5 billion) and “European Peace Facility”¹⁰ are the other two channels for EU funding towards third countries, included under the heading “Neighbourhood and the World”. The NDCI budget structure is fourfold:

- *First*, it comprises the amounts earmarked for geographic programmes, with at least €17.2 billion (€19.3 billion at 2020 prices¹¹) for ENP countries (17 countries and territories¹²). That is about €5 billion more than what the EU has earmarked for the four Western Balkan countries (Albania, Serbia, Montenegro and the North Macedonia), which are part of the pre-accession dialogue. However, if divided by country, the budget of the ENP countries seems insignificant at approximately €1 billion per country. This is three times less than that of the four Western Balkan countries (€3.1 billion per country). It is worth noting that in the past, the EU used money from the “pre-accession” funds for the ENP countries – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – as described in the following sections (see *Annexes: Table 10*).
- *Second*, NDICI contains €5.6 billion for thematic programmes, such as human rights, democracy, civil society organisations, etc.
- *Third*, €2.8 billion is budgeted from NDICI for rapid response actions.
- *The fourth* and last part of the NDICI, with €8.4 billion in its portfolio, aims to solve unforeseen situations (crisis and post-crisis management, migratory pressure). Disbursement of assistance for EU external action will be subject to the conditionality mechanism, which implies both respect for international law and commitments to sectoral reforms.

Intra- and interregional unbalanced EU assistance

Although the EU has put almost €70 billion on the table to develop cooperation with its neighbours, financial support has not been linear within the ENP (South and East dimen-

sions) and the EaP examined separately. This is due to geographic proximity and geopolitical logic. Between 2007 and 2020, the EU financial help distributed to its eastern and southern neighbours was similar when assessed by region: south and east, respectively. In 13 years, the 10 southern ENP countries received around €17.3 billion (or €1.7 billion per country), while the eastern neighbours benefited from €7.7 billion (or €1.1 billion per country). The first impression seems to indicate that the EU has been practically as generous with the South as with the East.¹³ However, a more nuanced analysis paints a more complex picture, showing that financial support has been largely unbalanced, both within and between the two neighbouring regions.

To begin with, after looking comparatively at the two neighbourhoods, various imbalances can be seen if EU assistance is estimated taking into account the size of the population.¹⁴ For example, the EU provided Israel¹⁵ (8.6 million inhabitants) with €7.6 billion in 2007-2020 compared to Ukraine (43.2 million inhabitants) that received €2.3 billion. Even without counting assistance per capita, Israel, which is not a direct neighbour, has benefited from almost 4 times more financial allocations than Ukraine, which borders the EU. The fact that Israel had access to more funding could be due to a longer tradition of cooperation with the EU, renewed based on the 2000 Association Agreement. In political terms, however, the EU’s relationship with Ukraine has become much more dynamic, especially after the first Russian aggression in 2014 (annexation of Crimea, separatist regions in Donbas), than with Israel, with which no Association Council was held in 2012-2019.¹⁶ It is worth mentioning that financial support to Ukraine does not entail macro-financial assistance (MFA), which constituted around




Figure 5: Representation of EU assistance for the collective southern neighbours according to amounts consumed/paid, € million, 2007-2020

Source: Author’s compilation based on examination of the data available in the EU Financial Transparency System, https://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm

€5 billion in loans, transferred in 2014-2020 (see Table 4, p. 12). In the wake of the second Russian military aggression in 2022, support for Ukraine will more than multiply, narrowing the gap with EU assistance to Israel or even surpassing it in many respects.

Another interregional discrepancy can be exemplified using the case of Georgia (3.9 million inhabitants) which received €1.2 billion (excluding MFA) in 13 years or almost twice as much EU money per citizen as Tunisia (11.7 million inhabitants), to which the EU allocated €2.2 billion (see Annexes: Table 8, p. 18).

At the same time, there are significant differences between countries within the same region. In the Southern Neighbourhood, the main and most obvious difference is between Israel and the remaining nine countries (see

Figure 5). On the eastern flank, the situation is more nuanced. For example, variations in EU assistance between Russia and Ukraine stand out, albeit at different points on the time axis.

Figure 6 shows that the main recipient of EU financial support has been Ukraine since 2014, which coincides with both the implementation of the Association Agreement and Russian aggression. Simultaneously, the EU slashed disbursements to Russia since the year it began to apply sanctions related to Ukraine (for the occupation of Crimea¹⁷ and after the downing of the MH17 plane¹⁸).

In 2014-2020, Georgia, which is 34 times smaller in population terms, received more assistance from the EU than Russia, which became a major loser of EU assistance in




Figure 6: Representation of EU assistance for the eastern neighbours according to amounts consumed/paid, € million, 2007-2020¹⁹

Source: Author's compilation based on examination of the data available in the EU Financial Transparency System, https://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm

the recent past. Moldova²⁰ and Belarus witnessed shaky EU assistance due to internal setbacks. After the fall of the oligarchic regime in Moldova, the country re-established a vibrant dialogue with EU institutions that reflected the positive impact of EU assistance.

The most dramatic drop in assistance has been to Belarus, against which the EU has applied five rounds of sanctions since the 2020 presidential elections called "neither free nor fair."²¹ EU assistance has a tendency to fluctuate even more in the eastern part of the ENP than in the south, mainly due to geopolitical interconnectedness with the region and Russia's growing opposition to deepening European integration.

The differences between the amounts of assistance transferred to neighbours in the south and the east show once again that there are no technical criteria to guide the logic of EU financing towards its neighbours. Consequently, financial support is adapted to each country and has a strong causality with the quality of the EU's bilateral relations with the recipient country at any given time. In addition, assistance is geopolitically contextualised. In other words, the allocation of EU funds is driven by strong political subjectivity and rather weak technical criteria on the basis of which allocations are distributed among neighbouring regions.

The new post-2020 agenda for the EaP – money for all six

02

Stabilisation and resilience building became driving motivations for the EU in the EaP region from 2015-2016, reflecting the objectives of the Global Strategy (2016),²² the revised ENP (2015) and the conclusions of the Summit of Riga Eastern Partnership (2015).²³ Towards this end, the EU designed the first iterations of the “2020 deliverables”,²⁴ published in 2016, which led to more practical, dynamic and close cooperation between the EU and the six EaP countries.

