

EMIGRATION AND THE GOALS OF LITHUANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

Egidijus Aleksandravičius

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this article is to convey a few messages. First of all, it aims to present a short overview of the historical role of Lithuanian emigrants in the period of the re-establishment of Lithuania as an independent state in the international arena. The principal issue which so far has been insufficiently addressed by both historians and political scientists, and which should be the constant focus of Lithuanian foreign policy-makers, is the current situation of Lithuanian diaspora in Western countries, the emigrants' position in respect to their homeland and their eventual behaviour in the performance of the diplomacy mission at the community level. Taking into account the traditional examples identified by historians of the political behaviour of Lithuanians world-wide, and by analysing political trends in the USA, Great Britain and other countries – the destinations of Lithuanian immigrants - it is possible to paint a clearer picture of the expectations resulting from the relationship between diaspora and the interests of Lithuania's foreign policy.

PAST EXPERIENCES

Migration has become a characteristic feature of modern history. There are researchers tackling the problems of social history and comparative civilisations who consider the 20th century the century of emigrations and exile¹. Although emigration has been predetermined by a complex of economic, social and political factors, the effects of emigration and the formation of different national diasporas in major Western states have always been key factors impacting international relations and diplomacy processes.

In the 19th – 20th century, the processes of emigration, the resurrection of nations and the birth of national states in Central and Eastern Europe were closely interconnected and impacted one another. The French bourgeoisie revolution, the Napoleonic war campaign, uprisings in Poland and Lithuania, the Hungarian revolution, the Balkan wars, the establishment of Bulgarian and Romanian states – all these events were linked to the movement of political emigrants.

In the middle of the 19th century, the Big Emigration Wave from Poland and Lithuania, where anti-Russian uprisings were suppressed, moved to France. Throughout nearly the entire 19th century, Polish and Lithuanian immigrants were actively involved in French foreign policy, and vice versa in the fights for freedom in Poland and Lithuania emigrants provided decisive support and contributed to self-awareness in the international setting, acting as an important political tool in negotiations with eventual partners.

From the beginning of the 20th century, the number of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe in the USA began to rise dramatically. During the First World War, diaspora participants put a lot of effort into the welfare of their nations' resurrection to a new political life. It can be maintained that at that time, movements of Lithuanians in the U.S. as well as the active involvement of their leaders were among the key factors leading towards Lithuania's liberation. Although the U.S. was slow in recognising independent Lithuania of the 16th of February, the diplomatic support of Lithuanian nationals in immigration was of great importance.

These developments from the past have a rather vast historical record. Studies by Alfred Erich Senn, Eberhard Demm, Alfonsas Eidintas, Raimundas Lopata and others have outlined key links between the birth of the modern Lithuanian State and the actions of emigrants. The scope and the tasks of this article do not allow a detailed study into the whole complex of historical records, therefore, it would be good to mention just a few of the most recent works which provide a

¹ V.Kavolis. *A Vague Man and Historical Ambiguity*. Metmenys, 1966, No.12, P.85

generalised picture of international policy and diplomacy at the beginning of the 20th century, and the key role of Lithuanian immigrants in these processes. The book *The Immigrant as Diplomat*² by an American historian Gary Hartman is of primary importance. It uses a coherent approach in disclosing the importance of emigration in the history of Lithuania as well as in the period of Lithuania's recognition as a young independent state. The author makes the point in revealing characteristics relevant to the actions of the Lithuanian diaspora as a result of the assumed national mission.

Attention should be drawn to yet another book³, whose author – a historian Juozas Skirius, takes a different approach to the problem in focus. Instead of analysing the identity of the emigrants and tracing their input in shaping the destiny of their homeland, he goes deep into the issues of U.S. policy towards the Baltic region.

The emigration factor involved in Lithuania's liberation processes includes scarce but politically active groups of Lithuanian emigrants in Western Europe. During the turbulence of the First World War, Switzerland was the best shelter and diplomatic base for the activists from Lithuania and other states. With respect to historical studies of the Lithuanian political movement in Switzerland, it is worth mentioning a book published a few years ago by diplomat Alfonsas Eidintas about Juozas Gabrys-Paršaitis – the most active figure in that political environment⁴. With these publications in mind, there can be no doubt that the foreign policy of the Republic of Lithuania was not only closely linked to emigration abroad, but in most cases was a continuation of work that had commenced prior to the re-establishment of the state.

It must be also noted that during the First World War participants in the Lithuanian national movement in Switzerland and France did not link their work to the expectations of the diaspora; nor did they take care of the future survival of the exiled community. Instead they considered themselves to be the direct re-establishers of the Lithuanian state, who because of the international circumstances had to carry out their mission in places where the destiny of post-war Europe was being shaped. E. Demm provides a clear illustration of such work in the biography of the mentioned J. Gabrys-Paršaitis. The author calls this active leader of the Lithuanian national movement a pioneer of protodiplomacy, who was a frequent visitor in the chambers of Western states where serious decisions of international policy were made⁵.

Really, the 20th century challenged Lithuania with numerous trials through occupations, wars, repression and resistance movements. This dramatic historical period was entirely marked by the active presence of emigration and Lithuanian diaspora world-wide. Without them we would not be able to comprehend the processes leading to the current situation.

EMIGRATION: WITH AND WITHOUT THE STATE

While trying to identify the mission of Lithuanian diaspora in the arena of international relations of the mid 20th century we are confronted with a very important factor. In the period of battles for independence and defence against foreign dangers, a country's approach towards emigrants was of one kind. When an independent state started targeting its own foreign policy goals, different challenges and expectations were associated with the emigrants abroad.

In the 20th century, the political leaders of the 1920's and 30's were very well aware of the importance of the role of the emigrant, and not only in the fulfilment of political goals or fighting Poland in the conflict over the Vilnius region. The national political agenda of that time consciously emphasised the issue of regulating (if not supporting) emigration from Lithuania. The conception by Prof. Kazys Pakštas advocating the significant role of Lithuanian colonies was

² Gary Hartman. *The Immigrant as Diplomat: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Shaping of Lithuanian-American Community, 1870-1922*. Chicago: Lithuanian Research and Studies Centre, 2002.

³ Juozas Skirius. *U.S. Government Policy Towards Lithuania, 1920-1922: Recognition of Lithuanian Independence*. Chicago: Lithuanian Research and Studies Centre, 2000.

⁴ Alfonsas Eidintas. *The Secret Lithuanian Diplomat*. Vilnius: State Publishing Centre, 1991; also see an elaborate study by the same author *Lithuanian Columbuses: Historical Study of Lithuanian Emigration*: Vilnius, Mintis, 1993.

⁵ Eberhard Demm. *Nationalistische Propaganda und Protodiplomatie als Ethnisches Geschäft: Juozas Gabrys, Die „Union des Nationalites“ und die Befreiung Litauens (1911-1919)*. Litauisches Kulturinstitut, 2001.

earning increasing popularity. Sometimes the emigration of impoverished Lithuanians to South America was clearly seen as a strategic hint at reducing social pressures.

Lithuanian authorities encouraged their countrymen in the USA to give their assets back to the homeland, but this odyssey either resulted in numerous bankruptcies in independent Lithuania or nationalisation of the assets after the Soviet invasion. Another very important factor affected the relationship of Lithuanian foreign policy and American Lithuanians – the majority of Lithuanians in America were manual workers. Principles of socialism and communism gradually superseded national sentiments. The nationalistic ideas fostered by the autocratic Smetona regime formed a negative attitude among the leftist Lithuanians in the U.S., and communistic Lithuanians could hardly have been advocates of Lithuanian foreign policy in their relations with the U.S. Administration. On the other hand, historical records have not clearly formulated uniform opinion on this issue.

After independence was lost in 1940 the political importance of emigrants once again increased. President Antanas Smetona while abroad, and later during his short stay in the U.S., attempted to formulate goals for the future which vitably involved international relations. The outcome of the Second World War, however, did not provide Lithuania with the opportunity to exploit the benefits of victory over the fascist coalition. It would be better said that Lithuania was left hostage to the Soviets by the winners of this global conflict.

Long decades under Soviet occupation in particular distinguished the importance of Lithuanian diplomacy in the West. First of all, it had a symbolic mission of continuing the existence of the occupied state. Stasys Lozoraitis, a standing chief of the diplomatic corps, maintained that Soviet occupation was the only factor evidencing the situation of the Lithuanian state to the world. Such an opinion meant that in the case that certain motivations made the Soviets withdraw from Lithuania the majority of the Western states would automatically recognise our sovereignty. Historians have prepared substantial works tackling the period of Lithuanian diplomacy after the Second World War. The recent study by Laurynas Janušauskas⁶ focusing on the Lithuanian diplomatic corps in exile reveals the factors that predetermined not only the symbolic diplomatic representativeness of occupied Lithuania but also the context in which foreign policy guidelines of the re-established Lithuania were brought forward. Although the diplomatic corps of that day wasted a lot of time in tackling everyday material shortages and vying for competencies with the Chief Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania (VLIK), at the same time it made a considerable contribution to the common future visions fostered by political emigrants from the Central and Eastern European States under occupation or communist regime.

The conflict over Vilnius and the future relationship with Poland were certainly among the most serious problems of the inter-war Lithuania. It can be maintained that over several decades the prospect of Polish and Lithuanian political dialogue was being fostered among emigrants⁷. A significant input to the elaboration and harmonisation of the conceptual future foreign policy between the two nations was made by Stasys Lozoraitis Sr, as well as his son and successor Stasys Lozoraitis Jr. They succeeded in finding appropriate dialogue partners on the Polish side. A breakthrough in the vision of Poland's future Eastern policy was achieved thanks to the immense efforts of Polish political emigrants united through the magazine *Kultura* - published in Paris - and its editor Jerzy Giedrojc. It can be said that the ability of the political structures in re-established independent Lithuania and those of post-communist Poland to deal away with historical barriers, originally stemmed from emigration and came as a surprise to political observers and experts on international relations.

Liberation from Soviet oppression and the first steps of the independent state on the international scene were reinforced not only through symbols preserved by the diplomatic corps of the first Republic of Lithuania, but also through the wide support of Lithuanians around the world. Up to this day neither historians nor political scientists have properly estimated the contribution of the Lithuanian community abroad to the country's fight for freedom. On the other

⁶ L. Janušauskas. *Led by Fate: Work of Lithuanian Diplomatic Corps in Exile, 1940-1991*. Vilnius: Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, 2003.

⁷ For details see: Egidijus Aleksandravičius. *Realities and Marginalities of Political Facts (Issue of Poland among the Lithuanian Emigrants)* *Darbai ir Dienos*, No.30, 147-166.

hand, the restored future vision of the Lithuanian state, foreign policy guidelines, and membership in NATO, perceived as natural processes by most Lithuanians, is the merit of Lithuanian emigrants, in particular the Lithuanian community in the U.S., through their actions and relationship with their native land. The emigration factor promoted pro-American sentiments, and the U.S. was seen as a close neighbour by Lithuanian nationals.

CHALLENGES OF LITHUANIAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE OLD AND NEW EMIGRANTS

The current lifestyle, disparities of globalisation and the emigration from Lithuania which has been on a rapid increase over the several years of economic developments are of vital importance and as such influence the targets of Lithuanian foreign policy. On the other hand, certain phenomena of the migration processes and characteristics of the newly established Lithuanian emigrants distinguish subtle parallels between domestic and foreign policy goals.

Today's concerns about the changing relationship between the new Lithuanian emigrants and their homeland are quite reasonable. These concerns, however, are associated mainly with domestic policy and the prospect of economic and social processes. We can, of course, support the opinion that all of this has no effect on foreign policy and that Lithuania's key strategic interests in the international arena should not depend upon such secondary circumstances as the great number of Lithuanian colonies in the USA, Great Britain or Spain. However, is it possible that when the economic integration of Lithuania is Western-oriented, that the priorities of Lithuania's foreign policy be directed to the East? Apparently, such a situation is hardly plausible.

The role of Lithuanian emigrants in the development of the country's foreign policy has been predetermined by several factors. First of all, the most efficiently organised and operating Lithuanian diaspora is situated in the U.S., a state with strong influence in the arena of current international relations. In the period of liberation from the Soviet regime, the same as during the strengthening of Lithuania's positions on the political scene, Lithuanians in the U.S. have been and continue to be representatives of popular diplomacy or simply lobby groups. Lithuanian sentiments promoted throughout America make Lithuania more noticeable, natural, close and attractive. This time-tested mission, like the very community of American Lithuanians, should follow the same path. Lithuania's inability to exploit this situation would be a great failure and a fatal foreign policy mistake.

Today certain expectations should be associated with Lithuanians in Great Britain, the number of which in recent years has become quite impressive contrary to their poorly-expressed sentiments for the motherland, perhaps with the exception of basketball. The core of British Lithuanians comprises new economic immigrants, the majority of which will remain illegal workers likely to escape open cultural and organisational contacts until Lithuania becomes a member of the European Union. The economic potential of this diaspora segment is very low, therefore a more significant effect in the policy of their new place of residence has little credibility.

Old Lithuanian emigrants with rich experience in public works, well-organised and maintaining regular institutionalised relations with the Lithuanian Seimas and national administration are rationally predictable. In the meantime, new Lithuanian emigrants, although much more numerous than post-war political emigrants, are still in the process of developing the principles of community co-existence and national relations with the homeland. These processes entail an important factor which should impose an obligation on Lithuania's foreign policy-makers, relating to the changing legal situation in the immigration countries. The harmonisation of dual citizenship, information on newly-established emigrants, their involvement in discussions about Lithuania-related affairs and improvement of voting availability can not progress without the approval of the Foreign Affairs Office.

Attention must be drawn to the current programme by U.S. President G. Bush for giving illegal employees amnesty. Once implemented this U.S. Administration policy will open new legalisation opportunities in the country where the majority of new Lithuanian emigrants

established themselves a decade ago. It allows the assumption that once the newly-established post-Soviet emigrants are out in the open they may partly restore the lost national self-esteem, drop the habit of concealing their cultural identity and establish more open and frequent contacts with Lithuania. Similar processes could be expected in Western Europe, where the majority of Lithuanian nationals, far from their homeland, will gradually have to undergo legalisation procedures.

THE DESTINY OF DIASPORA IS A CONCERN OF LITHUANIA'S POLICY

Besides the obvious fact that emigration issues are linked to foreign policy priorities, and foreign policy consequently affects the socio-economic prospects of the state, a few more issues should be mentioned. Anxiety over the future of Lithuanian diaspora expressed by the political structures of our state also stems from economic and political interests.

Lithuania's economic interests with respect to emigrants can be illustrated case in point by the Irish. Experts who have analysed Ireland's economic breakthrough have noticed that the success of the Irish in attracting global capital of Irish origin has been the key reason behind this phenomenon. Records reveal 35,000 Irish nationals who have moved or transferred their businesses to the Promised Land. The Lithuanian Government have made a few steps in this direction but these political attempts were far from becoming strategic priorities. In most cases the emigrants are underestimated and promotion of the investment environment by means of national sentiments to this point has been very inefficient. Involvement of the emigrants in the social and economic progress of the state has potential for increase, first due to membership in NATO. However, the leaders of Lithuania's foreign policy have to exploit the available resources to encourage their return to the motherland, at least through a virtual relationship.

Today it is still too early to compare the economic capacities of the new emigrants from the post-Soviet period with those of the old layers of diaspora. But due to irregular and frequently seasonal migration, very close relations with relatives and a certain habit of moving funds earned abroad back to Lithuania, considerable financial injections into the current Lithuanian economy are already noticeable. It is a well-known fact that in inter-war Lithuania, the amount of money sent by emigrants to their homeland accounted for almost one-tenth of the national budget of that time⁸. Contrary to the situation in the 1920's, today even the most general economic forecasts of the approximate amounts incoming from emigrants are not available, although these sources are certainly contributing to the economic phenomenon of the "Baltic tiger".

What changes is the Lithuanian administration likely to confront in this field? What aspects should be monitored? Policy experts claim that the decision by U.S. President Bush regarding the amnesty of illegal workforce is by no means an expression of affection for immigrants. On one hand, terrorism fears lead to the increased control of migration flows. On the other hand, there are many legitimate voters among the twenty million Mexicans residing in the U.S. Support from immigrants is a top task of the Bush team.

Tens of millions of people work unlawfully in the U.S. of which at least 100,000 are Lithuanians. The prospect for legalisation seems very tempting for tens of thousands of Lithuanians employed in the care of the elderly, in repair work or in restaurants. At last they will no longer be afraid of repression or deportation, and of course will have to pay taxes to the American treasury authorities. The remaining dollars will be allowed to be taken back to the homeland without any restrictions, and national authorities will have to adhere to the double-taxation treaty. What comes next? One assumption: migration back and forth will increase as there will be no apprehension that upon coming home, having violated visa regimen requirements, a migrant will be prevented from a subsequent departure overseas in search for work. Another assumption: a more balanced relationship between the newly established American Lithuanians and their homeland will be secured.

⁸ Linas Saldukas. *Lithuanian Diaspora*. Vilnius: Vaga publ., 2002, p.35; Alfonsas Eidintas. *Lithuanian Columbuses*, p.66.

This consequently leads to consideration of the very important political circumstances that affect emigrant concerns about the destiny of their native land, as well as the prospects of Lithuania's foreign policy and the Lithuanian state as such. Lithuanian nationals who are living and working abroad certainly can not be excluded from the discussions on furthering liberal democracy and promoting Western orientation in our state.

If radical anti-Western forces fail to destroy Lithuania's European integration, and if the prospects for legitimate work in Western Europe increase, it is quite conceivable that as early as this summer many Lithuanians formerly illegally employed in Great Britain will visit Lithuania. Earlier they frequently dismissed the idea of coming home because of fears of being refused entrance by British immigration services upon return. Unrestricted movement in Europe will also allow our citizens to escape the overly scrupulous formalities of our border officials. The question of how much money a pizza cook from London takes with him across the Western border of Lithuania will gradually become irrelevant. The traffic over this border will certainly become heavier, whereas displeasing procedures and large or small bribes will disappear over time.

There is of course a strong probability of Lithuanians streaming to the West in search of the easy money of their dreams, nevertheless, it can also be expected that such money making will entail its own weaknesses. However, citizens of Lithuania working worldwide either virtually or factually will increasingly become a common practise.

Let's consider the common points of migration and Lithuania's political life and whether foreign policy strategic leaders can completely ignore them. In my mind, there is a direct link. The decreasing number of voters and the changing social and intellectual patterns of the electorate have primarily originated from the outflow of several hundred thousand voters from Lithuania. More mobile, earnest, braver, and sometimes more clever Lithuanian nationals distance themselves from voting booths and leave a contrasting situation in the native land, with society splitting into two opposing groups, one of which embodies educated, well-off persons of upper social levels who have earned a better life through their intellectual abilities and hard work. The other group comprises individuals of lower social standing, tired of changes and failures, angered, disappointed and keen on social revenge rather than further progress.

I assume that emigration mostly undermines the formation of a Western-oriented middle social class. In the years ahead, if ever, emigrants are not likely to leave for Russia in search of work. Therefore, the electorate in emigration can be expected to be a very important social support promoting liberal democracy in the homeland. Thus, Lithuania's governmental authorities face the very important task of ensuring voting booths for Lithuanians in Western states, starting with the USA and Great Britain. Lithuania can enjoy the immense benefits of emigration provided it does not focus on the numerous growing demands of customs officials.

If Lithuanian politics is able to properly balance international and domestic affairs, we can be sure of the increasing importance of the emigrant factor in foreign policy. Globalisation is spreading so fast that we can have no doubts about the mobility of the workforce (and the electorate as well). Lithuania's foreign policy and modern international relations in general face serious challenges stemming from this mobility as the essential feature of the new life style. Timely reaction and proper preparations for the future play the key role in this process.

A BALTIC CHALLENGE

Ronald D. Asmus¹

One of the responsibilities Albright and Talbott entrusted me with when I joined the State Department was the Baltic states. They both had a special interest in the issue. If NATO enlargement was about creating a Europe whole and free and undoing historical injustice, then there was no doubt in Albright's mind that the Baltics qualified on both counts. One of her favorite sayings about Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was that one did not have to be located in Central Europe to have Central Europe in one's heart. Along with the subjugation of her native Czechoslovakia in 1938, Albright considered the Hitler-Stalin Pact and the illegal annexation of these three states by the USSR among the great injustices of the 20th century.

Albright saw the Baltic issue as a litmus test of NATO enlargement. If enlargement was part of an integrationist strategy to remove Russia's imperial temptation and alter old patterns of zero-sum thinking, nowhere was this antidote more needed than in the Baltic states. One day shortly after I joined the State Department, Albright told me of her dismay that so many people were trying to simply ignore the Baltic issue. "We can't ignore this problem" she said. "It is a test of whether we can succeed in changing the way people think about the politics of post-Cold War Europe. We shouldn't run away from it," she continued. "I want to try to tackle it. I want to make it the litmus test of our whole strategy." And she was looking to Talbott and me to help her come up with that strategy.

During a trip to Vilnius to meet with the three Baltic Presidents after the Madrid summit, Albright would say in public what she had told me earlier in private: "Perhaps no part of Europe has suffered more from the old pattern of European politics than the Baltic states. You lost your security, your freedom, your independence, your prosperity—everything but your spirit and your spine." No one would benefit more, she argued, if we could create "a new pattern of politics in Europe." The United States, she made clear, supported Baltic aspirations to join NATO and would not discriminate against them. "We will not punish you in the future because you were subjugated in the past."

But Albright did not just want to reassure the Balts about our commitment to their Western integration. She wanted to use the carrot of eventual NATO membership to help them transform and Westernize their own societies. This included encouraging countries like Estonia and Latvia to integrate their Russian-speaking minorities and become multi-ethnic democracies. Albright was willing to stand up and defend the Baltics against Moscow's pressure. But she also wanted them to change their own zero-sum thinking and reach out to Russia as they became part of the West. "The quest for security is not a zero-sum game in which Central Europe must lose if Russia gains and Russia must lose if Central Europe gains" she stated in a major speech in Vilnius. The process of NATO enlargement "is not about escaping West, it is about gaining the confidence to look East in a spirit of cooperation."²

Talbott, too, had a deep interest and commitment to the Baltic states dating back to his days as a journalist covering the former Soviet Union. He often told the story of how he had sat with Lennart Meri, then still a quixotic filmmaker, dissident, and chronicler of the native peoples of the Soviet far North, on a steamer between Tallinn and Helsinki debating the future of the Baltic states. Talbott was one of the strongest advocates of an open door policy that protected the Baltic states—and left open the possibility that countries further to the east might one day join NATO as well. At a Deputies Committee meeting in spring 1997 Talbott passionately made the case for SIBROD because of the need to protect the Baltic states. Several colleagues around the table in

¹ Extract from the "Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era". New York: Columbia University Press, 2002

² See the Memorandum from Acting S/NIS John Herbst to Secretary Christopher entitled "Scope Paper-Your Trip to Moscow," March 18, 1996.

the White House Situation Room looked stunned. Finally, Undersecretary of Defense Walt Slocombe broke the silence and said: “Strobe, you are supposed to be against all of this stuff.” Everyone laughed. But it was another example of the contrast between the public caricature of Talbott’s thinking and what he advocated in reality.