The first “deliverables” proposed 20 overarching priorities to be implemented in 2016-2020. Actions initially revolved around priorities and were less country-oriented. Subsequently, the EU gradually began to emphasise the benefits that each of the six EaP countries was receiving through individual projects and programmes.²⁵ However, the approximate budget for “Deliverables 2020” has never been published in its entirety. This is mainly due to the fact that the idea of “deliverables” came about after the approval of the 2014-2020 EU Multiannual Financial Framework. Nonetheless, to financially cover the “deliverables”, the EU used the ENI’s financial envelope.²⁶

The second and latest iteration of “deliverables” was developed before the sixth EaP summit in Brussels (December 15, 2021) – “Post-2020 EaP priorities”.²⁷ This time the approach was more specific in terms of financial distribution per field of action and per country.²⁸ The EU pledged to support actions leading to “recovery, resilience and reform” in the eastern neighbourhood. In this sense, the “post-2020 deliverables” document stipulates five objectives and 10 priority targets²⁹ until 2025 (see *Table 1*).

Table 1. The objectives and priority targets envisaged per country under the “post-2020 EaP Priorities”

Source: Author’s compilation based on the “Post-2020 EaP priorities” document.

5 objectives	10 Priority Targets
1. Resilient economy (together for resilient, sustainable and integrated economies); 2. Resilient institutions (together for accountable institutions, the rule of law and security); 3. Resilient environment (together towards environmental and climate resilience); 4. Resilient digital space (together for a resilient digital transformation); 5. Resilient society (together for resilient, fair and inclusive societies).	1. Competitive and innovative economies; 2. Rule of law; 3. Security and cyber resilience; 4. Sustainable and smart connectivity; 5. People and knowledge society; 6. Diverse societies and strategic communication; 7. Health resilience; 8. Sustainable energy; 9. Digital transformation; 10. Environment and climate.

To support post-pandemic economic recovery, intra-regional interconnectivity and digital and climate transition in the region, the EU offers less than €20 billion: €2.3 billion in grants and investments for an economic and investment plan and up to €17 billion in public and private investments.^{30,31} The two main sources of funding will be the European financial institutions (the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and the NDICI (for the blending and grant components). Figure 3 shows that the two areas/actions that will consume the most EU investment are “transport connectivity” (€4.5 billion) and “sustainable energy” (€3.4 billion). On the opposite side are “competitiveness” (€500 million), “health resilience” (€600 million) and “climate resilience” (€750 million).

The same amount of around €20 billion will be divided for the needs of six EaP countries into five groups of flagship initiatives/actions. As Table 3 illustrates, the four investment directions are identical for all six countries: 1) support for the innovative economy; 2) environment; 3) connectivity; and 4) digital transition. However, some of the actions characterise the particular local needs of the country: improving trade with the EU (Moldova, Belarus); economic transition in rural areas (Ukraine); economic recovery (Georgia); accountable democracy (Belarus). This principle, customised for each country, indicates that both the EU and host countries pay attention to the relevance of investment, clearly integrating the problem-oriented approach.

Table 2. The EU's investment plans per sector under the "Post-2020 EaP Priorities, €, 2021-2025

Source: Author's compilation based on the "Post-2020 EaP priorities" document.

Area of investment	Amount
1. Transport connectivity	€4.5 billion
2. Support for SMEs	€1.5 billion (local currency) €1.4 billion (by issuing green bonds)
3. Strengthen competitiveness and integration in the EU value chain	€500 million
4. Digital transition	€1.5 billion
5. Sustainable energy	€3.4 billion
6. Climate resilience	€750 million
7. Health resilience	€600 million
8. Knowledge societies	€1.3 billion



Due to increased political commitment and interest in further European integration, a large part of the announced financial support naturally goes to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. They will need increasing assistance from the EU as they have made known their strategic objectives to advance integration with each other and with the EU within the framework of the "Associated Trio".³² The second Russian military aggression has accelerated this process, as evidenced by the synchronisation of Ukraine and Moldova into the European electricity grid in 2022,³³ in the past scheduled for 2025. Next in line to ask the EU for more help is Armenia, which started implementing CEPA in March 2021. Azerbaijan appears to be one

of the most self-sufficient countries in the region, making assistance from the EU less stringent. Belarus' participation in EU-funded initiatives is complicated by the serious deterioration of bilateral political dialogue and the EU's decision not to recognise the legitimacy of the Minsk political regime. In the case of Belarus, EU funds are cancelled for projects carried out with the authorities associated with the Alexandr Lukashenko regime both due to the democratic regression of 2020 and more recently for facilitating the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. To a large extent, these trends are also reflected in the amounts the EU programmed for investments under the "post-2020 deliverables" (see Figure 7).

Table 3. The Flagships/Actions envisaged per country under the “Post-2020 EaP Priorities”³⁴

Source: Author’s compilation based on examination of the “post-2020 EaP Priorities”.

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Belarus	Georgia	Moldova	Ukraine
Flagship 1	Supporting a sustainable, innovative and competitive economy	Green connectivity	Supporting an innovative and competitive economy	Black Sea connectivity	Supporting a sustainable, innovative, green and competitive economy	Supporting a sustainable, innovative, green and competitive economy
Flagship 2	Boosting connectivity and socio-economic development	Digital connectivity	Improving transport connectivity and facilitating EU-Belarus trade	Transport connectivity across the Black Sea	Boosting EU-Moldova trade	Economic transition for rural areas
Flagship 3	Investing in the digital transformation, innovation, science and technology	Supporting a sustainable, innovative, green and competitive economy	Boosting innovation and the digital transformation	Sustainable economic recovery	Increasing energy efficiency	Improving connectivity by upgrading border crossing points
Flagship 4	Building resilience in the southern regions	Innovative rural development	Supporting a green Belarus	Digital connectivity for citizens	Improving connectivity	Boosting the digital transition
Flagship 5	Investing in a green Yerevan	Smarter and greener cities	Investing in a democratic, transparent and accountable Belarus	Improved air quality	Investing in human capital and preventing ‘brain drain’	Increasing energy efficiency support for renewable hydrogen



Figures 7 and 8: Representation of EU assistance for the six Eastern Partnership countries by flagship/initiative in € (left) and by form of assistance in % (right) in the post-2020 period.

Source: Author’s compilation based on examination of the “post-2020 EaP Priorities”.

Notably, only investments for Ukraine and Moldova include net grants (see *Annexes: Table 7*). Before Russia launched the military assault on Ukraine, the “Post-2020 EaP Priorities” envisaged grants worth €100 million to Ukraine for economic transition in rural areas and another €25 million to Moldova to address the “brain drain phenomenon”. In addition, grants to Ukraine also included €100 million for the development of renewable hydrogen production capacity, which also includes a national contribution. Figure 8 indicates that although Georgia is geopolitically close to the EU like Moldova and Ukraine, it was not supposed to benefit from grants at all. The democratic setback Georgia experienced in 2021

could be one of the reasons the grant component is missing in pure form.³⁵ Interestingly, although the Georgian authorities renounced EU loans in 2021 to avoid rule of law conditionality before local elections, they accepted the idea of contracting new EU loans for the next few years. For understandable reasons, the EU will be compelled to revise the “Post-2020 Eastern Partnership Priorities” in order to more fairly distribute existing funds. Russian military aggression is the main factor, but not the only one. Another could stem from the eventual positive decision of the EU regarding the applications for membership that Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia submitted in February-March 2022.

Financial demand for the “Association Trio” - an imminent increase?

03

As the aforementioned findings indicate, EU financial support to the EaP region is not at all linear. The augmentation or decrease in assistance is driven primarily by local dynamics and the broader geopolitical context. The most significant contribution to growing EU interest in the eastern neighbourhood is due to the Association Agreements/DCFTAs signed with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in 2014. The EU assumed obligations that imply growing financial assistance to support the implementation of these ambitious deals with three of its eastern neighbours. Other financial commitments stem from compliance with visa liberalisation agreements³⁶ and other initiatives, such as the observation and advisory missions in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to address concerns around separatist territories.³⁷ The establishment of the “Association Trio” format by Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, which produces further differentiation within the EaP, as well as the application to join the EU, naturally leads to claims for new financial support from the EU. However, the most urgent costs are caused by the enormity of the war destruction inflicted by Russia on Ukraine. In the first month of the war, they were estimated at approximately \$63 billion.³⁸ In addition, the war itself produced other unexpected costs that Ukraine and Moldova faced with respect to the management of internally displaced persons and refugees, respectively.

Past geopolitical disputes between the EU and Russia have increased the costs of the EU’s rapprochement with the neighbourhood both directly and indirectly. Russia’s restrictive measures against Eastern Partnership countries with pronounced European aspirations prompted additional assistance needs from Brussels. More precisely, the EU allocated financial assistance in the form of grants and loans to mitigate the effects of the war (Georgia, Ukraine), trade restrictions (Moldova, Ukraine) and gas disputes with Russia (Moldova, Ukraine) during 2008-2021.

Traditionally, the EU operates two categories of financial assistance towards partner countries from its neighbourhoods. One is based on *programme-based or conventional tool-based financing*, which is specific and generally predictable in terms of disbursements. From a legal point of view, funding decisions are made in three very strict frameworks through (1) annual and multiannual action programmes; (2) individual measures; and (3) special measures for unforeseen situations and “duly justified circumstances”.³⁹ The programme-based funding or conventional tools were integrated into NDICI’s financial envelope under the MFF for 2021-2027. *The macro-financial assistance (MFA) represents the second category*, which is a rather unconventional tool influenced by political volatility and not coherently embedded in existing easy-to-trace EU budget mechanisms. If national governments do not meet or refuse to meet sectoral conditions, the country cannot access EU loans. The MFAs are sporadic and depend on the timing of the request and the credibility of third-country governments, their cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the quality of implementation of political and sectoral conditions.



Programme-based assistance

From 2007 to 2020, the EU operated with two major financial instruments dedicated to the ENP countries and, in particular, to the EaP region and the three associated countries: ENPI (2007-2014) and ENI (2014-2021). However, a long list of programmes played a complementary role. The EU has used up to 14 programmes in relation to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine from 2007-2020 (see *Annexes: Tables*

9 and 10). The largest number of programmes applied to Ukraine (2018: 14 programmes). However, the three partner countries participated in an average of four to seven similar programmes. Although these countries do not have a European perspective recognised by the EU, they have benefited from “pre-accession” funds (Ukraine: 2014-15; Georgia – 2016, 2019; and Moldova - 2019). This evidence ensures that, at any given time and under certain circumstances, the EU can make financial resources available from its “pre-accession” pocket⁴⁰ for the needs of the partner countries not yet considered for membership.

The dynamics of assistance provided annually to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine varied from 2007-2018. Several interesting aspects of the Annual Action Programmes (AAP)⁴¹ stand out (see *Figure 9*). First, Georgia is the only country that has received EU funding on a consistent basis from 2007 to 2018. Second, EU assistance to Moldova collapsed two times, in 2017 and 2020, (see *Figure 10*), mainly due to the phenomenon of “state capture”⁴² and the pro-Russian government in 2020.⁴³ Third, the missing AAP for Ukraine in 2017 is explained by the continuation of funding based on the 2016 Special Measures⁴⁴ and the adoption of a new SSF for 2018-2020. The case of Ukraine indicates that the EU is capable of adapting its financing logic according to the individual circumstances of the receiving country.

It should be noted that the Annual Action Programmes were financed under the ENPI and ENI instruments. The ENI established in 2014⁴⁵ made financial resources available to the EU for the Annual Action Programmes (AAPs) established for the EU’s neighbours (both non-associated and associated countries), within the framework of the Single



Figures 9 and 10: The dynamic of EU assistance for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, as foreseen in the Annual Action Programmes (left) and as Committed Consumed/Paid Assistance (right), € million, 2007-2020⁴⁶

Source: Author's compilation based on examination of the data available in the EU Financial Transparency System (https://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm) and the EU Annual Action Plans for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, elaborated between 2007 and 2018 (<https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement>).

Multiannual Support Frameworks (SSF). The preparation of the multiannual budget⁴⁷ takes into account: 1) the previous performance, level of ambitions and political dialogue of the recipient country with the EU; and 2) goals of the bilateral agendas between the EU and the neighbouring country (envisaged in the Action Plans or Association Agendas) and the national strategies of these countries. As a rule, the funding of specific actions under the AAPs takes place under the “direct management” of the EU (through the coordination of EU Delegations on the ground) or under “indirect management” (via entrusted international organisations, etc.).⁴⁸ These types of annual and multiannual planning of EU financial allocations to EaP countries (and the ENP region as a whole) have proven to be reliable and rigid-free so far and will continue to be used in the NDICI financial instrument.