No one knew better than Talbott how deeply rooted Russia’s neuralgia on the Baltic issue was and how hard it would be to change that mindset. It was one reason why he was so adamant that the U.S. position on NATO’s open door be clear and consistent. His view was that Western strategy needed to be clear in saying that the Baltic states would one day join NATO. But he also believed the West, including the Baltic states, had to simultaneously reach out to Russia, cooperate with it, and address its sensitivities where they were legitimate. Just as the West needed to offer Moscow a vision of a new cooperative NATO-Russia relationship, Talbott believed that Washington needed a vision of how Baltic membership in NATO was part of a broader, cooperative framework around the Baltic Sea in which Russia, too, would have its place.

Derek Shearer, the U.S. Ambassador in Helsinki, Eric Edelman, Talbott’s Executive Assistant, and I resurrected the idea of the Hanseatic League as an image or metaphor for what we had in mind. By reaching into the region’s past, we hoped to show that it had once been possible for these countries to have the kind of normal, alternative future we were striving for in which Russia, as a Baltic littoral country, was connected to these countries by commerce and travel. Talbott liked it so much he asked us to read up on the history of the Hanseatic League and to look for modern-day parallels. When I brought back a book on the Hansa from the Hanseatic Museum in Bergen, Norway, he had the CIA blow up one of its maps into a chart which he kept in his office and would bring out to engage visitors on Baltic-Russian relations.

At a conference at Stanford University in the fall of 1997, Talbott spoke about how the U.S. needed to manage the dilemma of supporting the legitimate Baltic aspirations to reintegrate into the West and join NATO with Russia’s fear and loathing that they might succeed in doing so. “Quite bluntly,” Talbott told his audience,

Russians need to get over their neuralgia on this subject; they need to stop looking at the Baltic region as a pathway for foreign armies or as a buffer zone, not just because such old think offends and menaces the Balts but because it doesn’t make sense, since there are no would-be aggressors to be rebuffed.

In the final analysis, Russia will have to make that adjustment herself, by its own light and for its own reasons. But we and our European partners can help. One way is to make the idea of commercial, political and environmental and other forms of collaboration among the states along the littoral of the Baltic Sea a centerpiece of our own activity there — and an important part of our dialogue with Russia as an important regional power.

Our message to Moscow is this: if you Russians insist on looking at the 13th century for models applicable to the 21st, then you should dwell less on the image of Aleksandr Nevsky defeating the Swedish knights on the ice and think instead in what might be called “Hanseatic” terms—that is think about the Baltics not as an invasion route inward, but as a gateway outward.³

The Clinton Administration’s Baltic commitment took many people by surprise. And not everyone was happy. Primakov hated it and repeatedly warned us against taking steps to bring the Baltic states closer to NATO. It was unpopular with some of our key European allies as well. The exception was our Nordic allies who were, if anything, even more supportive in word and deed than the U.S. We looked to them for advice and ideas on how to craft our strategy. They knew the region better than we did and understood the importance of getting the U.S. more involved—and often lobbied for more U.S. involvement vis-a-vis more skeptical Europeans. The convergence of U.S.-Nordic thinking on the Baltic issue led to a kind of implicit strategic alliance and cooperation in the region that would, in turn, play a key role at the NATO Madrid summit.

The Clinton Administration was often accused of pursuing a strong Baltic policy for domestic political reasons. The reality was that we were being criticized at home from both the right and the left. I would sometimes amuse my Nordic and Baltic counterparts by explaining the U.S. political lineup on this issue with four wine glasses at dinner. My staff soon dubbed it the “Asmus Four Glass Theory on the Politics of Baltic NATO Membership.” As I described it to Talbott in a

³ Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 336. 399.

memo, “Right-wing Republicans want to bring them in now, Bush Republicans and Democratic defense hawks say never; Democratic internationalists such as you and me say yes in principle but not now; and liberal Democratic arms controllers say it is not worth risking the arms control agenda with Moscow because of the Baltic issue.”⁴ Fashioning the two-thirds majority required for Senate ratification required a good strategy and enough time.

This was why the United States had proposed a U.S.-Baltic Charter. We needed a strategy to create the conditions that would make it possible to one day bring the Baltic states into NATO—not as a precipitous, isolated act that would sour relations with Moscow but as part of an overall strategy for building security and stability in the region. But for that strategy to work, we first needed to agree with leaders of the Baltic states on what we were trying to achieve, embrace a common strategy on how to achieve it, and create the mechanisms to follow up with practical steps.

The Baltic states did not trust us either, at least not initially. Although we were in many ways their strongest supporters, the fear of betrayal by the West ran deep. Our Baltic interlocutors were uncomfortable with the slow, deliberate course we had charted on enlargement and they considered our approach to addressing Russian concerns naive. Like Lech Walesa in Poland, they believed that the best approach was to simply enlarge NATO and create facts on the ground—the sooner, the better. Moscow’s attitude, they believed, would change only once they were in NATO, not beforehand.

As a Democratic political appointee, I took some refuge in the fact that this distrust was bipartisan. The people of the Baltics had never forgiven Roosevelt for Yalta; and many of them still considered Democrats almost congenitally naive about Russia. But they did not trust the Republicans either. One could hardly spend an evening in a pub in Tallinn, Riga, or Vilnius without someone bringing up the fact that President George Bush had hesitated in recognizing Baltic independence in 1991 for fear of undercutting Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. At the time, President Bush had stated that: “When history is written, nobody will remember that we took forty-eight hours more than Iceland or whoever it is” that recognized them first.⁵ But they did. I was constantly reminded that the U.S. was number 34 in the list of countries recognizing the regaining of Baltic independence.

Vytautas Landsbergis, the first post-independence Lithuanian head of state, in many ways epitomized Baltic distrust of the U.S. He was a Lithuanian hero—the man who had led his nation to independence and rallied the nation to stand up to Moscow in 1991, when the Soviets had started to intervene and killed a number of Lithuanians in front of the parliament. An ethnomusicologist by training, Landsbergis was stubborn and proud. He had pursued Lithuania’s independence, which would help catalyze the collapse of the Soviet Union, over the advice and objections of many Western governments and friends who had urged him to adopt a more moderate course. He, and Lithuania, had won as a result.

I met Landsbergis while working at RAND in the mid-1990s and developed a candid relationship with him even though we did not see eye-to-eye on many issues. When I once tried to explain the reasons why the U.S. could not bring the Baltics into NATO right away, he brushed my comments aside as irrelevant. Landsbergis thought the U.S. was a naive but powerful country that sometimes had to be forced to do the right thing. It was the lesson he had drawn from dealing with the Bush Administration. Landsbergis’s view was simple. U.S. policy should be to enlarge NATO as fast as possible to remove any lingering Russian imperial temptations. Like the Nike commercial, his motto was: “Just do it.” Landsbergis wanted a security guarantee and he wanted it now—from the United States. All other issues regarding Lithuania’s qualifications could be sorted out later.

To varying degrees, this view was shared throughout the three Baltic states. These countries looked to Washington because we were a superpower and because they believed the U.S. policy

⁴ See Address by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, “A Democratic and Undivided Europe in Our Time”, Cernin Palace Prague, Czech Republic March 20 1996, <<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1996/96o3/96o32odossec2.html>>

⁵ See “Secretary’s Lunch with Central European Foreign Ministers, March 20 1996, Prague,” State 059734, March 27, 1996.

had more of a moral component to it than the *Realpolitik* practiced by many Europeans. At the same time, they also thought that Americans in general, and the Clinton Administration in particular, were not hard headed enough when it came to dealing with the Russians and their security. While respecting American power, they were determined to do whatever it took to get a security guarantee for their countries. If need be, that included pushing and even humiliating the U.S. into doing the right thing.

In the spring of 1997, Baltic anxiety was at an all-time high. The Baltic press was full of speculation about a possible sellout of the Baltic states as the price for Russian acquiescence to enlargement in the context of negotiations over the Founding Act. To make matters worse, Yeltsin had stated to the Russian press that he reserved the right to revise the Founding Act if any former Soviet republics were ever admitted to NATO. As Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs had put it: “NATO says the door is open, but the Russian dog is sitting in the entrance barking at us not to go in.”⁶ Knowing that Baltic anxieties were on the rise, Talbott invited the Presidents of all three Baltic states to a meeting to reassure them that no deals had been cut at their expense.

The meeting took place in The Hague on May 28, 1997 where President Clinton was commemorating the fiftieth Anniversary of the 1947 Marshall Plan. While welcoming the signing of the NATO-Russia agreement in Paris the day before, Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis and Estonian President Lennart Meri had expressed their fears that their nations’ security was being sacrificed in the attempt to accommodate Moscow. Ulmanis told Talbott that he was “no longer sure” where his country fit in the U.S. vision of Europe’s future.

President Meri was more dramatic. He started by telling Talbott that the last week had been one of the most difficult in recent memory for the Estonian nation.

The combination of the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act along with several U.S. policy moves had sent “the wrong signals to our immediate neighbors.” He had “expected more” from the United States and was disappointed. There were “illusions” in Moscow about the Baltic states that needed to be dispelled and only Washington could do that. He was concerned for the fate of the Estonian people. He compared himself to an Estonian Moses who had been chosen, “in a biblical sense,” to lead his people back out of bondage to freedom and to Europe. And he felt personally betrayed—including by us.

Talbott looked at Edelman and me for help. But at first we did not know what Meri was talking about. Then it clicked. He was referring to a U.S.-led military exercise named “Baltic Challenge.” As part of our effort to reassure the Baltic states, we had agreed to a series of military exercises in these countries over a three-year timeframe. In mid-April we had moved the dates of the exercise and scaled it back in size after someone realized it was going to take place *during* the Madrid summit. We did not think that 2,500 U.S. Marines landing on Baltic beaches was an ideal backdrop for the summit. All the participants, including the Estonians, had agreed to these changes. But somehow the story had become twisted that the rescheduling was in response to Russian pressure. The second complaint was that a U.S. spokesperson had mistakenly referred to the U.S.-Baltic Charter as a “cultural agreement.” It was an honest mistake by someone not up to speed on what we were doing. But it was taken as evidence that the U.S. was about to sell these countries out.

Talbott’s temper flared. Looking at Meri, he told him that they had known each other for many years and had always spoken openly and honestly to one another. If it were not for the U.S. commitment and this President, NATO enlargement would not have happened. Similarly, if it were not for Washington’s leadership, enlargement would surely have been capped after a single round and the Baltics would have been excluded. The President had defended the right of the Baltic states to join NATO with Yeltsin at Helsinki and there was nothing in the Founding Act “in large print, fine print or between the lines” that in any way discriminated against the Baltic states or closed the door to their entry into NATO. Estonian accusations on the Baltic Challenge were “just plain wrong.”

The Baltics did not have a better friend in the West than the United States and the Clinton Administration, Talbott continued. The distrust of American intentions Meri had shown would be a great disappointment to President Clinton and Secretary Albright. The Deputy Secretary

⁶ See Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 401.

challenged Presidents Meri and Ulmanis to name a single instance where the U.S. had failed to do what it had promised. Moses, he pointed out, also had a little bit of help. While making no claims to divinity, he told the Baltic Presidents that the U.S. was just as committed to leading the Baltic states back to Europe as they were.⁷

His outburst was met by silence. It was the low point in our relations with the Baltics. After the meeting broke up, Edelman put his hand on Talbott's shoulder and said, "Remember what he and those people have been through. Besides, Moses was probably a pain in the ass too after forty years in the wilderness." But the meeting proved to be cathartic. The distrust and anger on both sides had been vented and the air cleared of the former acrimony. We moved quickly to make a new start. At Sintra, Estonian Foreign Minister lives and Defense Minister Luik visited me in my hotel, looking slightly chagrined. Talbott dropped by and we started to patch things up over drinks.

Over the next two years, our dialogue with all three Baltic states would grow extremely close. As they started to believe that we were indeed committed to using American influence to guarantee them the perspective of eventual NATO membership, they started to relax and focused on doing their homework to get ready. Lithuania took the lead in trying to improve relations with Moscow and working regionally with Kaliningrad. Talbott and I would grow close to the leaders of all three countries, but especially to Meri and the Estonians. In the summer of 1999, Talbott and I spent a day as Meri's guest at the Estonian President's retreat on the Baltic coast—taking a sauna, swimming in the Baltic Sea, and talking politics into the dark hours of the morning. In the helicopter on the way back, Talbott said to me: "You know we talk more openly to these guys than even some of our current allies." It was a dramatic shift from the scene in that Dutch hotel room in May 1997.

Back in Washington, I had assembled a small team to draft a U.S.-Baltic Charter. A lot of good legwork had been done, especially by our Ambassador in Riga, Larry Napper. But the bigger questions about what we were trying to achieve had not yet been answered. With a mandate from Albright and Talbott, I took over the process. My basic idea was simple. The Charter would convey in clear terms that we had a common vision of Europe, that they were part of that vision, that NATO enlargement was part of a broader strategy of building this unified Europe, and that our goal was to integrate them into the institutions of this new Europe, including NATO. Politically, we were not willing to agree to any language that implied a surrogate U.S. security guarantee in lieu of NATO. But we were willing to underscore our enduring interest in their independence and sovereignty and the fact that we would not consider our vision complete unless and until we had brought them in.

At the same time, the Charter was not just about NATO. We wanted to use it to encourage the Baltic states to accelerate their internal reforms as well as to embrace policies that would contribute to our broader vision for the region—including an improved relationship with Russia. We therefore insisted on strong language on the need to build multi-ethnic democracies and the integration of Russian-language speakers, as well as support for regional cooperation with Moscow. It was far easier for these countries to make such pledges in a document with the U.S. than in any other context. We also wanted to back up these pledges with concrete tools to implement them. We proposed creating a Partnership Commission that would meet once a year. It would have two working groups on economic and military issues that would report to the Commission. It would be chaired by Talbott and the Baltic Foreign Ministers, respectively.

The goal was to use the commitment of the U.S. government to identify and resolve problems that would, in turn, accelerate the integration of these countries into Western institutions, including NATO. Our philosophy was captured in a metaphor I used with my Baltic interlocutors. I told them that they would have to complete the marathon to get into NATO, but that we saw ourselves as their coach. While they would have to run the race themselves, we would use America's influence to guarantee that there was a level playing field and that they were not handicapped because of geography or history. We would also be on the sidelines, offering practical advice and be cheering them on until they crossed the finish line.

⁷ See "Secretary Christopher's Meeting with Russian FM Primakov, March 21 1996," April 3, 1996.

The next step in clarifying our Baltic policy came in mid-June on the day we announced the President's decision in favor of inviting three countries to join NATO at Madrid. Several days earlier, Edelman and I had joined Talbott for a quick visit to a Starbucks. Talbott was practically addicted to cappuccinos and enjoyed sneaking out of the office for a quick caffeine fix. His secretary would call to say that the Deputy Secretary needed me to join him immediately for a meeting. I would drop what I was doing and run up the stairs to his office only to discover it was time to sneak out for a caramel macchiato. The drive on the way over was often used to plot strategy and think out loud about future policy.

It was during one of these covert trips to Starbucks in early June that Talbott asked Edelman and me how we envisioned actually bringing the Baltic states into the Alliance. We ran through various scenarios on how the Baltics might actually join NATO and debated the pros and cons of the countries coming in individually, as a group, or in conjunction with other Nordic countries. We concluded that the day when any of this would be feasible was probably still a long way off. But we agreed it was important that the Baltics understood our goal was to eventually bring them in, and that the strategy we were proposing was designed to make that possible.

Several days later on June 12, I joined Talbott in his office as we prepared to inform the three Baltic Ambassadors about Clinton's decision to invite three countries to join NATO at Madrid. As we went through his talking points, Talbott hinted that he had decided to clarify our long-term intentions on the Baltic issue. During the subsequent conversation with the three Ambassadors he stated: "We will not regard the process of NATO enlargement as finished or successful unless or until the aspirations of the Baltic states are fulfilled. We are aware of the implications of that, in the near term, the middle term and the long term." No U.S. official had previously made such a statement. It had not been in his talking points either. As we walked out of his office I turned to the Department's Baltic desk officer, Trevor Evans, who had been the notetaker, and said: "I want that sentence inscribed in that memcon. It is now U.S. policy."⁸

By mid June, Talbott and I had worked through several versions of a draft Charter to our satisfaction. We had promised the Baits we would start negotiations on the Charter before Madrid so that they had a clear sense of what we wanted to achieve. Getting the entire U.S. government to close ranks around the philosophy and strategy we had developed was not easy, however. I often had to invoke both Albright and Talbott to overcome the ingrained skepticism and reluctance of various parts of the U.S. government to take on any new obligations, especially on a sensitive issue like this one.

Finally, we were down to one last clearance—the White House. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger and his Deputy, Jim Steinberg, were uncomfortable with a couple of key sentences in the draft. Although much of the language was a repackaging of things we had previously said in other contexts, we had deliberately put it together in a way that sent a clear and powerful message. That was the idea. But Berger and Steinberg were nervous that the Baits might over-interpret the language and suggested that we had given them a quasi security guarantee. I appealed, arguing that not to repeat language previously used would be seen as a step back and that I could get assurances from these countries that they would not over-interpret such language. I was in a cab on my way to the airport to fly to the region when Talbott reached me from Denver on my cell phone, where he was attending the G-8 summit. He gave me my final negotiating instructions. I had nearly all the language I had requested.⁹

On June 23, 1997, I arrived in Tallinn for the start of a negotiating tour through all three Baltic capitals. I insisted that we ensure strict confidentiality of our talks. I had no intention of negotiating the content of this document with the Baltic press or, even worse, the Baltic-American community and press looking over our shoulders and judging who had made what compromise. It was also important that we send a clear and common message to our respective publics on what the purpose of this exercise was. We believed it was not a negotiation over a security guarantee or a precommitment to NATO membership. We saw it as a discussion among friends on how we

⁸ See Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 399.

⁹ See "Secretary Christopher's Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin, March 22, 1996", State 068798, April 3, 1996.

could build our common vision of Europe, the principles underlying that vision and how the U.S. and the three Baltic countries could work together to achieve our common goals.

In Tallinn, I paid a courtesy visit to Meri. By this time I had developed my own personal relationship with the man I had come to view as a kind of Havel of the north. He was known for playing practical jokes on his staff and friends. As I shook his hand, he looked at me with a twinkle in his eyes, reached up and touched the lapel on my suit and asked: "Ron, have you brought the security guarantee?" It was his way of reminding me that he was determined to use every ounce of his political capital and energy to make sure his country would be safely anchored in the West.

The Estonians were pleasantly surprised by our draft which, they admitted, was much better than they had expected. The Latvians were supportive as well, and especially grateful that we were proposing mechanisms to turn the rhetoric of the Charter into practical steps on the ground. The Lithuanians were more skeptical. Not only did they want a separate document, they also wanted more clarity on NATO membership than our draft offered. In essence, they wanted an implicit security guarantee. I detected the guiding hand of Landsbergis as the *eminence grise* behind the scenes as I negotiated with my Lithuanian counterparts.¹⁰

I explained the limits of our policy and warned them not to overplay their hand and run the risk of destroying the goodwill Washington was offering. The U.S. would not be pushed into offering them a security commitment through a back door that it was not prepared to offer through NATO's front door. It had to evolve through the building of trust, cooperation, and performance. The Charter was the first step in that process. I knew my counterparts understood the message. But I also knew that they were under instructions to get more. They were not going to get it. One of the Lithuanian negotiators was suffering from a bad back. I saw a dark sweat stain spreading across his shirt. I told him I hoped it was because of his back and not my message. He smiled weakly and said he had to go back to the parliament and brief Landsbergis on our talks. I encouraged my Lithuanian counterpart at our press conference, Albinas Januška, to say that the Charter would not contain a security guarantee and that Vilnius had not asked for one.

Upon returning to Washington, I sent Talbott a memo on the week's results: "I believe that we have finally succeeded in moving the Baltics, including the Lithuanians, beyond the point where they somehow view NATO membership as an "entitlement" or something we owe them. Instead, they increasingly acknowledge that this will be a long haul and that we are one of their closest friends and strongest supporters." We had come a long way, I wrote, since our disastrous meeting in The Hague one month earlier.

The challenge we now faced was the risk that it would have to compromise our open door policy at Madrid by agreeing to a package on Romania and Slovenia to accommodate the French that discriminated against the Baltic states. "At each stop I was repeatedly questioned about how committed the U.S. was to these measures and whether we wouldn't agree to compromises with the allies that would, in turn, compromise Baltic security as well. I assured them we would not. I hope I'm right."¹¹

¹⁰ See the memo to the President from Warren Christopher and Strobe Talbott entitled "Your Meeting with Yeltsin", April 18, 1996.

¹¹ See the "Memcon of Conversation Between President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin", April 21, 1996.

BUILDING ON SUCCESS: THE ENHANCED PARTNERSHIP IN NORTHERN EUROPE

Heather Conley

U.S. has always been committed to Northern Europe. There have been a number of times when the United States might well have walked away from this region. In 1945, we could have accepted Soviet annexation of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. We did not. In 1991 when those states regained their independence, we could have turned our attention elsewhere. We did not. In spring 2004 Northern Europe becomes a home to six EU members and six NATO members and we could decide to channel all our cooperation through those two organizations. We have not. The United States and Northern Europe are bound together by common interests and shared values. We have been partners in the successful development of the Baltic Sea region, and we intend to work with the Nordic and Baltic states to continue and expand this success in coming years.

Once they had freed themselves from Soviet rule in the early 1990s, the three Baltic States set themselves the goal of full integration into the community of European democracies. In September 1997, the Department of State launched the Northern Europe Initiative (NEI) to help the Baltics achieve this objective. Former Deputy Assistant Secretaries of State, Ron Asmus and Dan Hamilton, successfully guided this policy from 1997 to 2001, and so they have contributed to U.S. foreign policy.