Macro-financial assistance – a financial way to promote painful reforms

The EU has been actively using macro-financial assistance (MFA) to influence reforms in associated neighbours – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.⁴⁹ The combination of loan and grant components made the EU’s MFAs very attractive to third countries, represented equally by “candidate and potential candidate countries, countries bordering the EU covered by the ENP”.⁵⁰ Due to frequent use, the MFA has become consolidated and standardised as an intrinsic part of the EU toolbox to promote the goals of European integration at political-legal and economic levels in the three associated countries (see *Table 4*). At face value, Ukraine received the largest financial support from the MFA: around €4 billion be-

tween 2014 and 2020. In terms of MFA distribution per capita, Ukraine is also in the lead (approximately 43 million inhabitants, more than €90 per capita), followed by Moldova (approximately 2.6 million inhabitants, more than €60 per capita) and Georgia (approximately 3.7 million inhabitants, more than €40 per capita). Although Ukraine received the largest MFA, it consisted solely of loans and without grants, unlike Georgia and Moldova.

It is true that the impact of the EU MFA has increased significantly after it developed its own conditionality mechanism of conditionality that financially rewards the recipient country for the implementation of reforms. Conditionality was declared an underlying principle of the EU’s post-2020 financial assistance to its eastern neighbours⁵¹ without linking it specifically to programme-based budget support or MFAs. In reality, only financing arrangements under the MFA explicitly mention conditionality.

Rather than requesting only the implementation of reforms included in the country-related programmes with the IMF, the EU has begun to adopt independent positions on the quality of reforms in third countries. The EU provides its MFA assistance only after all political and policy conditions are met. The degree of compliance is evaluated before the new tranche of the agreed MFA is disbursed. The Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) that the EU signed with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in 2009-2021 included conditions targeting policy areas with the most urgent reforms needed. In the latest version of the MoUs, the recommendations on internal reforms integrated ideas collected from civil society actors (through informal meetings), complementing requests to national governments designed independently by the EU in Brus-

Table 4. The EU’s MFAs offered in the form of grants, loans or combined to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, 2009-2020

Source: Author’s compilation based on the European Commission’s reports on MFA. The MFA for Moldova in 2019-20 and Ukraine in 2015-17 were incomplete because of the expiration of the financing programmes: Moldova received only €60 million out of €100 million and Ukraine €1.2 billion out of €1.8 billion. Moreover, only half of the 2020 MFAs dedicated to post-pandemic economic recovery were disbursed by May 2021. To make the table readable the countries are abbreviated as follows: Georgia – GE, Moldova – MD, and Ukraine – UA.

	Grants	Grants and loans	Loans
MFA I	GE: €46 million (2009-10) MD: €90 million (2010-12)	-	UA: €610 million (2014-15)
MFA II	-	GE: €46 million (2015-17) MD: €60 million (2019-20)	UA: €1 billion (2014)
MFA III	-	GE: €45 million (2018-20)	UA: €1.2 billion (2015-17)
MFA IV	-	-	UA: €1 billion (2018-20)
MFA Pandemic	-	-	GE: €150 million ⁵² (2020-21) MD: €100 million (2020-21) UA: €1.2 billion (2020-21)

sels. Traditionally, the greater the dependency of the third country on foreign assistance, the greater the impact of EU MFAs. Furthermore, the rule of law and not sectoral reforms represent the ultimate criteria.⁵³ This can be seen in Moldova in 2015 and 2018 when the EU suspended the MFA following the 2014 bank fraud scandal and the cancellation of elections in the country’s capital.⁵⁴

Although some partner country governments have tried to circumvent conditionality, deviations carry two significant political costs. On the one hand, non-compliance with the conditions has reputational consequences with a strong echo abroad and, on the other, the erosion of external credibility leaves a deep mark on domestic legitimacy that affects the prospects of remaining in office. Consequently,

governments in favour of reform and European integration, when they come to power, can “entrap” their countries into short- and medium-term reform-drive international commitments by signing new MFAs with the EU. This makes it difficult for less reform-oriented successors to back out of foreign agreements.

To increase the efficiency of the MFAs (which also include grants) offered by the EU to its eastern neighbours, a regular or periodic evaluation by the European Court of Auditors could contribute beneficially to transparent use of the MFAs. To the same end, the investigative mandate of the EPPO (EPPO)⁵⁵ could be extended on all funds, including the MFAs, provided to third countries (grants).

The utility of MFAs goes beyond the obvious effects of the financial support provided by

the EU that implies political incentives for policy changes in the European neighbourhood. Although the MFAs specify that the EU takes into account the real needs of countries in terms of economic and structural reforms, as well as political preconditions, the EU should introduce, on a mandatory basis, consultations with civil society organisations, trade unions and political opposition forces. Taken to the next level of transparency and inclusiveness in setting conditions, MFAs can expand the potential for policy and political transformation in recipient countries of the ENP region. Due to the conditionality mechanism, MFAs have the advantage of reinforcing conventional EU financial assistance tools (through programmes) to achieve faster changes on the ground, which must also be durable, locally owned and financially viable over the long term.

However, MFAs and similar assistance offered by the EU to its neighbours should be implemented differently in times of emergency similar to Russia's military aggression against Ukraine. It is clear that EU financial support, including MFAs, should be available during normal times with full conditionality attached and become condition-free or adopt "soft conditionality" for periods of emergency.

EU funding for eastern neighbours and the implications of the Russian war against Ukraine

In the face of critical developments in the eastern neighbourhood, the EU has moved away from the initial parameters of projected financial assistance for the region. The rapid adaptation of the EU to these new cir-

cumstances indicates a certain degree of resilience in dealing with the cascading regional crises caused by the Russian military aggression against Ukraine. The rather conservative thinking of EU financial assistance underwent several changes that may have long-term consequences for programmes and projects carried out in the eastern neighbourhood, which were eligible for EU financial assistance before the Russian aggression.

First, the EU has prepared a new financial aid package for Ukrainians affected by the war in 2022, worth about €90 million. After the first Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the aid allocated by the EU amounted to €193 million⁵⁶ in 7 years. Brussels has pledged to allocate almost half of this to Ukraine and Moldova in 2022 alone. Moldova's support was requested to manage accommodation and care for Ukrainian refugees, who received shelter during the active phase of the war. For this purpose, the EU agreed to support Moldova with €15 million⁵⁷ to manage the refugee crisis triggered by the large population of Ukrainian refugees hosted by Moldova (up to 110,000 people who stayed until relocation or permanently of the 330,000 who entered the country).

Second, to secure the resources to start Ukraine's reconstruction immediately after the war, the EU has announced the creation of the Ukraine Solidarity Fund, which will be a platform to attract both European and international financial support. The reconstruction costs could exceed €100 billion. Such funds could be used to combine reconstruction with the country's future EU accession process, as under pressure from Russian aggression, the EU is likely to offer Ukraine candidate status in 2022-23. The decision was taken during the European Council at the

end of March 2022.⁵⁸ On the same occasion, the EU established the Food and Agriculture Resilience Mission (FARM), which will also be used to support the food security and agriculture of Ukraine as part of the effort to restore food supply chains interrupted by war. Before the war broke out, the EU had already placed €1.2 billion of emergency MFA online for Ukraine to stabilise the financial situation,⁵⁹ half of which was received without conditions⁶⁰ during the first month of the Russian military aggression.

Third, the EU has opened a new line of financing for the Ukrainian army, a historic decision that allows EU money to be allocated for the purchase of military equipment for defence projects against the Russian invasion. To this end, the EU has revised the scope of the European Peace Fund and doubled the initial funding for Ukraine to €1 billion.⁶¹ In December 2021, the EU prepared assistance packages to build the capacity of the Georgian Defence Forces (€12.7 million), military medical services and the Moldovan Engineering Battalion (€7 million) and mechanisms for managing the Ukraine crisis (€31 million).⁶² After the war, funds from the European Peace Fund for Ukraine increased 33-fold.

Finally, the EU suspended financial support for cooperation programmes with Russia and Belarus. More precisely, the EU stopped sending money to the two countries in nine cross-border programmes⁶³ and the transnational Interreg Baltic Sea programme⁶⁴ for the period 2021-2027. In the past, Russia ac-

cessed €178 million during the MFF for 2014-2020 through these programmes.⁶⁵ The benefits for Belarus reached €257 million. At the same time, the EU has decided to increase the border cooperation between Ukraine and neighbouring EU states, which could require funds previously used for Russia and Belarus. Another of the cuts inflicted on Russia's funding in the field of research was made within the framework of Horizon, where the European Commission has prohibited the signing of new contracts.⁶⁶ The EU has once again shown that it is capable of mobilising resources and political will in times of crisis. The Russian aggression against Ukraine opened up many avenues of EU aid not only for Ukraine, which is facing destruction on a historic scale at the hands of Russian military attacks, but also for small countries like Moldova, which is facing the spiralling consequences of war (the refugee influx). In addition to finding new resources in long-term budgeted funds until 2027, the EU has also shown determination to stop funding Russia and Belarus, freeing up funds that can be used to further help Ukraine. In general, the EU financial assistance ecosystem allows for innovative and exceptional decisions when the right political will exists among the EU institutions and Member States alike. Ukraine's resistance of Russian aggression has shaken the EU's moral compass, forcing it to show a willingness to grant financial assistance to a non-EU country struggling to gain EU candidate status, along with its smaller peers from the EaP region, Georgia and Moldova.

Conclusion and recommendations

The current policy paper comparatively analysed the contexts in which the EU offers financial support to its neighbours. The paper revealed at least seven important aspects related to the money that the EU has directed to its neighbours.

First, the new MFF for 2021-2027 contains more financial resources for ENP countries. However, this thicker financial cushion is due to the merging of numerous financial tools, not the injection of significantly more money. NDICI is the new “financial tool” that will serve to finance the EU’s external actions, including in the ENP region.

Second, the EU provides financial assistance to its southern and eastern neighbours based on the country principle. Thus, there are countries that collect the most financial support in both the South (Israel) and the East (Ukraine). The EU generally does not consider population size when providing assistance to its neighbours, making assistance appear disproportionate, especially when comparing the southern and eastern regions of the ENP.

Third, the Eastern Partnership “post-2020 deliverables” are better structured and contain country-related investments. This is an improvement over the first iteration of deliverables for the Eastern Partnership countries issued in 2016. However, unlike Moldova and Ukraine, the rest of the Eastern Partnership countries are not expected to benefit from grants in pure form. Furthermore, the EU pri-

oritises investments to increase transport connectivity over health and climate resilience.

Fourth, although the EU establishes Annual Action Programmes for each of the recipient countries, it can also use additional funds, including those from “pre-accession” pockets, as it did with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Thus, more money can be offered for those countries that perform well in the field of reforms.

Fifth, EU macro-financial assistance has the hidden role of trapping recipient countries in a reform agenda. Despite electoral cycles, national governments are reluctant to withdraw from reforms that were included as conditions for EU funds for fear of high political costs. However, more transparency is needed to improve the efficiency of EU MFAs both during the establishment of sectoral conditions, by consulting civil society organisations, trade unions and the political opposition, and throughout all assistance disbursement cycles.

Sixth, geopolitical instability in the eastern neighbourhood forced the EU to relax conditionality. This only encourages the idea of developing two types of approaches towards the conditionality mechanism. In normal times, hard conditionality should be applied, unlike in emergency periods, when it is advisable to use “soft conditionality”, which implies a wide margin of flexibility in political conditions

(rule of law) and low intensity in the demand for sectoral reforms. “Soft conditionality” may also be relevant for non-geopolitical exogenous shocks, such as climate change, natural disasters, food security, migration, pandemics, etc. that are likely in the future.

Finally, during times of emergency, the EU showed resolve in finding new financial solutions to offer immediate support and commitment to raising funds for Ukraine’s post-war reconstruction that can also be used to materialise its prospects for EU membership.