NEI was first described by then-Assistant Secretary of State Marc Grossman at a meeting with Foreign Ministers of the Nordic and Baltic nations assembled in Bergen, Norway. He laid out three priorities for the U.S. First, we pledged to help Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia become the best possible candidates for membership in NATO and the European Union. Second, we undertook to promote cooperation and integration between Northwest Russia and its Baltic Sea neighbors. Finally, we pledged to work with the Nordic States, Germany, Russia, Poland and the EU to reach these goals.

We implemented NEI in various ways. The U.S. became an observer at the Council of Baltic Sea States and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council. We signed the Baltic Charter, a pledge of support to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia that remains valid to this day. We also undertook a host of assistance programs designed to benefit the Baltic States, and the whole region.

Some of these programs were small in cost, great in impact. An Estonian NGO used \$11,000 to conduct a unique project called "Theater in Education: Promoting Behaviors That Reduce the Spread of HIV/AIDS." They produced an interactive theater performance that reached an impressive audience: 7,500 people have already seen the play, and it has garnered critical acclaim. In addition to the plays run in Tallinn, 21 performances of the play have taken place or will take place outside of big cities, including the final seven performances, which will be in Russian-speaking areas of Estonia, with translation.

Then there have been the big activities that made a big splash. The Helsinki Women Business Leaders Summit of 2003 was the brainchild of Ambassador McElveen-Hunter. 50 American women CEO's were brought together with businesswomen from the Baltic States and Northwest Russia. They met with officials from the Department of State, Department of Commerce, the Small Business Administration and the White House. Presidents Tarja Halonen of Finland and Vaira Vike-Freiberga of Latvia, among many others, spoke to the women. Most importantly, they spoke with one another, swapping business ideas and business cards. They shared best practices on accessing capital, secrets for success, surviving failure and being a good corporate citizen.

The benefits of this program have been astounding. Leila-Mari Ryynanen, a Finnish participant, told "I have already started cooperation negotiations with one of the participating companies. My mentor introduced me to several important people and they are helping me to find new customers.... I saved months and months of work with the help of my mentor." One of the

American CEO's, Ann Jackson, said, "I will start looking at more importing and exporting...I learned that there are resources to help with this, more than I thought were available."

Another large project, and one that we will be continuing in 2004, is the Partners for Financial Stability program, or PFS. Aply managed by USAID until this current fiscal year, PFS provides training and technical assistance designed to strengthen capital and financial markets. The U.S. Embassy in Riga has lauded this program for helping Latvian banks and government authorities detect, deter and prosecute financial crimes. PFS has organized multiple anti-money laundering seminars for the Latvian Association of Commercial Banks and provided related technical assistance on know-your-customer procedures to interested banks and Latvia's financial services regulator, the Financial and Capital Markets Commission. PFS also sponsored a regional conference, which included banking and government representatives from all three Baltic States, on compliance with the U.S. Patriot Act and combating terrorist financing. NEI's greatest success, however, has to be the obvious one - Baltic State membership in NATO and the EU. When we launched the policy in 1997 it was not certain that these states would be able to join those organizations. They proved themselves ready, and we look forward to working with them in those fora.

It is exactly this success that has caused us to revisit NEI. We reviewed what has been accomplished and considered what should happen next. During this process we detected some unease on the part of our friends, concern that we might seek a diminished role in the region. That will not be the case. Our overriding conclusion is that the United States and the eight states of the Baltic Sea region share common interests that we can advance together. We want to remain part of the multilateral network of cooperation that has developed in this region over the past decade. We want to deepen our dialogue on ways to address remaining challenges within the region. We want to work with our friends to extend success to the states beyond the new borders of NATO and the EU.

We believe that the issues we face can be divided into three broad categories. First is political security, dealing with terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, working within NATO and the Partnership for Peace to develop capabilities. Second is an area we call "healthy societies, healthy neighbors," addressing problems that threaten national and regional stability, including disease, trafficking in persons, and environment. Finally, we want to develop our trade, investment, economic and business ties, creating bridges between U.S. and businesses in the Nordic-Baltic region, and fostering entrepreneurship. The Helsinki Women Business Leaders Summit I mentioned earlier is the kind of activity we have in mind.

To help us advance this shared agenda the U.S. have proposed regular consultations of the Nordics, Baltics, and U.S. This "eight-plus-one" meeting at roughly the level of Political Directors will focus on the three agenda items. The states of the region welcomed this idea, and the first meeting was held in New York in late September. In a fitting bit of symmetry, the meeting was hosted by Marc Grossman, now Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the man who launched NEI in 1997. We hope to have the next meeting in the region in April. Between meetings we expect to share information on policies and assistance projects in order to foster joint action, by the whole eight plus one or in smaller groups, to address the items on our agenda.

Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe, or e-PINE, has been called this because that title accurately reflects the state of our ties: partnership, and more. The U.S. believes that with this policy it will continue positive relationships in northern Europe and achieve common ends that benefit all of us.

THE AMERICAN FACTOR IN RUSSIAN-LITHUANIAN RELATIONS

Leonid Karabeshkin

The Russian Federation and Lithuania are two independent states with developed full-scale bilateral relations, but it is difficult to neglect the American factor in these relations. On the one hand, such controversial processes as NATO enlargement are strongly affected by Washington's policy. On the other hand, strong cooperation with the U.S. and its growing presence in the region is among key Lithuanian foreign policy priorities. Though Russia has its own interests in the Baltic region, it is also interested in arranging its relations with the U.S. in a non-confrontational way. The aim of this article is to investigate the impact of the American factor on Russian-Lithuanian relations.

In the early 1990s it was more legitimate to speak about the Lithuanian (or Baltic) factor in Russian-American relations rather than the American factor in Baltic-Russian relations. At that time, the legacy of the Cold War was stronger than the experience of cooperation with the newly emerged states. As a former superpower, Russia was used to solving issues directly with Washington, but it was quite inexperienced in building equal relations with its small Baltic counterparts. In the eyes of Russian leadership, the Baltic States were a special case. They were considered as countries where Russia had "natural" economic and political interests, first in the sphere of transit and also in relations with Russian-speaking minorities. The growing American presence in the Baltic States was perceived negatively in Moscow, similarly to how the U.S. was unhappy with having pro-Soviet Cuba in immediate proximity to its borders during the Cold War.

In turn, the policies of the Baltic States contributed to Russian concerns. Russian policies were largely viewed as directed against the Baltic States' interests - a result of deeply embedded historical prejudices. Moreover, the Baltics used to capitalise on their tense relations with Russia by seeking increased political attention and economic assistance in the West - from the U.S. and Europe. At the beginning of the 1990s, one of the largest American newspapers characterised Lithuania as a "roaring mouse"¹.

Gradually both Russia and Lithuania realised the necessity to establish more pragmatic and constructive relations rather than just ignoring each other. Lithuania was at the forefront of this process among the Baltic States, partially for objective reasons (a marginal share of the Russian-speaking minority in Lithuania and the unavoidability of cooperation on Kaliningrad), and partially due to political strategies (Russia tended to "differentiate" its Baltic neighbors, while integration into the EU and NATO stimulated Lithuania to revise its policies vis-a-vis Russia in a positive manner). This fact was appreciated in the United States and helped to establish Lithuania as the frontrunner in the Baltic race for NATO membership. In 1999, contributors to the report "U.S. Policy Towards Northeastern Europe" wrote: "Which of the three Baltic states should be included in the next round of NATO enlargement will depend, to a large extent, on which one is best able to meet the responsibilities of membership at the time. At present, Lithuania has made the most progress in modernising its military forces. It also has the best relations with Moscow. Thus, its inclusion would provide the least controversy with Russia"².

While the prospect of NATO membership encouraged Lithuania to improve its relations with Russia, NATO enlargement contributed to normalization of bilateral relations. Yet, one must admit that this positive momentum was not utilised equally. By sticking to the "red lines" policy Russia was keen to suspend the solution of certain bilateral issues in hope of preventing Lithuania

¹ The Washington Post, 27 October 1992

² Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. Policy Towards Northeastern Europe, Independent Task Force Report (Washington: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999),
www.cfr.org/pub3127/zbignew_brzezinski/us_policy_toward_northeastern_europe.php

from entering NATO. For example, Lithuania was the only Baltic state to sign a border treaty with Moscow in 1997, but this treaty was ratified in the Russian parliament only in 2003. By much the same token it is hard to call the American policy in the Baltic Sea region consistent. Edward Rhodes describes the ambiguity of America in such a way: "Following the collapse of Soviet power (...) the United States found itself caught between a moral commitment to the independence and self-determination of the Baltic nations and a pragmatic concern with developing a *modus vivendi* with Russia"³. Notably, Washington's opinion and advice influenced the negotiation process on Russian military transit to the Kaliningrad Region.

Despite numerous suggestions by Moscow to conclude a comprehensive bilateral agreement on this issue, the Government of Lithuania insisted on maintaining the transit regime under the national legislation. It is argued that this policy line was suggested by U.S. administration and Lithuanian policy makers followed their recommendations.⁴

Although the American presence in the Baltic States was not specially directed against Russia, it was still perceived in Moscow as an adversarial act aimed at ousting Russia from the region. Thus, the Northern European Initiative, presented by the Clinton administration to encourage cooperation with Russia's northwestern regions, was considered a tool of accelerating secessionism in the border regions. The conclusion of the Baltic Charter, which established special U.S. relations with the Baltic States and demonstrated U.S. commitment to integrating the three Baltic republics into transatlantic structures, contributed to this view of weakening Russia's role in regional security. However, the implicit nature of U.S. guarantees regarding Baltic accession to NATO, which were laid out in the Charter, bred certain optimism among Russian leadership.

The consequent U.S. policies can be easily connected into a comprehensive chain of an adversarial U.S. strategy towards Russia. The privatisation of the Lithuanian Mazeikiiai Oil Refinery ("Mažeikių nafta") is a remarkable example. This company was sold to the American "Williams" Corporation despite local criticism and Russian demands to sell it to the Russian "LUKoil" company. American officials and diplomats were closely involved in the privatisation process and, it is believed, had contributed to the political process in Lithuania. According to the Russian daily newspaper "Nezavisimaja gazeta", top Lithuanian leadership was highly motivated by geopolitical considerations and pressure from Washington.⁵ A few years later the U.S. State Department indirectly recognised this fact in its welcome statement regarding the reselling of "Mažeikių nafta" by "Williams" to the Russian oil company "YUKOS".

The victory of American citizen Valdas Adamkus in the 1998 Lithuanian presidential runoff was another signal of Russia losing its influence in the former Soviet republic. Moscow showed scarce enthusiasm about this victory. On the contrary, it was accepted as additional evidence of the widening American influence in Lithuania. "Zero-sum" thinking clearly dominated Russian politics of that time, but, as practice showed, President Adamkus' role in Russian-Lithuanian relations was hardly negative. He was the only president of the Baltic States to make an official visit to Moscow in 2001, and in relations with Russia he proved himself as a moderate, consensus-seeking politician.

At the beginning of the George W. Bush Presidency, U.S. focus on the Baltic Sea region diminished. On the one hand, the American administration was preoccupied with military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. On the other hand, the Baltic region was undergoing stable and peaceful development, which left little reason to worry about it. But the division of Europe

³ Edward Rhodes, "Rethinking the Nature of Security: The U.S. Northern Dimension", COPRI Working Papers, 7 (2002) (Internet version: www.copri.dk)

⁴ Laurinavičius Č., Lopata R., Sirutavičius V., „Rusijos Federacijos karinis tranzitas per Lietuvos Respublikos teritoriją“, Politilogija, 4 – 2002 (Internet version: www.vul.lt)

⁵ Рик Пайп, «Тэлботт наследил в Литве. Американские политические и деловые круги способствовали отставке правительства», Независимая газета, 29 октября 1999

over the U.S. military operation in Iraq revealed the unique pro-American dedication of the Baltic Sea nations; hence the U.S. administration had to follow-up.

The new initiative Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (also known as e-PINE), which was presented to the public in October 2003, reflects a new meaning of the Baltic States for the U.S.⁶ In contrast, it is impossible to overlook the fact that e-PINE and the EU “Wider Europe – New Neighborhood” Initiative were presented almost simultaneously. Back in 1997, the U.S. Northern European Initiative and the EU Northern Dimension were presented with the same pattern. Therefore, e-PINE can be perceived not only as a foreign policy line towards the Baltic Sea region but also as an instrument for promoting American interests in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Russian leadership has not yet expressed their official position on e-PINE; however, it is conceivable to predict that it will be very cautious. Some reasons can be given to support this argument.

Firstly, despite the repeated claims about an “indestructible” partnership between Russia and the West, and especially between Russia and the U.S. on the one hand and Russia and Europe on the other, discrepancy and lack of understanding between these strategic partners is only widening. The war on terrorism (especially in Afghanistan) has produced a certain conjunction of interests between Russia and Western democracies, but common values and common routines of institutional cooperation have not been developed.

Secondly, the question of differences in values between Russia and the West is still open. Russia and the West have different approaches towards building democracy, human rights and market economy. European and American governments still criticise Russian policy in Chechnya, which brings a painful reaction in Moscow. Russia is also concerned about the consolidation of pro-Western regimes in post-Soviet territory, first of all in CIS countries and partly in the Baltic States. Russia’s policy failures in Moldova, Georgia and, increasingly, Ukraine have strengthened these concerns.

Dmitry Trenin has related Russian policies in the post-Soviet territory with Russian interest in gradually restoring its former international status and influence: “There is every reason to believe”, he argues, “that during his second term in the Kremlin President Vladimir Putin will start [a new strategy of] gradual restoration of Russia’s international role and influence. The main goals of this strategy in a foreseeable prospect are the reconstruction of post-Soviet territory and the creation of an international “power center” led by Russia. This new Moscow strategy can be labeled a ‘CIS Project’”⁷. Trenin also believes that the Baltic States will be, to a lesser extent, included into this newly reemerging Russian-led territory.

During Putin’s first term, Russia’s role in the Baltic States was rather marginal. Interestingly, this period of “marginalization” coincided with the weakening involvement of the U.S. in the region. But now Russia’s interest in the Baltic States is recovering. “The Baltic dimension” of Russian foreign policy is getting more pragmatic and constructive, seeking to balance Russia’s traditional interests with the new opportunities opened up by Baltic accession to the European Union and NATO. This does not mean that the issue of compatriots has been excluded from the agenda of Russian foreign policy. In other respects the policy is getting more active and effective, supplemented with the necessary instruments, demonstrating that the problem of Russian-speaking minorities is not a pure policy instrument in relations with the Baltic States.

“Exporting success” is one of the declared characteristics of e-PINE, which stipulates that the economic and political experience and expertise of the Baltic States could be utilised in assisting the Western CIS countries (Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus) and the South Caucasus nations (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan). It is important to note, however, that Baltic involvement in

⁶ e-PINE Mission Statement stipulates that “These [Baltic Sea] states are important U.S. allies and friends”. See: U.S. State Department Homepage, www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/epine/c10621.htm

⁷ Дмитрий Тренин, «Realpolitik Москвы. Россия замыкается в постсоветском пространстве», Независимая газета – Дипкурьер, 9 февраля 2004.

the CIS area was encouraged long before formal presentation of the e-PINE initiative⁸. This issue was also briefly discussed by Per Carlsen in the previous issue of “Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review” (footnote). Moscow’s enthusiasm about the Baltic role in promoting Western values and transition experience in the CIS is rather limited, largely due to Moscow’s fears that such actions could damage the political and economic integration of the CIS nations and lead to their gradual integration with NATO. Russia is equally critical about the “Eastern dimension” of EU foreign policy, the so-called Wider Europe – New Neighborhood Initiative. To quote Russian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Vladimir Chizov: “We assume that the new doctrine of the EU will contradict neither our bilateral agreements with the EU nor the integration trends in the CIS area.”⁹

The American line on widening U.S. presence in the CIS region has another negative impact on Russian-Lithuanian relations. Russia insists that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia should accede to the Adopted CFE Treaty as soon as possible in order to create a better security environment in the region after NATO enlargement. But rather than being dealt with at the bilateral level, this issue has become part of the broader U.S.-Russia agenda. The U.S. has blocked ratification of this document by relating it to the fulfillment of Russia’s international commitments made at the Istanbul OSCE Summit in 1999 to withdraw its troops from Georgia and Transdnistria (Moldova).

Russia is also concerned about NATO plans to relocate part of its European troops to Central and Eastern Europe. Though U.S. and NATO officials declare that contemporary threats originate on the southern flanks of Europe, Russia still cannot be sure that NATO military bases will not appear in the Baltic States. High-ranking Lithuanian officials, including Defense Minister Linas Linkevicius, have declared on various occasions Lithuania’s interest in having NATO military presence on Lithuanian territory. Such developments would cause extremely negative reaction from Moscow and would deteriorate the cooperative environment between Russia and Lithuania.

Last but not least, Russia’s place in the framework of e-PINE deserves special attention. According to the Mission Statement, e-PINE covers five Nordic and three Baltic States. Russia’s role is mentioned from a critical point of view: “Northwest Russia, including Kaliningrad, has not progressed as fast as the rest of the region”¹⁰. At the same time e-PINE underlines the necessity to resolve transborder problems; thus, implementation of the initiative will unavoidably include northwestern regions of Russia.

Fifteen years after the Soviet collapse Russia remains sensitive to foreign attempts to establish direct links with its regions, bypassing the central authority. So far the U.S. has pursued low profile policies in Russia’s regions, avoiding greater visibility and activism. Now the U.S. will be able use the Baltic States as an indirect channel of developing cooperation with Russian regions. For example, Lithuania can become a promoter of American interests in Kaliningrad.

All this will lead to the consolidation of Russia in the e-PINE framework as a “second-class” participant, meaning that Russia will be excluded from the formulation of e-PINE agenda. In terms of constructivism, e-PINE will contribute to the expansion of Western identity in Russia’s northwestern regions rather than to the building of shared Russian-Western identity. From this perspective, e-PINE will not be welcome in Russia.

It is necessary to stress that the aforementioned points of Russian dissatisfaction are hypothetical. The details of the e-PINE initiative still have to be developed. In the long-term perspective, the implementation of e-PINE should not deteriorate Russian-Lithuanian cooperation. Three circumstances contributing to this view must be outlined. Firstly, despite ongoing local competition, both Russia and the U.S. are interested in preserving partnership or, at least, constructive cooperation. Washington’s influence in the Baltic region is a real thing which Russia

⁸ Cf. e.g.: Charles Ries, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, “The Baltic Sea Region From a U.S. Perspective”, Remarks at Baltic Development Forum Summit, Copenhagen, Denmark, 15 October 2002, U.S. State Department Homepage, www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/14539.htm

⁹ Выступление заместителя Министра иностранных дел России В.А.Чижова на международной конференции «Широкая Европа: усиление трансграничного сотрудничества в Центральной и Восточной Европе», Киев, 10 ноября 2003 года, Russian MFA Homepage, www.mid.ru

¹⁰ e-PINE Mission Statement

must, and most likely will, take into account. Besides, it would be wrong to continue to stick to the view that U.S. policy in the region is directed against Russia.

Secondly, Russia is not interested in the destabilization of the situation in Lithuania, because it would have negative consequences for transit to the Kaliningrad Region, as well as Russian business interests in Lithuania.

Finally, Lithuania has explicitly demonstrated its commitment to play the role of a “bridge” between Russia and the West, instead of being a permanent opposition to Russia on the international arena. Lithuanian initiatives to foster cooperation with Russia’s northwestern regions will certainly help to counterbalance the possible negative consequences of “exporting success” to CIS countries. These initiatives will hopefully be promoted despite the political processes in Lithuania itself.

The experience of Russian-Lithuanian cooperation shows that the American factor is not an obstacle for the development of a mutually beneficial relationship. During the decade, Russia and the U.S. have not engaged in a *strategic rivalry* over the Baltic States, although *local competition* has taken place in certain fields. At the same time, Russian-Lithuanian relations are gradually gaining a systemic character, which is less dependent on the influence of external factors.

TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE

**Evaldas Nekrašas
Robertas Bružilas**

Analysis has proven that changes in transatlantic relations largely depend on the changing organisation, aims and policies of NATO and the EU on the one hand, and the changes in EU–U.S. relations on the other, with the U.S. being the largest and most powerful NATO state, and Europe moving towards ever closer integration. Transatlantic relations cannot be thoroughly analysed without addressing other current global geopolitical changes and possible further development trends. The euroatlantic community is facing exceptional challenges today. What changes are possible in the North Atlantic Alliance after September 11? What is the solution to disagreements over Iraq between the U.S. and some larger EU states? Transatlantic relations are further complicated by the differences in EU and U.S. economic interests. The EU and the U.S. are competing on the global markets and the competition is very tough. As their economic interests differ, European and American policies cannot be completely uniform either; even more so since policies partly reflect economic interests or indeed serve as an expression of the economic interests of the parties. The EU and U.S. had common economic interests when they had a common menacing adversary, and maintenance of political discipline was a prerequisite for survival. However, the end of the cold war period gave way to growing differences between the U.S. and the strengthening European political voice.

U.S., EU AND NATO: COMPETITION OR CONVERGENCE OF INTERESTS?

The future of transatlantic relations and their influence on NATO development trends has currently become one of the most frequently debated questions in international relations' discourse, with the European Union being increasingly identified with Europe as a whole. The St. Malo Declaration issued at the British-French summit in 1998 represents an important point of departure for the discussions. The Declaration serves as an expression of the growing identification of the United Kingdom under Tony Blair's government with the European continent. Before St. Malo, European politicians largely relied on the formerly unchallenged principle that common European security and defence could only be developed within the NATO context and with America's accord. The EU and its common foreign and security policy had no essential role to play in European defence. The British-French bilateral declaration put forward an objective to supply the EU with an autonomous defence dimension and thus opened the way for the creation of an autonomous EU defence force capable of reacting in times of international crisis and of carrying out Petersberg-type missions, and possibly, even more.

Ever since the establishment of the Alliance, the U.S. has been and still is the major and clearly dominating NATO state both in political and military terms. U.S. politicians and especially members of Congress are permanently expressing discontent at the insufficient financial and military input of the European NATO members towards the implementation of NATO tasks, including one of the most important ones, European defence. The U.S. allocates a greater part of its GNP than the European NATO states for defence. The European NATO states outstrip the U.S. in terms of size of armed forces; however, European NATO states badly lack modern munitions (e.g. precision weapons), communications, transport equipment, military aviation equipment and many other things essential to modern armies. Presently, U.S. military expenditure accounts for 43 percent of global military expenditure. The U.S. spends approximately three times more on ammunition per soldier than NATO states do in Europe. U.S. defence expenditure in 2002 accounted for 3.4 percent of GDP, whereas the average expenditure

in Europe amounted to 1.8 percent. Germany, the largest EU state, gave 1.5 percent of GDP for defence in 2002, France allocated 2.7 percent of its GDP, and the UK allocated 2.6 percent of GDP¹.