To update and increase the efficiency of the assistance toolbox, this policy document suggests the following recommendations to the EU:

- **“More for better results” instead of “more for more”.** Financial assistance for the EaP countries must follow the logic of quality in the implementation of reforms, not only their quantity or technical criteria (legal approximation, etc.).
- **A more balanced approach between “pre-accession” countries and the ENP.** The EU should find sustainable ways to balance disproportionate financial assistance to countries eligible for generous ‘pre-accession’ funds and those belonging to the ENP. As used for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, the “pre-accession” budget line should have sufficient flexibility to provide access to and support ENP countries that demonstrate sustained reform progress and strong absorptive capacity.
- **Apply uniform conditionality for all EU assistance.** According to the EU MFF 2021-2027, the EU should apply strict conditionality to the financial support it offers to both its southern and eastern neighbours. This means extending the application of the conditionality mechanism to different types of assistance, not just macro-financial assistance as seen in the case of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
- **Increase investments for health and climate resilience after 2025.** The EU should review its approach towards strategic investments in the six EaP countries to increase financial support for public health security and climate resilience, which in the “Post-2020 EaP priorities” are the least funded.
- **Introduction of a resilience system analysis component in EU budget planning for the EaP region.** Consideration should be given to the future review of the NDICI to expand funding in critical areas using a forecast/anticipation approach through the integration of Resilience System Analysis (OECD⁶⁷) and risk assessment tools.
- **Identify more financial possibilities for the grant component in general EU investments in the EaP region.** As the above findings show, only Moldova and Ukraine are eligible for grants in pure form under the “post-2020 deliverables”. This aspect should be reviewed so that the EU directs more grants to other countries in the region (in particular Georgia and Armenia) for projects and initiatives that target dimensions related to resilience, such as rural development or the fight against migration. Ideally, it is recommended to earmark at least between 5% and 10% of the total amount of the investment adapted separately for each country for grants.
- **Improve EU spending reporting mechanisms for the EaP region.** On the one hand, the EU must ensure that it reports systematically and fully (quantitatively and qualitatively) on financial assistance administered directly (direct management through EU

Delegations⁶⁸) or through entrusted/mandated institutions (indirect management). This type of data is completely missing and cannot be evaluated for academic or policy-making purposes. On the other hand, the EU has to report in a unified way on promised financial support for the “post-2020 deliverables”, which should avoid fragmented and incomplete information on EU support for the “2020 deliverables”.

- **Strengthen transparency concerning MFA efficiency.** It is recommended to engage the European Court of Auditors to assess the effectiveness of EU macro-financial assistance provided to third countries in order to reveal the real impact of EU assistance during and after the disbursement of MFAs. Only with independent evaluations of this kind can the EU’s accountability be increased, ensuring greater sustainability and efficiency of EU assistance. Furthermore, the mandate of the EPPO should be extended to include the possibility of investigating infringements related to the funds that the EU transfers to ENP countries through the NDICI financial envelope (under heading 6 “Neighbourhood and Global Europe” of the MFF 2021-2027) or via specific MFAs.
- **Upgrade the conditionality mechanism to deal with emergencies.** In light of Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and other destructive policies in the region, the EU should consider the permanent development of two conditionality regimes. Normal times will imply “hard conditionality”, with a strict evaluation of political and sectoral conditions, while during periods of emergency, conditionality must be waived

and support provided to EU neighbours much faster and not based on ex-ante compliance between tranches.

- **Prepare financial solutions to increase funds for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.** Already during the Russian aggression, the EU has managed to mobilise resources to support Ukraine (and to a much lesser extent Moldova). The reconstruction of Ukraine after the war will require a substantial contribution from the EU, which could link the Ukraine Solidarity Fund with Ukraine’s future accession process. In the same context, the EU must ensure that Moldova and Georgia can access the pre-accession funds available for the Western Balkans, taking into account the application for EU membership of these two associated countries that applied after Ukraine.

Review the emergency funding mechanism for the entire neighbourhood. The traumatic experience of Russian aggression against Ukraine and the way the EU handled it in terms of financial assistance should be used as a model to renew toolboxes for financial support to neighbourhoods during geopolitical emergencies or other exogenous sources of adversities (climate change, natural disasters, food crises, etc.).

Annexes:

Table 5. EU Multiannual Financial Framework represented in total commitments, € million, 2021-2027

	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	Total 2021–27
1. Single Market, Innovation and Digital	19,712	19,666	19,133	18,633	18,518	18,646	18,473	132,781
2. Cohesion, Resilience and Values	49,741	51,101	52,194	53,954	55,182	56,787	58,809	377,768
3. Natural Resources and Environment	55,242	52,214	51,489	50,617	49,719	48,932	48,161	356,374
4. Migration and Border Management	2,324	2,811	3,164	3,282	3,672	3,682	3,736	22,671
5. Security and Defence	1,700	1,725	1,737	1,754	1,928	2,078	2,263	13,185
6. Neighbourhood and the World	15,309	15,522	14,789	14,056	13,323	12,592	12,828	98,419
7. European Public Administration	10,021	10,215	10,342	10,454	10,554	10,673	10,843	73,102
Total Commitment Appropriations	154,049	153,254	152,848	152,750	152,896	153,390	155,113	1,074,300

Source: Author's compilation of the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-27 based on data available at <https://ec.europa.eu/>

Table 6. EU Multiannual Financial Framework represented in total commitments, € million, 2014-2020

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	Total 2014–20
1. Smart and inclusive growth	60,283	61,725	62,771	64,238	65,528	67,214	69,004	450,763
2. Sustainable growth: natural resources	55,883	55,060	54,261	53,448	52,466	51,503	50,558	373,179
3. Security and citizenship	2,053	2,075	2,154	2,232	2,312	2,391	2,469	15,686
4. Global Europe	7,854	8,083	8,281	8,375	8,553	8,764	8,794	58,704
5. Administration	8,218	8,385	8,589	8,807	9,007	9,206	9,417	61,629
6. Compensations	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	27
Total Commitment Appropriations	134,318	135,328	136,056	137,100	137,866	139,078	140,242	959,988

Source: Author's compilation of the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-20202

Table 7. EU financial assistance committed (loans, grants, blending) for “post-2020 EaP priorities”, €

	Flagship 1	Flagship 2	Flagship 3	Flagship 4	Flagship 5
Armenia					
Type of action	Supporting a sustainable, innovative and competitive economy	Boosting connectivity and socio-economic development	Investing in the digital transformation, innovation, science and technology	Building resilience in the southern regions	Investing in a green Yerevan
EU financial contribution	500,000,000	600,000,000	300,000,000	80,000,000	120,000,000
Type of financing	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>

	Flagship 1	Flagship 2	Flagship 3	Flagship 4	Flagship 5
Azerbaijan					
Type of action	Green connectivity	Digital connectivity	Supporting a sustainable, innovative, green and competitive economy	Innovative rural development	Smarter and greener cities
EU financial contribution	10,000,000	10,000,000	50,000,000	50,000,000	20,000,000
Type of financing	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>
Belarus					
Type of action	Supporting an innovative and competitive economy	Improving transport connectivity and facilitating EU-Belarus trade	Boosting innovation and the digital transformation	Supporting a green Belarus	Investing in a democratic, transparent and accountable Belarus
EU financial contribution	350,000,000	200,000,000	20,000,000	200,000,000	100,000,000
Type of financing	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>
Georgia					
Type of action	Black Sea connectivity	Transport connectivity across the Black Sea	Sustainable economic recovery	Digital connectivity for citizens	Improved air quality
EU financial contribution	25,000,000	100,000,000	600,000,000	350,000,000	100,000,000
Type of financing	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>

	Flagship 1	Flagship 2	Flagship 3	Flagship 4	Flagship 5
Moldova					
Type of action	Supporting a sustainable, innovative, green and competitive economy	Boosting EU-Moldova trade	Increasing energy efficiency	Improving connectivity	Investing in human capital and preventing 'brain drain'
EU financial contribution	500,000,000	30,000,000	300,000,000	780,000,000	25,000,000
Type of financing	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants and loans</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants</i>
Ukraine					
Type of action	Supporting a sustainable, innovative, green and competitive economy	Economic transition for rural areas	Improving connectivity by upgrading border crossing points	Boosting the digital transition	Increasing energy efficiency support for renewable hydrogen
EU financial contribution	1,500,000,000	100,000,000	30,000,000	200,000,000	100,000,000
Type of financing	<i>Grants, loans, guarantees, blending</i>	<i>Grants</i>	<i>Grants and loans</i>	<i>Grants and loans</i>	<i>Grants and national contribution</i>

Source: Author's compilation based on examination of the data of the "post-2020 EaP priorities" available at eeas.europa.eu

Table 8. EU assistance for the eastern and southern neighbours according to amounts consumed/paid, €, 2007-2020

		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Eastern Neighbours															
Russia		29,130,559	18,032,839	232,307,820	201,862,629	368,899,667	98,609,511	234,858,069	32,468,251	79,812,104	76,216,453	68,630,879	63,612,560	66,066,035	62,184,752
Ukraine		9,776,896	81,957,238	96,614,583	157,756,071	260,555,846	60,546,626	77,431,761	359,254,362	159,263,657	156,874,113	229,715,413	182,176,334	320,159,020	244,357,004
Moldova		60,518,198	23,430,976	81,864,801	137,934,262	48,172,245	16,551,529	74,832,257	97,867,788	129,985,838	145,939,061	66,494,196	34,106,637	151,379,780	29,596,868
Georgia		8,189,712	35,226,028	142,084,437	59,532,944	76,219,942	41,223,553	65,174,876	70,103,208	161,533,149	145,693,896	79,051,717	86,664,565	162,886,073	118,003,908
Belarus		1,866,852	2,357,211	4,766,299	18,740,209	23,377,434	12,189,959	12,703,289	18,535,798	62,155,384	191,508,466	10,906,275	9,977,446	115,132,439	12,765,507
Azerbaijan		408,920	1,868,493	4,239,110	27,234,810	9,625,501	2,682,774	29,339,439	7,428,776	5,002,123	13,955,933	5,016,644	13,988,665	2,533,277	6,321,650
Armenia		7,411,509	17,239,413	20,731,194	55,348,580	21,970,874	31,432,769	25,486,249	40,724,598	79,726,378	128,513,000	36,786,505	31,058,220	149,864,630	52,317,299

		Southern Neighbours													
		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Palestinian Authorities		Morocco	Libya	Lebanon	Jordan	Israel	Egypt	Algeria							
24,783,173		56,406,402	0	13,445,206	3,860,474	103,277,614	2,534,014	265,620							
188,352,149		217,038,971	0	22,992,304	42,126,025	168,437,179	87,128,944	265,735							
169,628,653		287,051,513	0	8,465,119	27,139,965	418,610,365	115,479,575	5,135,963							
252,002,235		259,232,936	298,019	26,536,161	119,279,671	538,373,285	97,308,546	19,309,372							
197,173,726		115,201,161	0	22,642,448	82,370,829	650,696,639	59,685,891	28,273,277							
156,148,360		89,702,771	495,769	10,664,890	42,716,296	494,310,308	59,284,280	4,959,119							
17,091,948		195,234,957	10,443,506	16,792,271	68,994,992	587,583,016	52,456,069	17,023,893							
204,212,021		177,518,908	1,740,827	24,675,826	127,443,253	357,095,272	28,307,893	4,357,167							
195,402,197		254,353,700	2,761,628	24,991,079	299,489,587	668,347,114	25,833,334	7,011,619							
206,062,999		214,710,607	6,172,162	33,636,125	174,782,431	827,106,195	44,945,711	25,609,761							
210,103,573		149,355,512	371,568	32,327,373	64,675,092	631,199,972	64,222,618	25,781,709							
170,345,540		110,811,778	282,867	30,077,645	44,071,903	794,513,518	31,018,493	8,705,041							
175,392,105		106,288,165	6,407,825	27,403,473	25,909,219	706,068,094	36,037,530	8,776,311							
157,607,862		263,074,247	13,001,094	22,935,741	174,628,241	710,452,275	20,133,889	8,432,707							

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Tunisia	668,142,080	33,549,443	76,813,536	61,124,481	312,327,802	70,240,916	98,909,117	66,522,776	113,303,733	137,805,846	191,176,982	191,932,738	54,159,509	173,621,690
Syria	665,134	786,387	5,443,424	12,057,110	0	7,203,469	10,881,772	195,711	7,505,447	14,498,675	7,333,449	997,598	931,878	0

Source: Author's compilation based on examination of the data available on the EU Financial Transparency System (https://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm)

Table 9. Most frequent types of EU financial assistance programmes/frameworks in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, 2007-2020