U.S. defence expenditure more than two times exceeded the military expenditure of all 15 EU member states in 2002. In 2003 U.S. military expenditure rose by another 48 billion U.S. dollars and accounted for \$396.8 billion. What about the EU? The U.S. defence budget in 2004 accounted for \$401.3 billion. By 2007, the U.S. is planning an increase in defence expenditure up to \$469.8 billion per annum². After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 the U.S. administration established the Homeland Security Department to combat terrorism. The 2003 national budget allocations for this purpose amounted to \$27 billion and will amount to \$28 billion in 2004³. The U.S. president demanded Congress to increase allocations for the Homeland Security Department by 9.7 percent in 2005 based on the expenditure foreseen for 2004⁴. At least a part of these allocations should be considered as national defence expenditure. Therefore, the gap between defence expenditures in the EU and U.S. is only likely to widen. Indeed, some EU states increased their military budgets in 2003, however, the EU and U.S. still remain unequal partners in terms of the financing of military forces. The gap is even larger in terms of the quality of their respective military forces. What aggravates the situation from the U.S. point of view is the fact that European states use their comparatively modest military allocations ineffectively, and their priorities in terms of military spending do not answer their needs.

It is worth mentioning that according to the EU strategic research institute (European Institute for Research and Strategic Studies) six EU states including France, Germany, the UK, Italy, Spain, and Sweden account for 85 percent of EU military expenditure and for 98 percent of all investment in scientific research and modernisation of technologies⁵. However, EU R&D investment is meagre if compared to the respective U.S. investment. This largely explains the huge gap between the U.S. and European states in military power. While maintaining an obvious technological advantage over its allies and potential enemies, the U.S. is not interested in sharing its inventions and technological secrets. This is also a reason for tensions between the EU and U.S. The U.S. is only prepared to share a part, at best, of their new technologies with their traditional ally the UK; other European NATO member states and EU states are not likely to be taken into account.

The technological gap between Europe and the U.S. gives rise to serious problems affecting overall NATO effectiveness and viability. The military operations carried out in recent years have shown that European soldiers are unable to work together with American forces. The increasing technological gap would make Europe even more dependent on U.S. technologies, although this is precisely what Europe is trying to avoid. This situation has a negative impact on the military and political significance of the Alliance. That is precisely why the modernisation of European military forces is crucial both for Europe and for the Alliance.

The Kosovo campaign largely added up to destroying the illusion that NATO is an alliance of partners who are equal or at least comparable in military strength. During the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2000 the U.S. Defence Secretary at the time William Cohen clearly pointed this out to American allies in Europe:

“We simply cannot continue with a posture in which one member of NATO conducts virtually two-thirds of all air support missions and half of all air combat missions; in which only a handful of countries have precision munitions that can operate in all kinds of weather; and in which some pilots had to communicate over open frequencies in a hostile environment.”

Europeans were obliged to acknowledge the truth of the deserved criticism. The German Defence Minister at the time, Rudolf Scharping, said at the same conference that the problem is

¹ SIPRI Yearbook 2003

² Schmitt B. Defence Expenditure, Institute for Security Studies – <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/11-bsdef.pdf>

³ Office of Management and Budget. Summary tables - <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/tables.html>

⁴ Progress in the War on Terror – <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040122-1.html>

⁵ Schmitt B. Defence Expenditure, Institute for Security Studies – <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/11-bsdef.pdf>

not about the Alliance depending too much on the U.S., but about it depending too little on Europe.

The military mission in Kosovo exposed a serious lack of military and technical compatibility in NATO forces more clearly than ever before, although the compatibility requirement was highest on the NATO requirement list for the NATO candidate states. This proved to be a great impediment to the successful conduct of military operations involving armed forces of different countries of the Alliance.

In order to strengthen the role of the European NATO states in NATO activities and operations, efforts to support European military capabilities were undertaken back in the 1990s, at the same time seeking to prevent duplication of the existing NATO administration and planning structures and military capabilities. Building up the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance was considered to be an integral part of NATO efforts to adapt to the new political and military realities emerging after the end of the Cold War.

Over time, however, Europeans grew increasingly unsupportive of this concept of ESDI developed within the NATO framework. Along the lines of ESDI, Europe was continuously approached as a younger partner of the U.S., with the U.S. being able to veto European actions at any time. As the EU acquired strength and continued on its way towards closer integration, it became increasingly aware of its interests and sought more independence from the U.S. In a way, this also meant seeking less dependence on NATO, as the U.S. was the clearly dominating state in the Alliance both in military and political terms. Clearly, at least for the time being, the EU cannot take over the territorial defence tasks the Alliance was created to perform. However, the EU is clearly demonstrating a tendency towards greater independence from the U.S., and this is evident in its implementation of the Petersberg tasks formulated back in 1992, including, (1) humanitarian and rescue tasks, (2) peacekeeping tasks and (3) tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

The implementation of the Petersberg and similar tasks by the EU should be based on both CFSP and common European security and defence policy. Since both these policy areas overlap, we can *de facto* talk about a common EU foreign security and defence policy. Its formation is based on European interests, rather than formal obligations to take up the implementation of the tasks that the WEU has just approached. According to analysts, European interests cannot be adequately represented in the global forum without real access to any military means of their implementation.

With transatlantic unity slowly, although not dramatically weakening and the U.S. influence in Europe waning for various reasons, Europe, embodied by the enlarging EU, is starting to see its place in the world in a new light. Europe seeks to become one of the power centres of the twenty-first century, with its might comparable to or even surpassing that of the U.S., China and Russia.

While seeking to become a global player, Europe cannot ignore the importance of the military dimension. A European military power with an independent military capacity cannot remain dependent on the military might of the U.S., even though the objectives of the European forces consist of the implementation of tasks limited in scope. This is the main reason why Europe grew less interested in its security and defence identity within the NATO framework and also why the Common European Foreign and Security Policy was supplemented by the Common European Security and Defence Policy.

The Americans tend to emphasise that the creation of an EU military force essentially independent from NATO should not lead to a splitting of the Alliance. They fiercely oppose the formation of independent European military planning and management structures by arguing that this leads to unnecessary and even harmful duplication of the existing NATO structures. Some leaders from the largest EU states have an opposing view. In their opinion, EU armed forces will remain dependent on NATO and on the U.S. unless they have their own military planning and management structures. Otherwise the European military force will essentially be controlled by the U.S., not by the EU.

There is increasing awareness in Europe that opinions about international security problems and the ways of dealing with them may not necessarily coincide on both sides of the Atlantic. The

U.S. and EU worked together in the past during the Kosovo crisis in spite of the difficulties they faced in the area of military cooperation. However, this situation may not necessarily repeat itself during all other possible crises, especially those arising outside Europe. The war in Iraq has proven that these fears do have a solid foundation.

Much needs to be done in order to enable the future EU armed forces to work independently from NATO, especially within the area of logistics. The first organisational steps towards the creation of independent European armed force management have already been made. They include the establishment of the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Headquarters, although through the end of 2003 the Headquarters were involved in military inspections rather than military leadership.

The new status of the EU as a political *and* military union, not limited to economic and political cooperation is further demonstrated by the institutional EU – NATO cooperation which started in January 2001. This includes regular EU- NATO meetings on the ambassadorial and foreign ministerial level.

There are talks in certain quarters in Europe, and especially in France, that the future EU rapid reaction force is going to become part of a larger future European army capable of implementing tasks ranging from Petersberg-type tasks to tasks of territorial defence. The first steps towards the creation of such an army have already been taken. With Europeans claiming a larger share in European defence matters, the creation of independent European military planning and management structures previously strongly opposed by the U.S. and labelled as duplication and a waste of resources, appears absolutely inevitable. This is a prerequisite, be it not a sufficient one, for the creation of full-fledged European armed forces. The French president Charles de Gaulle once said that NATO means European defence organised by Americans. U.S. military presence in Europe is weakening, and Europeans *volens nolens* will have to gradually shoulder the burden of European defence.

After meeting the new NATO Secretary General J. De Hoop Scheffer in Washington in late January 2004, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell officially declared that the U.S. was reviewing its military doctrine and intended to further decrease the number of military personnel and military bases in Europe in the near future⁶. During his visit to Russia a few days later he mentioned that U.S. redeployment of military forces in Europe in the near future would involve the creation of several new military bases in the former states of the Warsaw Pact. He assured, however, that the new bases were not going to be as large as the military bases in Germany had been during the Cold War period. According to Powell, American military forces in Europe will be decreased to less than 100 thousand; however, the remainder of the military force will be more rationally deployed. It may be that after their mission in Iraq ends a part of the U.S. soldiers will come to the new military bases in Central and Eastern Europe. Western analysts foresee that a part of the military bases in Germany may be transferred by the U.S. to Poland and even to some other new member states which are joining the Alliance in May 2004. Washington is reassuring Moscow that American plans to establish several military bases in Central and Eastern Europe are intended to provide better access to the regions of potential military crises, especially in the Middle East, and do not constitute part of an anti-Russian strategy nor pose any threat to Russia.

The Draft EU Constitution foresees the possibility for separate EU member states to work under a *structural cooperation* framework within the area of defence in order to work in closer military cooperation. In other words, several EU states may cooperate more closely within the defence area and later they may be joined by other states capable of such a degree of cooperation. States involved in closer cooperation in defence matters could undertake obligations of mutual support broadly analogous to the obligations under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Earlier in 2003, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg proposed that the EU set up its own military headquarters in Tervuren, Belgium⁷. The public statement on strengthening European defence integration contained a proposal to establish the Planning and Management Headquarters for EU international operations carried out without the participation of the Alliance and independent of

⁶ Remarks with NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer after their Meeting, 29 January 2004 - <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/28606.htm>

⁷ Defensive War// The Economist, p.25, 6 December 2003

NATO. Leaders of the four states said that this initiative is aimed at strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance. Washington was severely critical about this initiative and stated that the EU should endeavour to better its military capabilities rather than trying to create a new structure and continue ineffective use of its limited military resources.

The U.S. administration expressed even greater concerns about the creation of a Common European Defence System when the UK grew interested in the EU *structural cooperation* possibilities within the area of defence. Officially London maintains that the UK shall not undertake any measures that could weaken NATO. However, Britain can see many advantages to the future creation of a military force that could be used in critical situations without the participation of NATO and the U.S.

The move of the UK closer to the official position of France and Germany was largely influenced by the fact that Tony Blair has had to pay a high political price for participation in the U.S.-led war in Iraq. The majority of the UK population opposed dispensable military actions in Iraq. Besides, the UK is concerned about its influence in the enlarged EU. It strives to be a major player in forging the future of the EU and not to leave this task to France and Germany alone.

As the EU economy strengthens, creation of the European armed forces may become reality in several years' time. It is true that the objectives specified in the Helsinki summit in 1999 were not completely accomplished by 2003. However, according to CFSP High Representative Javier Solana certain work is being done or has already been done in implementing the ESDP and in reaching the objectives stated in Helsinki. Currently three EU-led missions are being carried out outside the EU, including the "Concordia" mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and missions in Bosnia and Congo. In addition, the European Defence Agency will be established in the near future. It will be responsible for harmonising munitions in EU member states, coordinating more effective use of EU states R&D investment and ensuring a competitive edge to the European defence industry⁸. The Helsinki summit objectives should be reviewed, made more specific and included in the "European Headline Goal 2010", a document which is still being discussed.

The transformation of EU-NATO relations in this case may change the structure of the euroatlantic defence community significantly: from "one polar power" it could move towards a two polar cooperation.

NATO-related problems are not the sole complication in EU-U.S. relations. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, one of the most authoritative institutes in Europe, wrote about European-U.S. relations.

Much misunderstanding stems from the simple fact that European-U.S. relations are and will be asymmetrical. The United States is a global power with a foreign and security policy determined by the president. The European Union is not and will not be in the foreseeable future a single state – it will be a community of states with differing priorities. Thus, so long as a genuine common foreign policy is lacking, there will be no common security and defence policy. Therefore, Europe and the United States are incompatible in these respects.⁹

However, this position could be questioned because the CFSP potential may increase within the European Draft Constitution context. The establishment of the post of EU Minister of Foreign Affairs for the EU alone will not guarantee the creation of a common EU foreign policy, but may surely add to the gradual convergence of foreign policies of the EU member states. It is likely that the establishment of this post will help coordinate the foreign policy of the EU and will result in its consistency. On the other hand, it is important to note that up to now forming a truly common foreign policy has proven to be a difficult task for the European Union.

IMPACT OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACK ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

⁸ Summary of the Interventions by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, Brussels, 5 November 2003 - <http://ue.eu.int/pressdata/EN/discours/77839.pdf>

⁹ Rotfeld A.D. "The New Transatlantic Agenda: the EU-U.S. Relationship", in: *Prospects for EU-U.S. Relationship*. Ed. by Ryszard Stemplowski, Warsaw, 2001, p. 15-16.

The attack on September 11, 2001 changed the world, and transatlantic relations were not an exception. NATO's response to the September 11th attack was quick and decisive. At the time NATO was established, everybody thought that an armed attack on one or several member states of the Alliance would really only be possible in Europe and that the United States would be the major power capable of withstanding such an attack. On September 11th, however, a European NATO-member country was not attacked, but the United States itself. American military power was unsurpassable, resting on the country's economic power: during the last decade of the twentieth century the American share in the world economy increased from 25% to approximately 30%¹⁰.

In fact, the strike was aimed at the major world power militarily, economically, technologically and in many other respects. The military, technological and economic power, however, did not prevent the attack that went down in history as a glaring example of an "asymmetric" act of war.

The North Atlantic Alliance responded according to Article 5 of the Washington treaty and thereby demonstrated the unity that everyone expected from it at all times of its existence. True, that unity had weakened since the end of the Cold War when a common enemy of Alliance members – the powerful and aggressive Soviet Union – ceased to exist. It is well known that the unity of any alliance is based on the existence of powerful enemies. In September 2001, the world realised that a new and equally dangerous enemy had emerged or, to be more specific, had been triggered. Like communism, it too is an international phenomenon, therefore it was natural to expect an international response to the threat to international security. NATO is often marked as the most successful military alliance in the history of the world. Consequently, though NATO was created as a response to threats of a different nature, the experience of its member states in the sphere of military cooperation supported the idea that NATO might become the most important international organisation in fighting international terrorism.

Being a member state of NATO, the United States could have taken advantage of membership in the Alliance and sought to carry out the operation in Afghanistan under the umbrella of NATO and make the Alliance a leader and headquarters for fighting international terrorism. However, the U.S. waived such an option and decided not to use NATO resources.

Such a secondary role played by NATO in Afghanistan and during the entire fight with international terrorism makes many politicians and analysts doubt the significance and future of the organisation. As already mentioned, such doubts emerged immediately after the Cold War, but they have never been as abundant and blaring as in recent years.

In fact, why was it undesirable for the Americans that NATO begin taking real actions according to Article 5 and that response to the international terrorism attack be a collective one attempted by the entire Alliance? One of the most frequently mentioned reasons thereof was the bitter experience of the Americans while acting together with the Europeans in NATO-led operations in the Balkans. The Americans decided that their formal allies would not be of much use from a military standpoint; they would hinder rather than help to carry out a speedy and successful military operation. Therefore, after September 11th the United States decided to take unilateral actions in spite of the good intentions of the Alliance. Based on the attitude formulated by Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld that "a coalition should be conditioned by a mission; a mission should not be conditioned by a coalition", the Americans formed a wide informal coalition whose actions were not restricted by the procedure for carrying resolutions applicable in the North Atlantic Alliance.

The most recent problem that has arisen since the Americans emerged victorious (in part) in Afghanistan is pertinent to Iraq. The only super power used its military force to change Iraqi regime. True, there was not much evidence of direct links of Saddam Hussein with *Al Qaeda*, or evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. In January 2004, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice acknowledged that seemingly Iraq had not possessed a significant stockpile of weapons of mass destruction immediately before the war. However, the Americans are of the

¹⁰ See: Cox M. "American power before and after 11 September: dizzy with success?", *International Affairs*, vol. 78, No. 2, April 2002, p. 266.

opinion that Saddam Hussein, because of his malevolent international reputation, had to be removed.

The dispute as to whether it is necessary to prevent modern threats by military measures demonstrates the different attitudes of Americans and Europeans towards ways that international problems should be dealt with. Many people thought that *a war* was not necessary. Their opinion is supported by the fact that the toll of casualties among soldiers of the U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq after the official end of large-scale military operations have exceeded those suffered during the operations and that a great many civilians have been killed in terrorist attacks.

The U.S. Coalition against Iraq did not receive support from many old timers of NATO and even met with their opposition. The difference in opinion on Iraq revealed a noteworthy development: the new European democracies are well-disposed towards the U.S. and seek to become important players in international relations. The Vilnius 10 pledged backing for the U.S. stance on Iraq and once again demonstrated the fact that the Old Continent was divided into two groups: the loyal allies of America from the former Soviet block and the old allies with much more sceptical views, namely Germany and France. The conservative American daily newspaper *The Washington Times* summed up the difference in opinion of the U.S. and Europe by stating that “the countries of Central and East Europe have become the major allies of America in Europe, and the dynamics of Old Europe policy may have a colossal impact on U.S. foreign policy¹¹”.

In February 2003, the Alliance faced the biggest crisis in several decades when NATO members France, Germany and Belgium blocked the approval of additional defence measures in Turkey in the event of war with Iraq. Agreement was reached some time later through NATO’s military planning unit without involvement from France.

The differences in opinion of the Europeans and Americans on Iraq and many other issues of international policy – from environmental problems to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court – are obviously as dangerous as international terrorism. Transatlantic unity had been a guarantee of international security for more than 50 years. According to many experts and researchers, such unity is weakening now.

Europeans accuse Americans of unilateralism that they, like most of the rest of the world, cannot accept and consider lawful. They are of the opinion that by stating that “a coalition should be conditioned by a mission” (not vice versa) Rumsfeld expressed doubt in the future of steady coalitions, permanent alliances and thereby, the future of NATO itself.

Thus, the question naturally arises whether NATO will manage to survive among *ad hoc* coalitions. Decreasing the significance of NATO’s role would be a real threat to the transatlantic partnership. It would be more expedient that such coalitions be a temporary measure to deal with particular problems, whereas NATO should continue as a long-term guarantee of security and stability.

Americans and Europeans view the world from different perspectives – power versus weakness. Europeans are weaker militarily and therefore tend to solve problems through diplomatic and other non-military measures. They are not capable of using military measures simply because they do not possess the required military capacity¹².

The future of transatlantic relations will be mostly determined by the fact of whether the Americans and Europeans can succeed in clinching their material arguments brought on by several factors: geopolitical position, different value systems and distinct ideas as to how to deal with international problems. Analysis of national security strategies supports this statement.

EU AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES: SIMILAR OR DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES?

¹¹ A Ticket to the New Europe// the Washington Times, 9 February 2003, p. 4.

¹² Kagan R. “Power and Weakness”, *Policy Review*, 113, 2002

One of the factors that determined the weak position of Europe in the transatlantic partnership was the fact that the EU failed to develop an agreed and consistent common foreign and security policy. Therefore, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been more an objective rather than a fact. Nevertheless, today, for the first time in its history Europe has a common security strategy. In December 2003, the common vision on European security and its place in the world, developed by Javier Solana, was approved. The development of such a vision was mainly brought about by increasing differences in the foreign policies of countries of the Old Continent and the natural desire of Europe to have more influence in the sphere of international relations. The document provides concrete suggestions on how the EU can contribute to fighting modern threats and become a stronger, more active and consistent global player.

The common attitude of Europe concerning the character of its response to modern threats is effective multilateralism. The strategy clearly specifies that the EU must closely cooperate with its partners and, above all, continue the *indispensable* transatlantic partnership.

The strategy maintains that Europe continues to face threats to its security. Moreover, the new threats – terrorism, distribution of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, the fall of entire states and organised crime – are less visible and more difficult to predict. Since most of the threats emerge in other regions, Europe must draw the first line of defence further off its borders. In addition, the security strategy provides that the EU must take strong preventive measures before a situation spins out of control. Since neither of the newly emerging threats are mere military ones, it is impossible to combat them by taking only military actions.

The document lists and discusses aspects of U.S.–EU relations. The strategy emphasizes that acting together they can be an effective force, and that Europe is the only reliable global partner of the United States, and vice versa.

In the course of analysis of transatlantic relations, EU Security Strategy should be compared with the National Security Strategy declared by the U.S. administration in September 2002, which is the most comprehensive document prepared by the G.W. Bush Administration and sums up the international system, defining the U.S. role therein. It is emphasized at the very beginning of the Strategy that from military, economic and political power perspectives the United States cannot be surpassed by any other country. The new strategy has a fundamental difference from the former one: it is a strategy of “pre-emption” rather than the passive Cold War strategy of “deterrence and containment”. After the Cold War, deterrence ceased to be the most effective means to guarantee U.S. national security, because the major threat to the U.S. is now posed by underdeveloped and unpredictable countries rather than by some other equal power. The document, which straight after its adoption became known as “the Bush Doctrine”, obligates the United States to identify and eliminate any threats posed by terrorists before they approach the borders of America¹³.

According to U.S. global strategy, Europe takes priority over other strategically important regions. It is emphasized in the National Security Strategy that “there is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe. Europe is also the seat of two of the strongest and most able international institutions in the world – NATO and the EU”¹⁴. On the one hand, Europe is considered a guarantee of democracy and the major ally from military, economic and cultural perspectives. On the other hand, status as an ally does not mean that Europe must become strong enough to challenge U.S. dominance.

It can be maintained that, according to the authors of the National Security Strategy, that U.S. global dominance and national interests can be guaranteed only by a strong, safe and democratic Europe. The European roots of the founders of the United States, close EU-U.S. cooperation as well as universal Western values establish that the U.S., in fact, is just “a little bit different Europe”. Therefore, EU-U.S. cooperation in various fields is inevitable and natural. Still, the strategic interest of the U.S. is not to allow any country – neither European nor Asian – to challenge U.S. global dominance.

In spite of the increasing power of the United States and the universally recognised fact that for the time being the U.S. is the only super power, Americans still need international structures

¹³ See also: U.S. Administration’s *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, declared on 14 February 2003.