2007–2013	2014–2020
1. European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)	1. European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)
2. Common fisheries policy and in the area of the law of the sea (Fisheries)	2. Competitiveness of enterprises and small and medium-sized enterprises (COSME)
3. Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIFP)	3. Creative Europe
4. Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)	4. Education, Training and Sport (Erasmus+)
5. Energy	5. Energy
6. Enterprise	6. Environment and climate action (LIFE)
7. European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)	7. EU Aid Volunteers initiative (EUAV)
8. Framework Programme for nuclear research and training activities (FpNRTA)	8. Euratom Research and Training Programme (EuroatomRTP)
9. Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (IfNSC)	9. European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF)
10. Instrument for Stability (IfS)	10. Food and Feed (FF)
11. Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA)	11. Health
12. Public Health	12. Horizon 2020
13. Research	13. Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)
14. Research: Framework programme n°6 (completion) (F6)	14. Instrument of Pre-Accession
15. Research: Framework programme n°7 (F7)	15. Internal Security Fund (ISF)
16. Youth in Action (YiA)	16. Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM)

Source: Author's compilation based on examination of the data available on the EU Financial Transparency System, https://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm

Table 10. Types of EU programmes and tools used for financing in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, 2007-2019

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Similar financial tools	1: ENPI	1: ENPI	4: ENPI F7	4: ENPI F7 DCI EIDHR	4: ENPI F7 EIDHR DCI	4: ENPI F7 DCI EIDHR	3: ENPI F7 EIDHR	5: ENPI "Horizon 2020" Erasmus+ DCI EIDHR	4: ENPI "Horizon 2020" Erasmus+ DCI	5: ENPI "Horizon 2020" Erasmus+ DCI EIDHR	5: ENPI "Horizon 2020" Erasmus+ DCI EIDHR	7: ENPI "Horizon 2020" Erasmus+ DCI EIDHR UCPM "Creative Europe"	5: ENPI "Horizon 2020" Erasmus+ DCI EIDHR
Distinct financial tools/programmes by country													
Georgia	1: EIDHR	3: DCI EIDHR IfS	2: MFA IfS	0	1: CIFP	0	1: DCI	2: MFA IcSP	3: MFA EIDHR IcSP	3: EUAV "Creative Europe" "Instrument of Pre-Ac-cession"	2: UCPM "Creative Europe"	2: MFA EUAV	6: LIFE "Creative Europe" EUAV EMFF UCPM "Instrument of Pre-Ac-cession"

Moldova	2: MFA DCI	1: EIDHR	0	1: MFA	0	0	3: Re-search Public Health	1: COSME	3: ISF Health COSME	3: Health COSME "Creative Europe"	3: MFA Health COSME	2: Health COSME	3: Health COSME "Instrument of Pre-Ac- cession"
Ukraine	3: IfNSC EIDHR F7	3: IfNSC EIDHR F7	4: IfNSC Enter- prise Re- search FpNRTA	4: IfNSC Enter- prise Re- search FpNRTA	3: IfNSC FpNRTA Fisheries	4: FpNRTA IfNSC F6 YIA	3: FpNRTA IfNSC Energy	3: Euroatom- RTP EUAV "Instru- ment of Pre-Ac- cession"	2: EIDHR "Instru- ment of Pre-Ac- cession"	2: Euroatom- RTP Energy	6: Euroatom- RTP LIFE EUAV "Creative Europe" COSME FF	7: EuroatomRTP EUAV DCI COSME EMFF EIDHR FF	8: Euroatom- RTP "Creative Europe" EUAV COSME LIFE UCPM EMFF FF

Source: Author's compilation based on examination of the data available on the EU Financial Transparency System, https://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm

Table 11. EU Annual Action Plans and annual contracted assistance for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, € million, 2007-2019

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Ukraine (Annual Action Programme)	142,000,000	138,600,000	116,000,000	126,000,000	135,000,000	138,000,000	186,000,000	242,000,000	160,000,000	200,000,000	0	147,000,000
Ukraine (Annual contracted assistance)	10,200,329	96,775,409	96,289,738	188,008,577	302,619,227	63,413,233	82,766,501	450,992,825	178,488,340	164,636,257	280,175,751	200,341,564
Georgia (Annual Action Programme)	24,000,000	28,800,000	27,400,000	37,200,000	50,730,000	60,000,000	70,000,000	101,000,000	100,000,000	109,500,000	96,500,000	79,140,000
Georgia (Annual contracted assistance)	8,917,395	37,056,588	142,722,393	63,424,269	79,358,351	42,229,518	68,560,252	72,765,560	179,182,626	153,985,468	87,314,241	144,821,360
Moldova (Annual Action Programme)	40,000,000	62,300,000	52,000,000	66,000,000	78,600,000	94,000,000	100,000,000	131,000,000	90,000,000	89,000,000	33,000,000	50,750,000
Moldova (Annual contracted assistance)	60,619,826	23,987,371	82,888,417	138,376,471	52,593,917	17,152,880	108,715,638	139,702,691	140,925,262	152,959,423	92,777,268	40,760,779

Source: Author's compilation based on examination of the data available on the EU Financial Transparency System (https://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm) and EU Annual Action Plans for Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, elaborated between 2007 and 2018 (<https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement>).

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- ¹² Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are not part of the pre-accession dialogue, although they will most likely participate in it sooner rather than later.
- ¹³ The calculations are made based on the data of EU assistance provided to the ENP countries in 2007-2020 (see the Annexes, Table 8).

- ¹⁴ The population (millions) of the countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy is as follows: Eastern neighbours: Armenia (2.9); Azerbaijan (10.2); Belarus (9.3); Georgia (3.9); Moldova (2.6); Ukraine (43.4); Russia (145.9); Southern neighbours: Algeria (44.6); Egypt (104.9); Israel (8.7); Jordan (10.3); Lebanon (6.7); Libya (6.9); Morocco (32.3); Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (5.2); Syria (17.5); Tunisia (11.7).
- ¹⁵ The abundance of EU financial assistance to Israel probably stems from advanced relations with the EU, anchored in the 2000 Association Agreement (Euro-Mediterranean Agreement). As in the case of Georgia, Moldova, Tunisia and Ukraine, the Israel-EU Association Agreement constitutes one of the most advanced bilateral agreements signed by the EU with third countries.
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- ¹⁹ The Annexes show more details on the specific amounts of EU assistance paid/consumed for all 17 ENP countries and territories.
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