¹⁴ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. September 2002, p. 25.

which can support the aims and objectives of Washington. The Strategy declares that the U.S. will continue to adhere to commitments given to NATO, the United Nations and other organisations; however, it also emphasises the establishment of *ad hoc* coalitions for the purpose of U.S. national security. Such coalitions are convenient for the U.S. because they can be quickly formed by several countries for the accomplishment of a concrete mission. In order to obtain support for pre-emptive actions the U.S. shall give its greatest attention to allies or “*Coalitions of the Willing*”. In addition, the Strategy says that the U.S. shall constantly try to make use of the support offered by the international community but it shall not think twice about acting unilaterally if necessary. The Strategy implies that the U.S. does not believe now as before that its interests can be protected by means of deterrence and collective actions irrespective of whether it is NATO’s collective defence or resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

Comparison of the above two strategic documents has shown some similarities – an almost identical understanding of threats and emphasis on the necessity of pre-emptive actions. On the other hand, there are many differences. Firstly, the obvious unilateralism of the United States as distinct from the multilateralism advocated by Europe. Further, some differences can be found when analysing their views on allies – Europe speaks in favour of equal partnership, taking into consideration U.S. military dominance, whereas the U.S. in the context of “*ad hoc*” coalitions tries to provide its allies with some secondary functions (e.g. peace keeping operations after settling a conflict). The differences will continue to complicate the U.S.-EU partnership, which, of course, does not imply that development of the partnership is impossible. In the end, the most important condition for a successful U.S.-EU partnership is the equality of its partners, and the increased military power of Europe should provide more opportunities to take joint actions.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RUSSIAN FACTOR ON U.S.-EU-NATO RELATIONS

While carrying out analysis of U.S.-EU relations, the Russian factor cannot be ignored. In the course of the changing international situation, Russia eventually started dialogue with NATO, but at the same time, it was trying to decrease the importance of NATO and diminish the role of NATO as an organisation of collective defence. Since September 11, 2001, relations with Russia have transformed into real cooperation, though there is no way of knowing if this will last. Russian President V. Putin was one of the first to offer support for the United States and its actions in fighting terrorism. At that time the Russia-U.S. cooperation developed into a new partnership, which was confirmed in the *Joint Statement on New U.S.-Russia Relationship*¹⁵ announced in November 2001. The Statement spoke in favour of close cooperation between the United States and Russia in building an integral and peaceful Euro-Atlantic community. Further, the new common enemy – international terrorism – was named, and the necessity to combat the same was maintained. All of this provided stimulus for more active cooperation in both political and military fields. Russia supported the operation of the U.S.-led Coalition in Afghanistan, opened its air space and even did not dramatise the fact that U.S. forces were deployed in former USSR territory. Furthermore, Russia did not oppose the war in Iraq as much as did Germany and France. All of these factors led to intensification of the dialogue between Russia and United States. On the other hand, Russia’s support for the U.S. in fighting international terrorism helped the country put some of its internal problems on the international agenda. Aiming to justify its equivocal methods applied in solving the conflict in Chechnya, Russia benefited from linking its actions to the necessity to combat terrorism¹⁶.

In the context of the analysis of transatlantic relations it would be quite complicated to say who will be a close partner of Russia in the future – the USA, the EU or NATO. Europeans worry about the tendency towards unilateralism characteristic of the U.S. administration foreign policy,

¹⁵ Joint Statement on New U.S.–Russian Relationship – access via the Internet:
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011113-4.html>

¹⁶ The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, approved on 28 June 2000 - access via the Internet:
<http://www.president.kremlin.ru/>

because the U.S. could seek cooperation with Russia on a unilateral (or better, a bilateral) rather than on a multilateral basis.

Through cooperation and development of both political and economic relations with the U.S., Russia wants to show Washington that Moscow (not Paris or Berlin) is the best ally. Should Moscow succeed, this factor would become an additional threat to the limited unity of the North Atlantic Alliance and would make relations between America and Europe even more complicated.

It often so happens that Russia, though supporting the initiatives of Old Europe, in fact seeks to prevent the EU and U.S. positions from getting closer. Russian President Putin emphasises the significance of Russia–EU relations and maintains that the shortest and most reliable way for Europe to become an independent and strong centre of global power lies through relations with Russia, which has become more transparent, understandable and predictable. Recent events in Russia, however, fall short of proving the above opinion of Putin. By balancing between the two powers, Russia hopes to win or at least not lose.

Contradictions between the U.S. and EU should not, however, be overestimated. Although the EU seeks to strengthen its political influence through the CFSP, and the U.S. seeks to maintain its dominant position in the Western world and North Atlantic Alliance, and though Europeans are not satisfied with U.S. plans to develop the antimissile defence system while Americans oppose the formation of self-dependant EU military forces, these contradictions are not too great to allow Russia to cause damage between the allies. Europe and America enjoy common, though not completely identical, civilisational values that would not allow the West to split easily. One could hardly expect that based on such cooperation that Russia would be able to drive a wedge between the U.S. and EU. The United States needs a strong, safe and reliable partner - and Europe as well.

The end of the Cold War and ensuing processes highlighted some points of disagreement between the major allies which would have been impossible in the former bipolar system (West-East), and even could have caused the U.S.-European partnership to cease. Nevertheless, Europe most likely will remain the major U.S. ally and partner in military, political, economic and cultural spheres.

LITHUANIA AT THE CROSSROADS OF TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION

What conclusions should Lithuania draw from the transformation of U.S.-EU-NATO relations under analysis, and how should they be reflected in the foreign policy of Lithuania? The most important conclusion should be the following: both the EU and NATO today are rather different from the organisations that were called the EU and NATO at the time when Lithuania officially declared its intention to join them. In addition, the global balance of power has also been changing. At present, the second centre of power after the U.S. is located in Europe (and most likely will be for a long time), which through economical and, to a lesser extent, political power allows Europe to compete with America. However, the growing economies of Russia and, in particular, China, as well as their strivings to increase their own international influence may create conditions for the development of a system with several centres of power.

Lithuanian membership in NATO and the EU will impose some more restrictions, in addition to those already existing, on the foreign policy of Lithuania. It will have to comply with the provisions provided for in the common foreign policy of the Alliance and the European Union. Therefore, Lithuania will have to apply significant efforts with a view to influencing the EU CFSP, so that it would satisfy the country's interests. Of course, much will depend on the evolution of the CFSP itself, because nowadays the EU fails to produce unanimous opinions on certain international issues, leaving the policy still somewhat of a draft rather than a reality. In cases when the interests of the EU and Lithuania do not completely match, Lithuania certainly will continue to defend its interests as it has been doing so far, for instance, in the case of transit to Kaliningrad.

In addition, Lithuania will have to take a clearer position concerning EU evolution, functioning, organisation and other issues. To this point, while not being a member of the EU but taking part in discussions on the future of the EU (for example, in the Convention), it has been reasonable for Lithuania to adopt a relatively cautious and moderate position. After Lithuania

becomes a full member of the EU, we believe it will be possible to express ideas that are more daring. The same could be said about the position of Lithuania on the functions, tasks, enlargement and development of NATO.

Another problem, even more important in our opinion, of the long-term foreign policy of Lithuania could be defined as a problem of *divided or dual loyalty*. This problem will result from the simultaneous membership of Lithuania in the two international organisations, whose relations have been far from ideal recently.

NATO and the EU are separate, though cooperating, organisations. U.S.-European relations will have great impact on the future of both NATO and the EU. Nowadays, many analysts and experts believe that the strategic U.S.-EU alliance that played such an important role during the Cold War now faces a deep crisis. If we look at U.S.-European relations taking into consideration their development from the late 1700s to now, we have to state that the strategic partnership in the second half of 1900s is far from being as natural as we are used to thinking. Moreover, we can hardly assume that such a partnership will last forever. Nevertheless, it is not very likely that in the near future the partnership will collapse, though there is no question that it will have to overcome many difficulties.

We are frequently asked how the European security and defence policy initiatives should be evaluated from Lithuania's position. Naturally, in general they are assessed positively because Lithuania associates itself with Europe, which is getting stronger and more secure economically as well as politically and therefore serves the national interests of Lithuania. Lithuania as a would-be member of the European Union supports development of the EU defence dimension so far as it does not decrease the importance of NATO. Lithuania holds the position that determination of the EU to independently settle crises by establishing the EU rapid response forces demonstrates its willingness to assume more responsibility for stability and security assurance in Europe. Lithuania identified and provided the EU with a list of its forces that in the future would become a part of the EU rapid response forces. Nevertheless, NATO remains the most important security-assuring factor, and the Vilnius 10 countries assume the same position on this issue as Lithuania.

After accomplishment of the set task to become a full member of NATO and the EU, Lithuania should stop for a while and think of further landmarks of the foreign policy of the country, in particular, if the positions of the U.S. and the major countries of the EU would differ on international issues.

Until now Lithuanian foreign policy has been more pro-American for many reasons. One of the most important factors has been the priority of the country's security over its welfare. Since there was no question that only NATO membership could provide the security guarantee, and only the strong support of the United States could ensure membership in the North Atlantic Alliance, the pro-American position of Lithuania was natural and reasonable. Lithuania would not become a member of NATO without the active support of the U.S., because the major European powers were definitely much more sceptical than America over the necessity of the present NATO enlargement. The latter applied pressure on the former, and that resulted in an outcome favourable for Lithuania. The truth is that the pro-Americanism of most of the other Central European countries is, or was, conditioned, to a great extent, by concern over the security problems and the conviction that only America is able to help solve them.

Although Lithuania, after more than a decade of tenacious efforts becoming full member of the North Atlantic Alliance, has to admit that today the future of NATO seems quite vague and uncertain. The Alliance was established with a view to fighting threats that no longer exist. Moreover, it does not have much to boast about as far as fighting the new threats to international security is concerned. For many reasons, including the regionality of the Alliance, it might be very difficult to fight global threats of international terrorism or the distribution of weapons of mass destruction, even after the introduction of radical structural and operational changes by the Alliance.

Having admitted that in this century the role of NATO will be less significant than in the second half of the 1900s, and having established that both the security environment of Lithuania as well as the nature and functions of NATO have changed, we may entertain doubts about whether Lithuania should *under all circumstances and almost automatically* support the U.S. position on international issues.

U.S. foreign policy to a great extent is conditioned by the president and his administration. It is doubtful that Bill Clinton would have started a war in Iraq. Anyway, today many analysts and even influential politicians in both Europe and America do not believe that the war was inevitable. Official independent commissions in both the United States and the United Kingdom have already started investigations into why the intelligence information about the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was so inaccurate.

It is unlikely that the war in Iraq has made the world more secure. It seemingly has strengthened rather than weakened international terrorism. One of the facts supporting this point of view is the increasing number of casualties after the official end of the massive military operations.

The U.S. administration seems to have failed to learn lessons from Afghanistan. After true (or superficial) victory in Afghanistan, the country's government really only controls its capital though it has the support of U.S. soldiers other NATO member states and countries that are not members of the Alliance (including Lithuania). Today Coalition forces in Iraq fail to guarantee security even in Baghdad. The war in Iraq has been the most significant step in realising the U.S. National Security Strategy (2002). However, it is reasonable to doubt whether it has been a rational and successful step.

The pro-American position of Lithuania is conditioned by various factors. One of the factors is the Russian threat in its new forms strengthened by "the controlled Russian democracy" developing towards authoritarianism. For many reasons there is not the slightest doubt that the American factor will remain very important in the foreign policy of Lithuania. Still, should it be as significant as it has been up to now?

Lithuania, as a full member of the EU and NATO, is interested in the success of this relationship. New EU and NATO states, including Lithuania, should actively contribute to the development of the transatlantic partnership of the new century. It is very likely that over time the pro-Americanism of the Central and East Europe countries will be declining, whereas European orientation will be increasing. The stronger unity of the EU countries should assure a more harmonious and successful transatlantic relationship.

RATIFICATION OF THE NATO TREATY IN THE U.S. SENATE: LESSONS LEARNED

Renatas Norkus

In the spring of 2004, Lithuania, along with the other six Vilnius Group countries, have become full-fledged members of NATO and the European Union. These two equally important foreign policy achievements mark the recognised progress that the country has made in terms of its economic and democratic development. Without a doubt membership in both organisations also comes as a result of the decade-long process of developing and realising Lithuania's bilateral relations with member countries of the Euro-Atlantic community. Not minimising in any way the importance of such cooperative relations with many European NATO and EU members, this article will focus on the role of the United States, more specifically of the U.S. Congress, in the process of Lithuania's Euro-Atlantic integration.

The U.S. influence and political as well as military weight in the decision-making of the North Atlantic Alliance has always been and remains very significant. This has been equally true with regard to NATO enlargement. The U.S. has played a leading role both in terms of its engagement with other allies and non-members on the issue as well as in terms of its practical support for the NATO candidate countries. Those who closely followed the evolving discussions that were taking place in NATO-member capitals over the last two rounds of NATO enlargement clearly observed that internal public debate in the U.S. was much more visible and vocal than that conducted in the other NATO countries. Moreover, unlike in many European allied countries where decision-making on NATO enlargement was predominantly driven and influenced by the executive branch of government, the debates in the U.S. involved a much broader range of players. These included a wide number of non-governmental think-tank organizations, but most importantly the U.S. Congress, which played a very significant role in the process.

This article attempts to provide an insight into the specific role played by the U.S. Congress in the process of the U.S. policy formulation vis-a-vis Lithuania's successful road to ultimate membership in NATO. What are the main observations and lessons to be learned from the process that led to the historic May 8, 2003 vote of the U.S. Senate by a margin of 96 – 0 to ratify the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the accession of Lithuania and six other European democracies?

THE ROAD TO NATO MEMBERSHIP: REACHING OUT TO THE HILL

For the last several years, reaching out to the U.S. Congress has been one of the pillars of Lithuania's NATO accession diplomacy in the United States. Understandably so, since any favorable position on NATO enlargement that was being promoted by the Administration and supported by informed non-governmental audiences would require, at the end of the day, a two-thirds majority vote of the U.S. Senate.

It was evident that a designed strategy was needed to help achieve the desired result, namely the strongest possible support for Lithuania's case in the Senate. Such a strategy evolved over time. The most valuable experience for Lithuanian diplomacy was the Polish campaign that resulted in a strong vote of support in the Senate for the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The latter campaign showed the importance of the role that was played by the Polish-American Community and later the so-called NATO task force uniting representatives of ethnic communities from the Central and Eastern European Coalition.

THE ROLE OF BALTIC-AMERICANS

It was already more than evident in the mid-1990's that the Lithuanian-American Community, working closely with other ethnic diasporas of Eastern and Central Europe, was going to be at the center of Lithuania's efforts in working both with the U.S. Administration and obviously with Congress. Indeed the Baltic-American communities contributed to the shared effort of the three Baltic States in many important ways. As voters - Democrat, Republican or Independent - they made known their positions to their elected representatives in the U.S. Congress in Washington D.C. But even more importantly, they spared no effort in creating wider support by informing the local public through interaction with local media and organisations that had an interest in foreign affairs. Some of the most important activities at the State level included seeking passage of NATO resolutions by State legislatures, organizing fund raisers for members of Congress and holding seminars at colleges or universities on the topic of NATO enlargement. All these activities greatly helped to raise awareness of Lithuania and the other Baltic State's foreign policy objectives and their rightful wish to join the Euro-Atlantic community. Every single letter by individual members of the Baltic-American communities sent to their representatives made an impact.

As a result of this active contribution by ethnic communities, the case of Lithuania and the other Baltic States was much better understood, which in turn helped Baltic friends on the Hill to establish so-called Baltic Caucuses. Congressmen John Shimkus from Illinois and Dennis Kucinich from Ohio opted to co-chair such a group in the House of Representatives. Similarly, in the Senate the Baltic Caucus was formed and co-chaired by Senators Richard Durbin from Illinois and Gordon Smith from Oregon. In many respects, the two Caucuses helped the Baltic States to present their NATO case on the Hill.

CONGRESSIONAL VISITS

A second pillar of the strategy of reaching out to the Hill was finding the ways and means to get congressional members to travel to Lithuania and the other Baltic States. Obviously, first-hand experience always helps a great deal in understanding the real needs of a country as well as its policy posture, and helps evaluate achievements and identify the challenges faced ahead.

I very well remember the numerous bilateral meetings between Lithuanian officials and members of Congress when to a very common question asked by a congressman or a senator: "What can I do for you, Mr. Minister", we would respond with: "Come and visit Lithuania". Given the extremely busy congressional schedule, it was not an easy task to get members of Congress to go overseas, despite their genuine interest and wish to do so. In such circumstances, we realized the importance of congressional staff. Their role and influence as well as professionalism clearly indicated to us a truly effective way of communication with Congress. The first group of staffers representing the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees as well as the Speaker of the House of Representatives office visited Lithuania in August of 1998. The visiting delegation met with the President of Lithuania, the Chairman of Parliament, members of Parliamentary Foreign Relations and National Security Committees and Foreign and Defense Ministry officials. But most importantly, the staffers also had a chance to travel across Lithuania and make first-hand judgments of the process of democratic development in the country. Looking back from today's perspective, the visit opened an important new chapter in the Lithuanian-U.S. congressional agenda. It helped communicate the message to the right people, who passed it further on to the most important decision-makers in the U.S. Congress.

Other visits quickly followed. In the fall of the same year a delegation of eight Senators headed by the late Senator William Roth of Delaware visited Lithuania. In the period from 1999 through 2003 Lithuania hosted more than 60 members of Congress travelling with various CODEL's (Congressional delegations) either on a bilateral basis, or in the context of NATO Parliamentary Assembly visits to Europe.

Lithuania also entered into a very productive relationship with the Potomac Foundation – a non-governmental organization which helped organize four congressional staff trips to the Baltic States. All these visits were most instrumental in helping present Lithuania's progress in both economic and defense reforms as well as in getting highly appreciated feedback from the U.S.

side. Moreover, these visits provided the best opportunity to establish professional parliamentary member-to-member and staff-to-staff working relations between the two countries.

Such an emerging active parliamentary cooperation prompted Vilnius to appoint a senior diplomat to the position of Congressional Liaison at the Embassy in Washington, D.C. His function was largely to ensure that contacts between the Embassy and congressional staff were maintained on a daily basis. Having a person in charge of the relations with the Hill was also appreciated by people in Congress, for having a “one stop shop” contact on matters related to Lithuania. His function also included close coordination with congressional liaison officers of the other NATO-candidate countries, though not all of them appointed one.

In summary, the second important element of the so-called “Hill strategy” was the continuous networking with important congressional staffers, which in turn helped to attract the attention of congressmen and senators to Lithuania. As a result, their support for membership of the Baltic States in NATO was steadily growing. The Vilnius Group was a third critical factor that helped attain support on the Hill for NATO enlargement.

THE VILNIUS GROUP: ADVANTAGES OF JOINT ACTION

After Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined NATO in 1999, the United States and other member states of the Alliance began to consider the next round of enlargement. At the time the conventional wisdom was to invite one or possibly two states to join NATO, despite the interest expressed by nine Central European states. On May 19, 2000, however, a major conference was convened in Vilnius by nine East and Central European aspirants to NATO. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Albania, Macedonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria announced that they would work together cooperatively to gain membership in NATO. This cooperation soon became known as the Vilnius Process, which later became the Vilnius Ten Group after being joined by Croatia.

These ten countries entered an unprecedented process of cooperation, which produced numerous joint statements and helped convene to date fourteen meetings on the level of presidents, prime ministers, speakers of parliament and foreign or defence ministers. Nowhere was this cooperation as active and structured as in Washington, D.C. In many instances the Embassy of Lithuania played a leading role in organizing almost monthly consultations among Vilnius Group ambassadors aimed at working out a structured plan of cooperation.

One of the unprecedented events took place on May 1, 2002, when all ten Vilnius Group ambassadors testified at a hearing before the House International Relations Sub-Committee on Europe. This hearing represented the most visible opportunity for Lithuania and other candidate countries to present their case in the U.S. Congress. Even though the House of Representatives did not have a formal role in the ratification process (ratification of international treaties is the prerogative of the Senate), it was always crucial to keep congressmen informed and involved in the debate because of their important role in forming a broader public opinion throughout the States.

It is important to note the immense support by the Committee on NATO – a bipartisan group of NGO representatives, which counselled the embassies throughout the process. Indeed, the Committee on NATO was the first to outline the architecture for the second round of NATO enlargement that included the seven candidate states that were most ready for membership, thus creating the logic and mechanism for what became the American policy of pursuing a Europe, whole and free. At the end of the day, the so called “Big Bang” approach to NATO enlargement became official U.S. policy, and was adopted by NATO at the Prague Summit in November 2002 at which Lithuania and the other six Central European states were issued an invitation to join the Alliance.

After the Prague Summit, the focus of the Vilnius Group fully diverted to the U.S. Senate in view of the upcoming ratification process that would have to amend the Washington treaty with the inclusion of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On January 8, 2003 the Embassy of Lithuania drafted the so-called „Senate Ratification Strategy and Action Plan”, which was presented by Ambassador

Vygaudas Ušackas to his colleagues from the other six invited countries. The strategy suggested that the seven should continue active work with the strong NATO enlargement proponents in the Senate and House of Representatives, especially with those members of Congress that had been selected to be in control of the floor during the ratification debate. Another important task was to help gather support for ratification from newly elected senators as well as those members of the Senate that were undecided or for various reasons opposed to the Vilnius Group membership in NATO.

The ambassadors also agreed upon certain important aspects of cooperation, namely to coordinate all of the activities as much as possible to avoid duplication of the congressional meetings in Washington. There was a common sense agreement and encouragement among the Senate staff and Administration that visits by high-ranking government officials should occur in groups and not individually. If visits still took place individually (which was unavoidable and not to be discouraged), all agreed to coordinate that they did not occur in the same week, let alone the same day. On the other hand, the ambassadors agreed to share the information of and to coordinate their appointments with senators in D.C., as well as sharing their travel plans to states. It was desirable to strive for group calls (with three, four or seven present, as appropriate) when meeting senators. It was also quite helpful to include cities outside of Washington and New York for these visits. Senators respond to their constituents and they appreciate bringing foreign leaders to their states. The states to be targeted included those represented by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the leaders of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate leadership. A prerequisite for the successful implementation of such a strategy was, of course, trying to be as flexible as possible, which the group indeed managed to be. In implementing the above strategy, the coordinated meetings of the Vilnius Group were intensified and also included officials from the U.S. State Department.

All in all, the jointly coordinated action by the Vilnius Group turned out to be a manageable exercise. But most importantly, working together, sharing information, talking to each other and jointly approaching members of the U.S. Congress had a much greater impact than by each country doing it on its own.

ENLARGEMENT DEBATE: ISSUES AND POSITIONS

One would be not mistaken if observing that the nature of the debate over the second NATO enlargement was different compared to the one when Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined the Alliance. It was much less polarised in terms of views, and therefore carried a rather positive tone. Some of the heavily-debated issues in 1996-1999, such as the financial cost of accession, NATO-Russia relations, or fear of creating a new division in Europe, turned out to be non-issues in 2000-2003. Furthermore, the whole international security environment in the aftermath of the September 11 events provided completely different points of departure for the debate on new NATO members.

The U.S. position on NATO enlargement

NATO enlargement has always been a bipartisan issue in the United States. Both the 1994 Republican “Contract with America” as well as the Clinton Administration supported NATO enlargement. On the campaign trail in 2000, both Presidential candidates supported further NATO enlargement in 2002. All the official statements were in favor of new countries joining the Alliance.

The most vocal statement, however, first specifically supporting the Baltic States’ membership in NATO came from Senator Jesse Helms. In his speech at the American Enterprise Institute on January 11, 2001, he said:

“...Just as we never recognised the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States, we must not repeat the mistakes of the 1940’s today by acknowledging a Russian sphere of influence in what Russian leaders ominously call the “near abroad”. These nations’ independence will never be fully secure

until they are safe from the threat of Russian domination and are fully integrated into the community of Western democracies.

I intend to work with the Bush Administration to ensure that the Baltic States are invited to join their neighbors Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as members of the NATO Alliance. This is vital not only for their security, but for ours as well. [...] That means taking the next step in the process of NATO expansion, by issuing invitations to the Baltic nations when NATO's leaders meet for the next Alliance summit planned for 2002".

Similarly, in the hearings before the House International Relations Committee on March 7, 2001, Secretary Colin Powell testified that:

"[...] NATO is still alive and well, and that's why nine more countries are standing there waiting to see if they can join this great Alliance. Why do they want to join? Is it to become a partner with their other European friends? Yes. But the real reason? They want to join so that they can have that connection with the bastion of freedom, and that's here in North America, represented by the United States and Canada. That's why they want to be part of NATO, and that's why we have to keep letting this Alliance grow.

[...] three of those countries in particular, there is a unique set of sensitivities – the Baltic States and our relationship with Russia. But Russia will never be given a veto as to whether or not they come in or not come in."

While in Lithuania on March 23, 2001, the Speaker of the House, Dennis Hastert, when addressing Lithuania's Parliament said:

"[...] I pledge to you that if Lithuania invests the resources necessary to meet the requirements of NATO membership, I will do all in my power to bring Lithuania into the Alliance in 2002.

I intend to work side-by-side with President Bush, Vice President Cheney and Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld to make this a reality..."

On April 5, 2001, seventeen U.S. Senators wrote a letter to President Bush urging his Administration to "ensure" that NATO invites qualified European democracies to begin accession negotiations at the 2002 Summit in Prague. Resolutions were introduced in both the House (Shimkus Resolution HCR 116) and Senate (Campbell Resolution SCR 34) singling out the three Baltic countries, praising their substantial progress and in the House supporting their accession to NATO.

The strongest signal that the United States was about to make a positive decision to enlarge NATO was sent by President Bush on June 15, 2001 in Warsaw, Poland. At that time he said to the world:

"It is time to put the talk of East and West behind us". "The partition of Europe was not a fact of geography, it was an act of violence. Wise leaders for decades have found that the hope of European peace is in the hope of greater unity."

He went on to say:

"NATO, even as it grows, is no enemy to Russia. America is no enemy to Russia." "We will not trade away the free European peoples. No more Munichs, no more Yaltas."

On October 24, 2001, Senator Jesse Helms introduced the Freedom Consolidation Act (S.1572), which reaffirmed support for continued enlargement of NATO. It also authorized specified amounts of security assistance for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The bill was passed on May 17, 2002 by a vote of 85-6. President Bush signed the bill into Public Law 107-187 on June 10, 2002.

In August 2002, a report by the Republican staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended that seven European democracies be invited to join NATO at the Prague summit if they continue to carry out political, economic and military reforms. The report stressed the importance of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) during the ratification process in preventing backsliding on reforms among the invitees, and that the MAP process would also help to implement policies announced in Prague to fight the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass

destruction. NATO members preliminarily endorsed the expansion of the Alliance at a November 2002 summit in Prague, setting in motion a process to expand NATO for the fifth time since 1949.

Indeed, as was recognized by Senator Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Foreign relations Committee, the Bush Administration and the Senate had been in constant dialog on NATO enlargement policy for two years. This consultation was admitted to be a model of how the two branches should cooperate in exercising their treaty-making power.

Non-Issues

The Cost of NATO enlargement was an important, and at times contentious, issue when the Alliance was considering the membership of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. In the debate leading up to the 1999 Senate vote ratifying enlargement, cost estimates for the United States and for the new member states varied wildly. Unsurprisingly, those opposed to enlargement reckoned the costs much higher than those who supported it. Estimates ranged from \$27 billion to \$110 billion in total. In fact, the cost of bringing in the three countries appeared to have been relatively modest. After their admission to NATO, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic began making payments into NATO's three common budgets and the prorated contributions of the other member states fell accordingly.

The budget issue almost disappeared from the discussions of the current round of enlargement. The seven countries under consideration for membership presented a different set of issues militarily. Rather than dollars and cents, policymakers focused this time around on military capabilities, with emphasis being placed not on how long it would take for new members to become interoperable with current NATO members, but rather on what their militaries would be able to offer. Hence the seven countries were advised and began to concentrate on developing "niche" capabilities that NATO could draw on to fulfill its new missions. There was also a growing recognition of the value of having countries pool their resources to develop so called "big-ticket" procurement items such as strategic airlift.

On April 28, 2003, a report by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that integrating seven countries into NATO would cost the 19 current NATO members about \$2.7 billion over the 2004-2013 period; the U.S. share of that amount would be about \$650 million and would be subject to appropriation action. In addition, the seven prospective members could incur significant costs to upgrade and modernise their militaries. The United States might help those countries in that process through the use of foreign military financing (FMF) and other assistance. However, according to the CBO report, such assistance would be discretionary and probably not significantly larger than current levels of aid to those countries.

U.S.-Russia relations were one of the issues debated by the opponents of NATO enlargement in 1997-1999. One vociferous critic was Michael Mandelbaum, who argued that "NATO expansion is the Titanic of American policy, and the iceberg on which it will founder is Baltic membership". Likewise George F. Kennan, the famous architect of U.S. containment policy towards the Soviet Union, and one would have thought an unlikely source for such sentiments, condemned NATO enlargement as "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era." Indeed, while there was a tendency among opponents during the last round of enlargement to lay every problem in the U.S.-Russia relationship, and every example of Russian misbehavior at the doorstep of NATO enlargement, there have been few such examples during this round of enlargement.

In comparison to the Russian government's caustic rhetoric during the last round of NATO enlargement, Moscow's message has softened. There are a number of factors that have contributed to this softened position.

Firstly, in the three years that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have been NATO members, there have been no aggressive moves toward Russia, and Russia has seen that enlargement to Europe's east is not directed against Moscow's interests. Secondly, the applicant countries have adopted responsible and cooperative policies towards Russia aiming at good neighbourly relations based on pragmatic bilateral agendas. Lithuania, among other cooperative

initiatives involving Russia in regional frameworks such as the Council of the Baltic Sea, in 1999 proposed to the Russian Government a package of bilateral Confidence Building Measures that enhanced military-to-military cooperation and lowered the ceilings of the Vienna CSBM's to be applied between the two countries. It is worth noting that during the visit of President Adamkus to Moscow in March 2001, President Putin agreed to make a joint statement that said:

“... The Parties recognize the right of each and every state to choose its security arrangements, committing at the same time not to strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other states.”

Later that same year during his visit to the United States, President Putin said the following on National Public Radio:

“[...] I am not opposed to it [Baltic States' NATO membership], [...] We of course are not in a position to tell people what to do. We cannot forbid people to make certain choices if they want to increase the security of their nations in a particular way [...].”

Thirdly, it is possible that President Putin now views a unified front against terrorism, in part due to Moscow's ongoing conflict in Chechnya, as more important than potential divisions with the West over enlargement.

Fourthly, and I think most crucially, the U.S. other NATO member states, as well as candidate countries have been able to consistently convey a common message, which at the end of the day is appreciated by Russia. The message being that NATO enlargement and the development of a cooperative NATO-Russia relationship are not mutually exclusive, but they are complementary and reinforcing; the enlargement of NATO, a defensive alliance comprised of democratic nations, does not threaten any country in Europe; all of Europe benefits from the existence of NATO, including Russia. The latter message was supported by an important practical arrangement. In December 2001, NATO and Russian Foreign Ministers announced their intention to create a NATO-Russia Council, on the principle of “NATO at 20”. In May 2002, NATO and Russian leaders meeting in Rome signed the “NATO at 20” agreement, in which Russia and NATO members participate as equals on certain issues. This replaced the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council that had been initially established in 1997. Spurred by the tragic events of September 11, 2001, this decision demonstrated the shared resolve of NATO countries and Russia to work closely together as equal partners in areas of common interest and to stand together against common threats and risks to security.

Enlargement and NATO's Transformation

While neither of the above discussed issues – the cost of enlargement and the Russian factor – turned out to be problematic in the debate on the current round of NATO enlargement, the focus of the discussion between Congress and the Administration was the North Atlantic Alliance itself and its transformation in order to meet new threats.

At the November 2002 Prague summit, NATO Heads of State committed to transform NATO with new members, new capabilities and new relationships with its partners. By inviting Lithuania and the other six democracies to start accession talks, the Alliance considered the membership of these seven countries as part of its transforming role for the 21st century.

In this context, a number of key questions were examined during the numerous hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees as well as during the full Senate floor debate.

First, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the U.S., the Alliance must adapt and be ready to respond to the very ripe threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, Americans and Europeans together need to strengthen NATO's role in meeting threats outside of Europe, which in turn means becoming a more capable and useful force to respond to the array of asymmetric threats. Against this background, will the seven new nations enhance the military effectiveness of the Alliance? How will their entry into NATO affect the growing

“capabilities gap” between the United States and many of the other NATO members that the Alliance has been facing for years?

By and large these issues are equally relevant to both old and new members of the Alliance. To address them effectively, NATO’s leaders at the Prague summit in November 2002, decided to launch the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) and to create a NATO Response Force (NRF). Through the PCC, NATO members agreed to spend smarter, pull their resources and pursue “niche” specializations. The NRF is intended to enhance NATO’s ability to undertake out-of-area military operations with capabilities relevant to today’s threats. The Response Force is envisioned to be a highly- ready force of approximately 25,000 troops with land, sea and air capability, deployable on short notice and able to carry out missions anywhere in the world. The seven new members fully associated themselves with these initiatives. Each of them is engaged in the process of military reform, upgrading its secure communication systems, improving training, logistical support and personnel capabilities and establishing military spending at a minimum level of two percent of gross domestic product. Each of the seven invitees has provided direct military support for the global war on terrorism, acting as *de facto* allies by contributing transit and basing privileges, military and police forces, medical units, transport support to U.S. and coalition efforts, and/or airspace rights.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, which was submitted to the Senate on April 30, 2003 by Committee Chairman Senator Lugar, presented the following conclusion regarding the qualifications of the seven candidate countries:

“In considering the qualifications of the seven countries, the Committee has examined the degree to which each has satisfied the Membership Action Plan (MAP). The Committee believes that Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia have overcome obstacles to their candidacies. And of the seven aspirants, the Baltic States have made the most progress in meeting MAP requirements”.

The second group of questions that were raised in the debate on NATO were concerning the so-called “consensus rule” by which NATO operates. Should NATO consider changing its operating procedures so that it is not, in all cases, bound to act by consensus? Hence, does NATO need a process for suspending the membership of a nation that is no longer committed to upholding NATO’s basic principles and values?

Some Senators were concerned that the divisive debate at the end of 2002 over planning for the defense of Turkey in the event of war with Iraq demonstrated that achieving consensus in NATO had become more difficult. Agreement was reached only by moving the discussion out of NATO’s political body (the North Atlantic Council, or NAC) and into its Defense Planning Committee (DPC), in which France does not participate. This, according to some Senate Armed Services Committee members, slowed decision-making and constrained operations. They also argued that achieving consensus was likely to become even more complex as NATO enlarges its membership. Therefore, the consensus rule must be reexamined to ensure that NATO will remain an effective military organisation.

Regarding the issue of a suspension mechanism, some Armed Services Committee members were concerned about the lack of a mechanism to suspend a NATO member if a member no longer complies with the fundamental tenets of NATO – democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

These views, however, found support neither in the Administration, nor in NATO’s North Atlantic Council. In fact, in his letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee, dated April 21, 2003, Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman underscored his belief, shared by all NATO member states, that the consensus rule works more in favor of the U.S. than against it, and that compromise and persuasion, and use of the Defense Planning Committee, remain effective tools to enable NATO action. The letter also asserted that NATO has ways other than expulsion to deal effectively with allies that “go bad”, for instance, isolating them or excluding them from sensitive NATO discussions.

One should note though that questions about the consensus rule and expulsion were not raised directly in relation to the new NATO members, but rather reflected emotions stemming from the debate and division among the U.S. and certain other NATO allies over whether to use military force against Iraq. In January 2003, Bush Administration officials applauded the decision of

Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia to sign a letter that endorsed the U.S. position on Iraq. At the same time the Administration criticised France, Germany and Belgium for blocking NATO efforts to provide preliminary assistance to Turkey in the event of an attack by Iraq.

Moral and Strategic Imperatives of Enlargement

Even though the questions that have been discussed above were by and large at the center of the debate on the latest round of NATO enlargement, the two major arguments that led the ratification of the accession of the seven new members to a successful result were moral and strategic imperatives of enlargement.

The moral imperative called the U.S. to help new democracies, formerly subjected to the yoke of tyranny, consolidate and secure their own freedom and sovereignty. The strategic imperative suggested that a united Europe of common values would help avoid the major wars as experienced in the 20th century. A united Europe would be a better partner to the United States in dealing with world affairs. A united Europe would provide a context of security that would encourage reform in Ukraine, Russia, Caucasus and even Belarus.

Of course recognising these two imperatives, the basis for a positive decision in the U.S. Senate was the sound reform of each aspiring nation – including military reforms of national strategy, secure communications systems, upgrading infrastructure and procedures to NATO standards, improved training, logistical support and personnel and military spending at a minimum level of two percent of gross domestic product.

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, each of the seven aspirants declared its determination to act as an ally of the United States in the fight against terror. Since then all seven countries have provided support for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, and have contributed to both operations. At a May 1, 2002 hearing of the Senate Foreign relations Committee, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Mark Grossman and Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith said that enlargement was needed to extend the zone of security and stability in Europe through the expansion of a united Euro-Atlantic community based on democratic values. Grossman asserted that enlargement was still relevant in the wake of the September 11 attacks because “if we are to meet new threats to our security, we need to build the broadest and strongest coalition possible of countries that share our values and are able to act effectively with us.”

CONCLUSIONS

Summarising all it up the four observations might be drawn:

First, working with the U.S. Congress on the issue of NATO enlargement, and specifically on Lithuania’s case in that process, required a number of commitments. Establishing a network of working relationships with members of Congress and their staff, both in Washington, D.C. as well as on the State level, proved to be essential. Three important elements helped achieve that objective: 1) effective work on the grass roots level by the Lithuanian-Americans and other ethnic communities, 2) exclusive focus by Lithuania’s government on its diplomacy efforts on the Hill, and 3) joint action by the Vilnius Group working together with the Committee on NATO. An additional feature that helped maintain a vibrant and lively agenda on the Hill was being flexible in dealings with members of Congress.

Second, the experience of the process of the previous (1999) NATO enlargement ratification (even though it was a different process in its nature of debate and circumstances) served as a good background for both the new candidates and the congressional experts as they prepared for the ratification debate in 2003. The Polish experience in this context was particularly helpful to Lithuania’s diplomacy in Washington, D.C. and indeed throughout the rest of the United States.

Third, the NATO enlargement ratification debate in 2001-2003 did not encounter visible opposition, as was the case with the previous enlargement. Most of the current debate focused on

NATO's transformation in the aftermath of the September 11 events, and what role the new members would play in the Alliance. Since the question of membership qualifications of the candidate countries was dealt with mostly through the Membership Action Plan program, the congressional debate centered on more general moral and strategic arguments for NATO enlargement.

Fourth, members of the Senate came to vote on May 8, 2003 having a broad agreement that an enlarged Alliance of democratic states with improved capabilities and interoperability, joint defence and operational planning and realistic training will be better able to fulfill the Alliance's main purpose: to increase the security of its members and provide for common defence against terrorism and other threats.

It is important to recognise that the U.S. decision to support the enlargement of NATO to include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, was not a reaction to any single event or threat, rather it was a strategic opportunity for the expansion of a zone of peace and democracy in Europe. This is the best proof that Europe remains of vital interest to the United States.

REVIEW AND COMMENTARY ON LITHUANIAN–U.S. RELATIONS IN 1918–1940

Juozas Skirius

Since the mid-1800's the history of Lithuania has recorded close relations between our nation and the United States of America. This is primarily related to Lithuanian emigration. It was maintained in the early 1900's that one third of all Lithuanians lived outside Lithuania, with some sources stating that 500,000 to 1,000,000 of our compatriots lived in the USA. There were really no families in Lithuania that bore no connection to emigration. Emigration had an economical, cultural and political effect on the nation and embedded the name of *America* in Lithuanian society. Over time, this word acquired plenty of meanings in the mind of a simple Lithuanian. This remote and mysterious country became a symbol of freedom, wealth, and later on, a powerful intercessor and ally.

Established in 1918, the Lithuanian state had a natural striving for prompt international recognition, especially from the great powers. The international recognition *de facto* and *de jure* is an act of quite complicated political and diplomatic process describing, in concentrated legal form, the attitude of a state towards its new partners.

The first still not official contacts between the State of Lithuania and the USA were detected precisely at a time when Lithuanian politicians were striving for recognition. At this point it should be noted that research shows that representatives of the newly established Lithuanian state focused a great deal of their attention on the United States and expressed deep sentiments towards the country. Moreover, many Lithuanian people had set their hopes on the "mysterious and wealthy America" that emigrants were so fond of. Why?

On closer analysis of the international situation after World War I (1914-1918) we will take note of many reasons, most of which are related to the advantages of the U.S. over Great Britain, France, Germany and other great powers. Firstly, after the war the U.S. emerged on the international stage as the greatest economic power (over 40 per cent of the world's production). Secondly, Europe was under American financial control (20 countries, including the major U.S. allies, were its debtors). Consequently, the immense economical and financial potential necessary for Europeans was concentrated across the Atlantic Ocean. Thirdly, the famous *Fourteen-Article Programme*, the peace and post-war world arrangement programme, declared by U.S. President W. Wilson's Administration on January 8th, 1918, gave the hope of self-determination to all dependent and liberated nations. This objectively caused the U.S. to be regarded as the international leader and protector of small nations. Fourthly, the U.S. was also very important to Lithuania because of the numerous Lithuanian emigrants united into quite strong political and social organisations. The American Lithuanians supported the motherland by means of active propaganda and financial support, sending their representatives to work in the state institutions of Lithuania. Moreover, many emigrants were determined to come back to Lithuania, and later on a part of them did, bringing their capital and professional experience to the country.

THE ISSUE OF THE RECOGNITION OF LITHUANIA BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM 1919-1922

It is reasonably understandable that political leaders of the young Lithuanian state were highly interested in gaining the patronage of such a political and economical giant, along with its approval on decisions aimed at solving national and economic problems in Lithuania as well as border determination. Therefore, it was not by coincidence that on October 31, 1919, Prime Minister Ernestas Galvanauskas signed a mandate for a mission to be sent to the U.S. On the 3rd of October, former Minister of Finance Jonas Vileišis, major Povilas Žadeikis and the American Lithuanian priest Jonas Žilius left Kaunas. However, for a long while they could not obtain

permission from U.S. ambassadors in Paris to leave for America. Permission with certain restrictions was issued only on the 6th of December. The U.S. Consul had not granted visas explaining that the U.S. Government did not recognise Lithuania. Still it did not object to the activities of the mission by the American Lithuanians.

The road to recognition by the U.S. Government was long, extending to 1922. Moreover, the very process of recognition appeared to be amply complicated. So, what caused the Americans to sit on the fence, bringing disappointment to the Lithuanian society, particularly politicians, and breaking their faith in the principles of peace, democracy and self-determination advocated by America? Martynas Yčas, a member of Lithuania's delegation to the Paris Conference in 1919, in his published review of U.S. policy towards Lithuania in 1920, ventured an opinion that "in Paris the American politicians failed to support the cause of Lithuania even though it was the United States from which the Lithuanian Government had expected the most support". In order to find out why this happened it is necessary to discuss the position of the then U.S. Government in regard to the Baltic States, and Lithuania in particular. It should be noted here that the stated position was not unanimous because several political opinions prevailed.

It became clear from the meetings of Lithuanian political leaders with their counterparts from the USA in 1918 – 1919 that the latter still held Lithuania as a part of Russia. American President Wilson and Secretary of State R. Lansing followed the so-called *principle of undivided Russia* in official foreign policy (with the exception of the former parts of the Russian Empire – Poland and Finland). When on April 6, 1917, the U.S. entered the war on the side of the Entente it became Russia's ally. After the revolution in February 1917, Russia was in the hands of new Provisional Government. After the Bolshevik coup d'état in October, the U.S. Government held the position that the rightful successors of A. Kerenskiy's government in Russia were the governments of the major anti-Bolshevik forces (A. Kolchak, A. Denikin). This is well-illustrated by the relations of Americans with the envoys of A. Kolchak during the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919. There exists a letter to Kolchak dated May 26, 1919, and signed by the leaders of the major countries of the Entente (Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan) and the American president. In the letter, Kolchak was in fact recognised as the head of the would-be democratic Russia on condition that the national minorities on the peripheries, including the Lithuanians, were granted wide autonomy. Therefore, the American officials regarded the envoys of Lithuania (likewise Latvia and Estonia) as representatives of an autonomous Lithuania within Russia. In addition, the ambassador of the anti-Bolshevik forces in Washington, B. Bakhmetyev, attempted to officially represent Lithuania in America from 1917-1922.

On the other hand, Americans had another point of view – to unite Lithuania and Poland. This idea found support not only among some American businessmen interested in trade with a country as big as Poland (in compensation for lost markets in Russia) but also some politicians connected to the Embassy of Poland in Washington and activities of the 4 million American Poles. The legal grounds for such a position were provided for in Article 13 of the Fourteen-Article Programme on the Polish Issue. The article, in its abstract form, points out that the territories indisputably populated by Poles are to be incorporated into Poland, and that Poland should have a free and reliable gateway to the sea. A provision like that provided the Polish Government with the opportunity to lay claim to the Vilnius region and to Klaipėda, the nearest port to Poland, since Danzig (or Gdansk) was established as a *free city* under control of the *League of Nations Union*. It is understandable that Lithuanian politicians resisted such plans of a union with Poland and unexpectedly received support from the White Russians. On June 1st, 1921, Ambassador B. Bakhmetjev delivered an official memorandum on the status of the Baltic States to the U.S. State Department. The document offered a so-called 'conditional', i.e. provisional recognition. The ambassador's position could be explained as follows: should Lithuania be incorporated into Poland, it would be more difficult to 'recapture' Lithuania after the overturn of Bolshevik rule. The memorandum provided the Washington administration with new legal grounds for amending the 'Russian Issue'. Hence, officially on the U.S. Government level, there emerged a third viewpoint – the possibility of a provisional recognition of Lithuania. America, however, delayed this recognition. Why?

Firstly, American diplomats were making preparations for an international conference in Washington (Nov.1921 – Feb.1922) where they intended to use the principle of an *undivided Russia* against the plans of Japan in the Far East. Before the conference, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Flecher gave a straight answer to the analogous question of Senator V. King: ‘at the moment it is not beneficial to the United States to recognise the Baltic States’. It is known that the opinion of American officials that Bolshevism would not be liquidated was growing stronger in 1921-1922. American businessmen were more and more interested in economic relations with Soviet Russia. It can be proven by the statement of U.S. Trade Department officer H. Grove in 1922 saying that the Baltic States were the best American–Russian trade base.

Secondly, delay of the recognition of the Baltic States until 1922 was also caused by territorial disputes between Poland and Lithuania, which resulted in the incorporation of the Vilnius region into Poland on January 8, 1922, in violation of the interests of Lithuania. Thus, with approval of the Entente countries, the dispute was solved in favour of the larger country – Poland. Nevertheless, it should be admitted that by satisfying Poland’s minor claim to the territory of Lithuania, a more acute political and military conflict between the two states was avoided. The interests of Lithuania were in fact bargained away for the benefit of the great Western powers and their political purposes in Eastern Europe. In addition, such a situation in the Eastern European region satisfied the Americans, as their primary priority had always been *peace...at any price*. It was now possible to decide the question of international recognition of the Baltic States. However, the administration in Washington was still waiting for some “pretext” that could completely justify the actions of the U.S. Government to Russian emigrants in America (not only the leaders but the society as well). Such a pretext occurred on June 30, 1922, when the *Conference of Ambassadors* (an international organisation of the ambassadors of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan) passed a resolution on the intended recognition *de jure* of Lithuania. Upon complete examination of the issue of official recognition of the Baltic States, the U.S. State Department, before the Conference of Ambassadors on July 28, 1922 ‘recognised the governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’ *de facto* and *de jure*. Attention should be given to the fact that the governments were recognised instead of the states. In other words, America recognised the autonomous governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania within Russia, but which at that time (of course, temporarily) were not within Russia. It was obviously a limited and uncommon recognition. Why? Because the recognition was provisional, i.e. until the Soviet-Bolshevist power ceased to exist. When the regime collapsed, the Baltic States would have to return to democratic Russia, and only then their future would be decided democratically: whether to grant independence or not. Yet, it did not happen that way because after the collapse of the USSR, the scenario of the rebirth of Russia was different.

It should be noted that the above status of the recognition of the Baltic States in 1922 was not given publicity, nor did politicians speak about it. One can imagine that they did not go deeply into it or possibly even did not know about it. The politicians and press in Lithuania simply used to maintain that the U.S. Government recognised Lithuania, and that was enough.

Such limited recognition at the time embedded some positive factors. Firstly, the Lithuanian Government was granted recognition at a time when it had already lost the Vilnius region, and when the Klaipėda region had not yet been legally incorporated into Lithuania on an international level. The recognition of the State of Lithuania by America would have made difficult the return of the mentioned territories. Secondly, the United States was still the first Western power to recognise Lithuania on such a high level, which added to Lithuania’s international self-confidence and moral strength when fighting for its national rights. Evidence of that was the Lithuanian Government’s refusal in 1922 to accept the proposal of the *Conference of Ambassadors* concerning internationalisation of the Nemunas.

THE KLAIPĖDA AND VILNIUS ISSUE IN AMERICA

The Lithuanian Government really anchored its hopes in the USA when dealing with the territorial problems of Lithuania because it knew that in 1922 the American Government was inclined to attribute the Klaipėda region to Lithuania. Therefore, it was not a coincidence that in

1923, when this issue became a topic in international relations, Lithuania requested U.S. mediation. The American position represented by Norman Davis, Chairman of the *Nations Union* Commission on the Klaipėda issue constituted in 1924, was clear – to give Klaipėda to Lithuania in exchange for the Vilnius region, which was occupied by Poland. The American decisions and proposals concerning Lithuania were more favourable than those of other Western countries. The Polish representatives were against Davis' proposal because they wanted more rights to the Nemunas and Klaipėda seaport. Nevertheless, when on March 23, 1939, Hitlerian Germany forced the Lithuanian Government to surrender the Klaipėda region, American Government officials accepted that fact in silence and thus approved the occupation of Klaipėda by Germany. It was conditioned by U.S. neutrality in European policy, as well as through fear of heightened tension. This could be proven by the circulation of the American media of the day making mention of the possibility of the outbreak of war in Europe in the context of events related to Klaipėda.

The American Government tried to settle relations between Lithuania and Poland but it did not demand the return of the city and region of Vilnius to Lithuania. America tried to neutralize the tension in relations between the two countries by involving them both in various conventions and agreements. The American Government invited both Poland and Lithuania to sign the well-known *Briand-Kellogg pact*, but the Lithuanian Government took this invitation coolly since it knew that signing thereof could prevent it from regaining Vilnius.

In order to tilt the balance of the U.S. Government's position more in Lithuania's favour, Lithuanian politicians had to seek out different and more effective forms of action. Beginning in September 1924, the *Vilnius Liberation Committees of American Lithuanians* were organised in Chicago and then in other colonies of Lithuanian emigrants. They started active anti-Polish publicity campaigns with a view to turning the U.S. Government's attention to the most agonising problem for Lithuania. Beginning in the year 1930, representatives of the *Vilnius Liberation Union (VVS)* organisation in Kaunas (Prof M. Biržiška, Prof F. Kemėšis, V. Uždavinys and others) regularly went to visit American Lithuanians. Their aim was to invite the emigrants to organise and join the branches of the *Vilnius Liberation Union* in Lithuanian colonies in America, to collect money for cultural and educational institutions in Vilnius and thereby try to unite the emigrants in joint activities for the benefit of Lithuania. Every year, on February 16th and October 9th (the day Vilnius was surrendered to Poland in 1920), there were mass meetings organised in Lithuanian colonies in America, with speeches, the collection of donations, various newspaper articles, resolutions addressed to the U.S. Government and *the Nations Union* and protests addressed to the Embassy of Poland in Washington demanding restoration of the rights of Lithuania to its capital Vilnius. The Government of Lithuania through its envoys in Washington – Kazys Bizauskas (1923-1928), Bronius K. Balutis (1928-1933) and Povilas Šadeikis (1935-1957) – supported the movement of American Lithuanians because it was of great political importance for Lithuania and particularly for emigration. In general, as far as the interwar Lithuanian-U.S. relations were concerned, the Lithuanian Government focused its attention on emigration.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Economic cooperation contributed to the consolidation of international relations between Lithuanian producers and the American Lithuanians. Trade relations started with the signing of economic agreements in Paris in 1919. It should be noted that the Americans were first among the Western nations, granting six million dollars worth of economic support to Lithuania. It was a loan granted according to the agreements signed on April 10, May 7, and June 30, 1919. Lithuania received train engines and cars, munitions, medicaments, food, etc. Some goods, however, were of low quality, and Lithuania had to pay high interest according to the Lithuanian-American agreement dated September 22, 1924. Like major debtors of the USA (Great Britain, France and others), the Lithuanian Government duly executed payments until 1933, when these payments were completely suspended. Negotiations continued until 1940 as the parties tried to find a mutually acceptable outcome.

By the year 1921, the *American Relief Administration* under the leadership of H. Hoover had shipped food products to Lithuania valued at over 1 million dollars, and the *American Red Cross* (ARC) had sent medicaments, munitions and other goods purchased with 130 thousand dollars donated by American Lithuanians.

As far back as before Lithuanian independence was recognised in 1922, the first Lithuanian ambassador in Washington Jonas Vileišis (1919-1921) and the second one Voldemaras Čarneckis (1921-1923) had done much for the benefit of Lithuania: motherland. The American Lithuanians granted a 1.8 million dollar.

U.S. statistics started recording data on trade turnover with Lithuania only in 1921. Since trade statistics were low, America opened its consulate in Kaunas with a view of trade development and dealing with the problems faced by migrants. Beginning in 1923, trade relations between Lithuania and America became increasingly stable. This resulted not only from recognition of the Lithuanian Government but also from the opening of Lithuanian consulates in New York (1923) and Chicago (1924), as well as the signing of a trade agreement in Washington on December 23, 1925. America's share in the total trade turnover of Lithuania was not significant, but more critical was that Lithuania had an inactive balance of trade. Lithuania exported timber, leather, fur, cellulose, small amounts of butter, sweets, amber, folk art articles, etc. It was difficult for Lithuanian goods to win their way into the American market. Lithuanian merchants were exposed to impediments such as high requirements, legal profits, the absence of means of transport and enormous distances. From 1929, Lithuania started exporting the most important commodity – meat and meat products. In 1937, Lithuanian companies *Maistas*, *Lietūkis* and *Pienocentras* opened their trade mission in New York and started the direct export of their goods to the U.S.

With the intention of boosting sales of Lithuanian goods in America, the Lithuanian Government tried to involve American Lithuanians. In 1930, the *Economics Centre of American Lithuanians* was established (initiator – P.Žadeikis, Consul General in New York) with a view of uniting American Lithuanians engaged in business who could be mediators between Lithuanian and American societies (including the American Lithuanians) in their economic relations. Unfortunately, the disunity of the Lithuanians and ravages of the economic crisis (1929-1933) to the U.S. economy hindered prompt achievement of the desired results. Moreover, when in 1939 Lithuania lost Klaipėda, Lithuanian exports to the U.S. shrunk because of the termination of production of the major exported good – cellulose. America exported agricultural equipment, cars, petrol, lubricants, chemicals and luxury goods to Lithuania, and since these goods were more expensive than the Lithuanian goods being exported to the U.S., the result was a negative trade balance for Lithuania. All in all, it was the economic connection that the U.S. was mainly interested in. In his interview with the American Lithuanian newspaper *Vienybė* in 1937, the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to Lithuania O. Norem said that one of his primary duties was the consolidation of U.S.–Lithuanian trade relations. Lithuania, though, expected more from the United States – protection and support in European policy issues.

LITHUANIA AND THE USA IN 1939-1940

With the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Lithuania and the USA officially followed a policy of neutrality. Contrary to the U.S., however, Lithuania had two aggressive neighbours – Germany and the USSR. In their secret agreements, these countries had already divided the territory of Lithuania and were waiting for the right moment to realise their plans. The Lithuanian Government did not expect either political or military support from Washington. Therefore, Lithuania centred its hopes on the American Lithuanians, and their economic support, particularly for reconstruction of the Vilnius region. Meanwhile, Lithuanian diplomats residing in America (P. Žadeikis, J. Budrys) felt that U.S. neutrality was temporary and took every occasion to remind the American Government about Lithuania and its national interests.

As far as the Vilnius issue was concerned, the U.S. Government steered a neutral course. On October 2, 1939, Žadeikis made inquiries at the U.S. State Department about the U.S. position in the case that Lithuania accepted an offer by the USSR to return the Vilnius region, which the Red Army had occupied at the beginning of the war after its attack on Poland. On the 4th of October,

the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State A. Berle said the following: the U.S. Government does not recognise any occupation by force, nevertheless, it is completely aware of the unusual circumstances related to the present situation concerning the Vilnius region. Further, Berle added that the United States had always felt the “deepest fellowship” with the Baltic republics. Hence, he spoke with a benevolent strain. However, in the eyes of Americans, the establishment of Red Army military posts in the Baltic States (following involuntary agreements between the USSR and the Baltics) was evidence of the helplessness of the small states, and even of their voluntary submission to the influence of the USSR. Moreover, the American Italian press coined a pointed phrase: “*Vilnius – for Lithuania, Lithuania – for the Soviets*”. Lithuanian diplomats in America asked their government to officially express dissatisfaction – including protests - with the Russian military posts and thereby attract the attention of the U.S. Government and American society. It did not happen, though – the Lithuanian Government could not, or to be precise, did not dare to protest. Only Juozas Urbšys, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his secret telegram, instructed Ambassador Žadeikis to unite the American Lithuanians into a political organisation and collect funds in case of a sudden collapse of the statehood of Lithuania. Unfortunately, it was too late. Lithuanian officials should have earlier – before the war had started - used the U.S. factor as a base in the struggle for the independence of their country, making every effort to prepare such a foundation. The importance of the existence of such an American political base is well-illustrated by the struggle of Lithuanians for the restoration of independence after World War II. If preparations had been made beforehand, many organisational and financial problems would have been settled.

When on June 15, 1940, the USSR deployed an additional military contingent (in fact starting the country’s occupation), the American Lithuanians held huge protests against occupation and promised every kind of support for the Lithuanian Government. In the end, after many years, various ideological groups of Lithuanian emigrants stepped into the path of consolidation and established a united political organ, *the Council of Lithuanian Americans*, which provided political, material and propaganda support to Lithuanians in Europe. In addition, the U.S. Government reacted to the Sovietisation processes that had begun in Lithuania. On July 23, 1940, U.S. Secretary of State S. Welles in an official statement did not recognise annexation of the Baltic States by declaring, in no uncertain terms, that: “Everybody is aware of the U.S. Government’s position. The American people protest against invasive acts regardless of the fact of whether they are carried out by violence or threats. We also are against interference of a foreign state, though very powerful, into the internal affairs of another state, though very weak... The U.S. will never forsake those principles...”. The U.S. Embassy in Lithuania worked until September 5, 1940, when all of its staff, archives and other property were moved to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Meanwhile, the Lithuanian Embassy in Washington D.C., the Consulates in New York, Chicago and the Honorary Consuls in Boston and Los Angeles continued their activities and represented the interests of Lithuania not only during the war but also within the post-war period up to the restoration of independence. By assent of the U.S. Government, the mentioned institutions of Lithuania were, for emigration, a symbol of the continuity of independence and hope of freedom for 50 years.

LITHUANIA AND THE UNITED STATES: AN EVOLVING PARTNERSHIP

John F. Tefft

What Lithuania has achieved in the past twelve years is nothing short of a miracle. The country is democratic, free and independent and will soon join the European Union and NATO. Nobody would have believed this would ever come true some fifteen years ago, when my diplomatic career at the Soviet desk of the State Department had just started. But Lithuania made us believe that nothing is impossible. It is primarily due to the hard work and sacrifice of the Lithuanian people, along with a little help from some of its friends including the United States.

As the enlargement of the European Union and NATO increases substantially the possibilities of cooperation in the transatlantic area, the U.S.-Lithuanian bilateral agenda must be reconsidered accordingly. Four major areas deserve a particular attention: developing the strategic U.S.-Lithuania security partnership; strengthening the economic and commercial relationship; cooperating in building the values and conditions for healthy societies; and broadening and deepening people-to-people contacts.

THE GROWTH OF U.S.-LITHUANIAN RELATIONS

The accomplishments of twelve years in building ties between Lithuania and the United States are truly extraordinary. A lot has been done together since Vice President Dan Quayle, Vytautas Landsbergis, and the first U.S. Ambassador to Lithuania Daryl Johnson opened the U.S. Embassy in Vilnius on October 2, 1992. The state-to-state relationship has developed quickly. A broad range of bilateral agreements has been completed and put into operation. The ties between the American and Lithuanian people have expanded rapidly, with thousands of people traveling and working in each other's countries. Many Lithuanian-Americans have returned to their homeland permanently or on visits, and many have made extraordinary contributions to this country. And the really important ties, like our mutual passion for basketball, are thriving.

The strengthening of bilateral relations was one of the goals set in January 1998, when the United States, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia signed the Baltic Charter. That remarkable document guided us for five critical years. It laid out the principles of a partnership between the United States and the three Baltic nations.

In 1998, "the historic opportunity to build a new Europe, in which each state is secure in its internationally recognized borders" was recognized. The United States and the Baltic countries pledged "a common interest in developing cooperative, mutually respectful relations with all other states in the region". And the pledge to strengthen our bilateral relations was viewed as "a contribution to building this new Europe and to enhance the security of all states through the adaptation and enlargement of European and transatlantic institutions."

Membership of the three Baltic nations in NATO and the EU will mark the accomplishment of one of our major goals. We are no longer going to be just partners but allies. But even as we celebrate what has been achieved all of us would recognize that much still remains to be done to fulfill the promise of the Baltic Charter. In Washington and in each of the three Baltic capitals discussions continue as to what are the next steps in our partnership. It would be appropriate to conceptualize our future agenda in terms of four key areas:

- Developing our strategic security partnership;
- Strengthening our economic and commercial relationship to create jobs and greater prosperity;
- Working together to build the values and conditions for healthy societies; and
- Broadening and deepening our people-to-people contacts.

In suggesting this agenda one must accept from the outset that all of this can be done without in any way jeopardizing Lithuania's responsibilities as a member of the European Union. The United States supports Lithuania's membership in the EU. The EU is the biggest trading partner of the United States along with Canada. Obviously, the transatlantic cooperation is a net plus for both sides. Sure, there will be differences between the U.S. and the EU, problems to resolve and differences to surmount. But there is no doubt that the U.S.-Lithuanian bilateral ties can prosper just as they have with other close European allies who are also members of the EU. It is not a zero-sum game. There can and must be multiple winners.

SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

Last November President Bush brought tears to many when he said in his speech outside the City Hall of Vilnius:

“Our Alliance has made a solemn pledge of protection, and anyone who would choose Lithuania as an enemy has also made an enemy of the United States of America. In the face of aggression, the brave people of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will never again stand alone.”

This is eloquently stated the Article V guarantee that is at the core of NATO's mutual defense. All of us recognize that NATO membership will change the course of Lithuanian history. But it is also true that membership in NATO brings with it responsibilities. Admittedly, it is only one part of our potential cooperation in the security field.

Lithuania qualified for NATO membership and earned the Alliance's respect by showing that it is already being a good ally. And Lithuania did it by building a critically important political consensus of support for NATO membership that encompassed political parties across the national political spectrum. Approving a defense budget of two percent of gross domestic product, supporting a sound NATO Membership Action Plan, building military forces by investing prudently in people and weapons systems, and approving deployments of Lithuanian forces to the Balkans, Afghanistan and now Iraq – all have been critical to Lithuania's success.

Obviously years of expenditure and hard work remain to build the NATO-ready deployable brigade that has been committed to the Alliance. But it is important that Lithuania is already well on this way. And that is good for all of NATO because Lithuania's accession to membership comes at a critical time when the Alliance is being asked to take on challenges not previously envisioned. Last week NATO approved taking over the International Security Force in Afghanistan. A NATO peacekeeping role in Iraq is being discussed. These proposed missions reflect the dangerous, new world in which we live. The global war on terrorism is imposing new responsibilities on all of us. But there is no other choice. Global terror has demonstrated that it knows no boundaries. Lithuania and the United States are in this together, a fact that is recognized in Lithuania's National Security Strategy.

In addition to providing forces to international operations, Lithuania will of course also soon take its place in the North Atlantic Council, first as an observer and then as a full member. This will give an even greater say in international security decisions. And there is no reason to doubt that Lithuanian diplomats will take full advantage of this opportunity.

Lithuania and the United States should also continue to work together on regional security issues. The U.S. administration strongly supports Lithuania's constructive engagement with Russia on Kaliningrad, with Ukraine and now with the nations of the South Caucasus. America and Lithuania have worked together to promote democracy in Belarus. The U.S. Northern European Initiative has funded some very creative projects for training in Lithuania of entrepreneurs and economists from Lithuania, Kaliningrad and Belarus. Obviously much remains to be done, but there is a joint stake in promoting the peaceful transition of all nations in this region to functioning democracies and responsible members of the European and transatlantic community. Lithuania and the United States should continue to consult closely and work together on all of these regional issues.

REINVIGORATING ECONOMIC AGENDA

Strengthening the economic and commercial relationship can be translated directly into creating jobs and increasing prosperity. Lithuania today is at a pivotal moment in its economic development. Accession to the European Union is obviously the most visible part of this transition. Membership will give Lithuania the opportunities through market access, the challenges through fierce competition, and the resources with CAP and structural funds, to exploit all the hard work of the last twelve years.

As important as EU accession will be for Lithuania's future, it is important that a window of opportunity has opened on another critical option. That option is to reenergize Lithuania's economic relationship with the U.S. Frankly that relationship has not moved ahead as quickly as it might. In 1998 the U.S. was the largest investor in Lithuania with 25 percent of total foreign direct investment – LTL 1.08 billion. Today it is fifth providing just under 10 percent – about LTL 880 million. And the reason for the decline is not just the sale of Mazeiku Nafta shares by Williams to Yukos. There are other factors.

Before 1999 American capital bought large state-owned assets, which could produce for and serve global or regional markets. Kraft, Philip Morris and Masterfoods are good examples. There has not had been much investment of that scale since. With the close of the era of large-scale privatization in Lithuania, American firms have simply not been persuaded that this is the country for their new Eastern European "Greenfield" investment.

Part of the problem is that American firms see this as a small market, not as a base for sales in the EU or to the east. That perception must change. Some firms may also have hesitated because of the recession in the U.S. For others, it is possible that the negative publicity generated by the political controversy over the Williams investment was a disincentive to invest. Potential investors also complain about the difficulties of working with Lithuania's regulatory system. Finally, some of the other countries in Central and Eastern Europe are just more aggressive than Lithuania in competing for investment. This shouldn't be the case. Today Lithuania enjoys the fastest growth rate in Europe and the second lowest corporate income tax rate in Europe. The local labor pool is enormously intelligent. Lithuania should be able to attract more "Greenfield" investment.

Ireland is frequently discussed as a model for Lithuanian development, despite the clear differences in history, geography and economic development. One of the reasons Ireland has succeeded in achieving annual growth rates averaging over 9 percent from 1996 to 2000 was its aggressive effort to draw in foreign direct investment from the United States. In the year 2000 U.S. foreign direct investment in Ireland was 33.4 billion dollars or 28 percent of total foreign direct investment. Today Ireland continues to attract around 25 percent of total U.S. "Greenfield" investment into Europe. U.S. investments employ five percent of the Irish work force and have been critical in developing Ireland's high tech manufacturing sector.

The question is not whether Lithuania can duplicate Ireland's role in luring U.S. investment. Neither is there a simple strategy to promote investment. But the fact is that both Lithuania and the United States need to work harder at this. The last autumn visit of U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce Grant Aldonas, and the December visit of Assistant Secretary of Commerce Linda Conlin, have showed that the U.S. administration is committed at the highest levels to doing our best to promote greater trade and investment. Lithuanian Embassy in Washington D.C. is also working hard on this. But more needs to be done in this field.

The Lithuanian Development Agency is a very useful resource for prospective investors. It is instructive, however, to compare its mandate and political profile with those of its counterpart agencies in the region. Some of Lithuania's neighbors, its competitors in Central East Europe are doing better because they offer free "one-stop shopping" for potential, new investors. They provide investor advocacy within the government, help in dealing with local regulatory agencies and they furnish a fully funded marketing program. Investors notice this and tell us about it. To be able to compete effectively for investment dollars in the future, particularly in the high tech, knowledge economy sector is going to require a higher political profile and a more focused strategy. Joint efforts are needed to make this case, and realize the potential that exists for a rapid expansion of the U.S.-Lithuanian economic and commercial partnership.

PROMOTING HEALTHY SOCIETIES

Part of the promise of the Baltic Charter was a commitment to the “full development of human potential within just and inclusive societies.” Part of the promise of a better life sought by Lithuania when it achieved independence from the Soviet Union was to live in a free community of democracies brought together by common values. This means a world where citizens of all nations and from all ethnic and religious groups can live freely and safely and prosper together without fear of prejudice or discrimination, without fear of crime and corruption. In our age, the threats to security must be fought from without and from within the states. Thus, promoting the values and conditions for healthy societies is the third major area where the United States and Lithuania can build partnership.

Lithuanian politicians have always placed a great emphasis on Lithuania’s history of support for openness to people of all races and creeds. At a critical crossroads in Europe, Lithuania has distinguished itself in past centuries as a place where everyone could live and prosper. Today Lithuania is again proving that the era of totalitarianism with its horrible injustice and barbarity is an aberration in Lithuanian history.

Achieving a free society embodying these values and ruled by law is not an easy undertaking. The history of America’s long struggle for a just society is a good example. In recent years Lithuania made a good progress in this effort. The government has taken serious steps to deal with the legacy of the Holocaust and anti-Semitism through comprehensive education campaigns in the schools and the military. It is also making efforts to provide historical justice to the Jewish community through the restitution of Jewish property.

Lithuania has mounted a significant effort to fight corruption – an insidious cancer that eats at the core of a society and undermines people’s confidence in their own democratic institutions. In the business world, it damages business and discourages foreign investment. In recent years much of the U.S. assistance to Lithuania has been in this field. Through the funding of the Northern European Initiative the American administration tried to encourage the Lithuanian government institutions and NGO organizations that support these goals.

Fighting crime, particularly organized crime, is another area where the United States and Lithuania have cooperated. The arrest recently of members of a major organized crime family in Lithuania and their colleagues in the United States was a significant success for our law enforcement organizations. This crime group was distributing counterfeit dollars and drugs on an international scale and may have been involved in trafficking women. Sadly, the influence of organized crime only seems to be growing. The concern is that criminals could engage in selling or smuggling weapons of mass destruction. All of this will require considerable cooperation. The United States is determined to work with Lithuania against those who threaten the very fabric of our societies.

There is another threat that is growing in this region and in Lithuania. And that is the threat of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. While Lithuania has historically had low prevalence of HIV/AIDS, the official number of cases has tripled during the last three years. There are now 751 “official cases” of HIV infection in which 607 acquired HIV through intravenous drug use. Most experts agree that the real number is probably three to four times the official number.

In addition, a recent survey of multi-drug resistant tuberculosis conducted with the support of the United States Center for Disease Control, shows that Lithuania has one of the highest prevalence rates of multi-drug resistant tuberculosis in the world.

Unchecked these trends demonstrate that HIV/AIDS and multi-drug resistant tuberculosis are quite literally daggers pointed at the heart of this society. The U.S. agencies have contributed much along with the UN and many of the Nordic countries to help Lithuanian health authorities in combating this threat. Hopefully cooperation in this field will continue. But it should not be mistaken that HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis are just the problem of people on the edges of the society. These diseases are becoming central issues and the Lithuanian government and people need to recognize this and deal with them aggressively.

BROADENING PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS

The fourth and final area for attention is helping build the people-to-people ties between the United States and Lithuania. A lot has already been achieved through private organizations, and government should preferably not try to fix what isn't broken. Rather, it should seek to help or augment the range of ties that exist in the social and cultural spheres.

Over the past twelve years the U.S. Government has sponsored a number of official exchange programs. The success of the Peace Corps program in Lithuania is widely acknowledged. One can regret that it has now been phased out, but it really did bring Lithuanians and Americans together in projects of shared values. Similarly, the U.S. Embassy has sponsored over the years many educational, training and tourism programs. The prestigious Fulbright program has been a spectacular success for the Americans and Lithuanians who have participated and for the societies.

Many active sister city programs, university-to-university partnerships and cross border cultural programs have been launched, but we need more. During the last few years, over 4000 U.S. visas have been issued annually to Lithuanian university students to participate in the work-travel program in the States. This is a real investment in our common future. And notably a very high percentage of the students are returning to Lithuania.

This is just a small part of the vast scope of the U.S.-Lithuanian bilateral relations. The great Lithuanian writer, Tomas Venclova, has told once that the Lithuanian people tend to pessimism. It is not surprising given the history and the horrible tragedies that were inflicted on this country and its people in the twentieth century. Venclova also added that life was not as bad as some people in Lithuania would have claimed. In fact, the Lithuanian people were talented, pragmatic and capable of great works. They just needed more self-confidence.

Well, in the United States they say that a pessimist is an informed optimist. There is no doubt that one can deal with a lot of problems if he or she tries hard to understand them and devise good strategies to solve them. It is my hope that together as pragmatic partners, informed optimists, the United States and Lithuania can solve a lot of problems – in our respective countries, in this region, in Europe, and in the world.

U.S. STRATEGY TOWARDS LITHUANIA: A REGIONAL APPROACH

Vaidotas Urbelis

The last century will be remembered in the history of international relations as a century of American hegemony and dominance. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11 challenged this view. For the first time since World War II the United States was attacked on its own territory, adding a new dimension to the American threat perception. Therefore, U.S. strategic concepts had to change accordingly.

This transformation has had a direct impact on Lithuanian-American relations. On one hand, in U.S. security strategy, Europe is no longer perceived as a potential area of instability. New threats to U.S. security largely come from the other parts of the world, and the focus of Washington's policies is shifting towards these regions. On the other hand, the robust development of Central and Eastern Europe, along with certain political and economic strengths in Russia, raises U.S. economic and trade interest in countries like Lithuania.

Changes in U.S. security strategy raise new questions or decision makers and the academic society. They are asking whether the U.S. is further determined to remain in Europe, what role Lithuania and other countries of the region can play in the U.S. strategy, and what measures they should take to maintain American presence in the region.

This article aims to discern the regional dimension of U.S. foreign policy towards Lithuania and its neighbours. In geostrategic terms, Lithuania belongs to two regions. First, it is part of the Northern European region which encompasses the Nordic and Baltic nations. At the same time, together with the other new members of NATO, also known as the Vilnius-10, it is bound by the same desire to maintain NATO's presence in Europe. The term Central and Eastern Europe is frequently used to define these countries.

For the time being, Lithuania's policy towards the U.S. is in many ways similar to that of both Northern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. A perspective of Lithuania as a country belonging to both regions allows us to better define U.S. interests in the country and fit Lithuania into U.S. global security strategy. As still the most effective tool in promoting U.S. interests in Europe, NATO will be the focal point of the analysis.

CENTRAL, EASTERN AND NORTHERN EUROPE IN U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY

In U.S. security strategy, Europe plays the most important role. The National Security Strategy approved in September 2002 clearly states that "there is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe. Europe is also the seat of two of the strongest and most able international institutions in the world: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has, since its inception, been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European security, and the European Union (EU), our partner in opening world trade."¹ Europe is perceived as the birthplace of democratic values and a major partner in spreading them across the globe.

On the other hand, the U.S. expects a cooperative rather than a competitive or counterbalancing approach from Europe. Specifically, U.S. policy in Europe pursues four major goals:

- to get support for the U.S.-led war on terrorism and engage European countries in crises response operations;

¹ The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, p.25.

- to encourage democratic developments in Eurasia, including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus, and the Balkans;
- to maintain economic ties with the EU, to guarantee flows of investment, to expand the market for defence industry production;
- to sustain strategic balance in Europe, mainly through strengthening the transatlantic link, preventing militarisation of the EU, and fixing the borders of Russia.

U.S. policy towards Central and Eastern Europe and Northern Europe is constructed along these lines. Although Central and Eastern Europe and Northern Europe are different in their economic, social and cultural characteristics, their policy towards the U.S. is largely similar. The main factor that unites these two regions is their pro-American orientation. In terms of security, both Central and Eastern Europe and Northern Europe feel dependent on the U.S., and they do not envisage European security architecture without American involvement.

This dependency is determined by the geographic location and the historical experiences of the two regions. This is especially true in Central and Eastern Europe which historically used to serve as a battlefield between Germany and Russia. As one prominent analyst has put it, "Pechenegs, Tatars, Turks, Muscovites and Soviets all merge [for Central and Eastern Europeans] into one continuum where they mingle with Teutonic knights, Prussians and Hitlerites."² Lithuania is no exception with its centuries-old history of foreign occupations.

The second important feature of the U.S. relationship with Central and Eastern Europe and Northern Europe is the asymmetry of power between them. The U.S. speaks to the region from the position of the strong. Central and Eastern Europeans and the Nordics possess almost no strategic capacity to threaten U.S. strategic interests. Their participation in the U.S.-led campaigns is good for America, but their incapacity or unwillingness to participate would do no harm. Therefore, the region is vitally interested in developing certain specific capabilities that would be of consequence to the U.S. Such capabilities could be intelligence information, specialised military units, hi-tech equipment or the experience of working with certain countries such as Russia and Ukraine.

WAR ON TERRORISM AND MILITARY COOPERATION

The terrorist attacks of September 11 changed the whole context in which NATO enlargement was viewed by the United States. American security expert F. Larrabee notes that "the main U.S. strategic priority became the war on terrorism. For this the United States needed as broad a coalition of allies as possible."³ The ability to contribute to the war on terrorism has become one of the key requirements for developing relations with the U.S.

Interestingly, the role of Central and Eastern Europe and Northern Europe in the global antiterrorism campaign is not at all marginal. The countries of the region have provided their military units to U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The contributions of new members alone reached 4,000 troops in 2002. This constitutes more than 7 per cent of all allied troops in Afghanistan.

In the future, these numbers are likely to increase due to ongoing modernisation of the new NATO member armies (see Table 1). For example, Lithuania plans to increase its participation in international operations by 10 times in 2009 - from a 100 strong company-size unit to a 1,000 strong battalion-size task group. On a regional scale, this growth will be even more substantial.

² Liebich A. East Central Europe: The Unbearable Tightness of Being, Yale University, Historical Roots of Contemporary and Regional Issues, Occasional Paper Series, No.15, 1998.

³ Larrabee F.S. NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era. RAND, 2003, p. 58-59.


Table 1. Enlargement effects on NATO Alliance

	NATO 19	NATO 26	Change (%)	Long-term Forecast
Increase of population (mln.)	735	839	14	~
Total Armed forces (thousands of troops)	3,448	3,986	16	Decrease
GDP (bln. USD)	18074	18446	2	Increase
Cumulative Defence Budget (bln. USD)	460	467	1,5	Increase
Number of NATO				
Troops deployed abroad (thousands)	59	63	7	Increase substantially

Source: Larrabee (2003).

U.S. economic and military assistance is another important element of U.S. cooperation with Central and Eastern European nations. The new members of NATO need to modernise their armies and improve their military capacities. By providing assistance to these countries the U.S. administration can also promote the interests of American military industry in the region. Over the past decade, Central and Eastern Europe has been a major recipient of U.S. economic and military assistance, and this trend could be sustained in the future.

Chart 1. U.S. Economic and Military Assistance (1980 - 1999)



Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2001).

There are two reasons to believe that military cooperation between the U.S. and the new NATO members will increase. One is the widening technological gap between America and Europe, which makes the transfer of technologies critical to NATO effectiveness. The second reason is the rapidly growing defence budgets of the new NATO members, which is related to defence reform. In 2002, defence spending reached 9 billion dollars (see Table 2) and is likely to grow as Central and Eastern European nations seek to acquire modern weaponry compatible with that of NATO.

Table 2. Defence expenditures of NATO's new members (mln. USD)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Bulgaria	339	390	392	333	360	431
Czech R.	987	1.132	1.155	1138	1192	1622
Estonia	65	68	71	79	94	131
Hungary	666	647	768	671	823	1084
Latvia	156	157	58	70	76	116
Lithuania	135	134	107	149	167	230
Poland	3.073	3.356	3.222	3000	3400	3500
Romania	793	870	607	940	989	1100
Slovakia	414	407	305	356	345	450
Slovenia	329	360	337	268	275	313
TOTAL	6957	7521	7022	7004	7721	8977

Source: SIPRI Yearbook (2003), Wilk (2003)⁴

Over the last few years competition between American and European military manufacturers has constantly increased. Both the U.S. and certain European countries seek to influence strategic decisions made in the capitals of new NATO members. For example, in 2002 Poland decided to purchase 46 American F16 fighters, thus becoming, in the words of U.S. President George W. Bush, "one of the best friends of the United States in Europe."⁵ In 2003, the Czech and Hungarian governments opted for European Gripen aircrafts, which caused a fierce diplomatic reaction from the U.S. administration.⁶

In comparative terms, Lithuania is one of the leading Central and Eastern European nations in acquiring U.S. technological products. Its contracts with U.S. military manufacturers include: the acquisition of tactical radios from Harris Corp., Javelin antitank systems from Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Corp., and Stinger anti-aircraft systems from "Hughes Missile System Company" and "General Dynamics / Raytheon Corp."⁷ Thus, despite its small size Lithuania has managed to establish itself in U.S. strategic thinking.

The changing U.S. attitude towards Lithuanian armed forces supports the argument that the U.S. increasingly considers Lithuania as a reliable partner. This shift is reflected in strategic recommendations drafted by U.S. experts upon request of the Lithuanian Government. In 1997-1998, a group of experts led by Major General Kievenaar carried out a Lithuanian Defence Assessment study⁸, and a similar study was conducted in 2001.⁹ The first study clearly advocated the principle of territorial defence for Lithuania and was rather sceptical about Lithuania's capabilities of contributing to support peace or NATO Article 5 operations. Lithuania's capacities to provide Host Nation Support facilities were not even considered. U.S. experts advocated the view that in the instance of an aggression Lithuania would have to rely primarily on its own armed forces.

However, the study carried out in 2001 presents Lithuanian armed forces in a completely different light. Enormous attention is paid to C3I (command, control, communications, intelligence) capacities and their interoperability with NATO. The study stresses the importance of English language skills and Host Nation Support preparedness. A strategic role is given to the Klaipeda sea port and the Šiauliai airbase. The study says nothing about the model of territorial defence, but instead it urges the Lithuanian government to develop mobile armed forces interoperable with those of NATO. This view is fully consistent with the growing U.S. need for mobile deployable units and infrastructure support to combat terrorism.

PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC VALUES

The American perception of globalisation builds on two key assumptions. One is that democratic states that share similar values do not fight against each other. The other stipulates that free trade leads to prosperity for all nations. J. Kurth in his article "The next NATO: Building an American Commonwealth of Nations" notes that the American view of the world has not changed much over the last few decades. The U.S. strategic focus is still limited to the few regions which together constitute less than half the area of the globe and less than half its population. "These regions include almost all of Europe, much of Latin America, some of the countries on the periphery of East Asia and of course Australia and New Zealand. As it happens, these four regions

⁴ Wilk A. „The New Members of the New NATO.“ Center for Eastern Studies. Warsaw.
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/epub/eRap2002/ecz_01.htm; SIPRI Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Oxford University Press, 2003.

⁵ Hoagland J. „Allies in a New Era.“ *Washington Post*, January 3, 2003.

⁶ Crosby A. „Czechs in Diplomatic Dogfight Over Jet Purchase.“ *Reuters*, 2003 12 15.

⁷ BNS [Lithuanian Armed Forces will be armed with Stinger systems] *Lietuvos kariuomenė bus apginkluota "Stinger" raketomis*, 2002 10 11.

⁸ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the United States European Command *Lithuanian Defense Assessment*, 1998.

⁹ Office of the Secretary of Defense. International Security and European Policy. *Strategic Review of the Defense Plans and Military Capabilities of the Republic of Lithuania*, 2001.

largely correspond to the U.S. system of alliances as it existed fifty years ago (NATO, the OAS, a series of bilateral treaties with Asian countries, the ANZUS). The extent of "globalisation" in 2001 is not that different from the extent of the "Free World" in 1951."¹⁰

In this context, Central and Eastern Europe represents a significant challenge. Central and Eastern European nations have successfully liberated themselves from the communist yoke and now seek to return to the democratic mainstream. "The Baltics [in particular] have been extraordinarily successful in establishing and embodying the American values of liberal democracy, the free market and the rule of law."¹¹ These dramatic changes have rocked the grounds of the U.S. global perception, hence the enlargement of the European Union and NATO.

Now the U.S. administration seeks to expand democratic values further to the East, and countries like Lithuania can play an important role in this strategic move. Their specific knowledge and expertise of eastern nations helps to address the needs of emerging democracies in a more targeted way. Lithuania already consults its European and American allies on developments in Belarus and Kaliningrad. Lithuania has also demonstrated motivated attempts to participate in securing democracy in Ukraine and South Caucasus. Central and Eastern Europe is rich in cooperation formats that could be applied across EU and NATO borders.

The Nordic countries have also gathered enough experience to participate in EU and U.S. Eastern initiatives. In the early 90s, the Nordic countries devoted huge resources to assist Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian democratic reforms. Their active policy and support helped the Baltic nations to integrate more quickly into the European Union and NATO. By joining their assets and expertise the Nordic and Central and Eastern European nations can now contribute to U.S. strategic goals to strengthen security and democracy in Eastern Europe.

ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Economic cooperation between the United States and the Central, Eastern and Northern European markets is relatively small. Northern Europe accounts for slightly less than 2 per cent, and Central and Eastern Europe - for 0.42 per cent of the overall U.S. foreign trade (see Table 3). However, the numbers have been constantly growing during the last decade. For example, the U.S.-Baltic trade turnover quadrupled in 1993-2000. The U.S. is also a major investor in Central and Eastern European markets.

Table 3. U.S. Foreign trade with Central and Northern European countries

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Nordic 5	1.60	1.53	1.59	1.68	1.69	1.54	1.63	1.63
Baltic 3	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.08
Central and Eastern Europe (Vilnius10)	0.25	0.27	0.26	0.26	0.30	0.34	0.37	0.42
Nordic Baltic 8	1.62	1.55	1.62	1.72	1.73	1.58	1.68	1.71
Nordic 5 + Central and Eastern Europe (Vilnius10)	1.85	1.80	1.85	1.94	1.99	1.88	2.00	2.05

Source: U.S. Census Bureau (2001)

Notes: Nordic 5: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden. Baltic 3: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania. Central and Eastern Europe (Vilnius 10): Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Rumania, Slovenia, Slovakia.

The strategic location of Central and Eastern Europe on the major oil and gas transportation routes only increases the region's importance to U.S. strategic interests. However, U.S. involvement in this area has been limited and is further decreasing. Statistics shows that the U.S. share in foreign investment in Central and Eastern Europe has shrunk since the first wave of

¹⁰ Kurth J. "The Next NATO: Building an American Commonwealth of Nations" *The National Interest*, Fall 2001, <http://www.expandnato.org/kurthnato.html>

¹¹ Ibidem.

NATO enlargement, and the decrease is particularly visible in the so-called strategic sectors.¹² At the same time, Russian investment in these sectors has increased dramatically. This situation has even fuelled speculations about a "strategic deal" between the U.S. and Russia on Central and Eastern Europe.

GEOSTRATEGIC BALANCE IN EUROPE

The U.S. strategic goal in Europe is to influence the processes taking place on the old continent. Naturally, the most important European partners of the U.S. are the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, but inside the EU, small states are also important. A country succeeding in EU decision-making may be a valuable partner to the U.S. Thus Lithuania must be active and innovative in the European Union in order to increase its transatlantic importance.

The U.S. administration understands that the EU countries bordering Russia and Belarus are concerned about their security. The EU is still in the process of developing its common security and defence policies, thus it does not yet possess real capabilities to provide "hard" security guarantees. On the other hand, the EU's Nordic nations have for years pursued a policy of neutrality and they now resist rapid militarisation of the EU. U.S. diplomacy can use these affairs to expand its participation in European domestic affairs.

The U.S.-based Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) in their study, *Strategic and Operational Implications of NATO Enlargement in the Baltic Region*, indicates that "Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania could constitute part of a core of Eastern and Central European states that serve as "new Atlanticists," states who have a compelling interest in keeping the United States involved in European security."¹³ This opinion is echoed in U.S. Senator J. Kyl's statement during the NATO Expansion Treaty debate, namely that "the expansion of NATO is more than just a rearward-looking act of humanity. It is also a forward-looking act of statesmanship that will serve U.S. interests well in the future."¹⁴ K. Waltz sticks to this view by noting that "NATO enlargement will obviously allow the U.S. to keep its finger in European security and defence policy."¹⁵

This new role of Lithuania and the other new NATO members was revealed during the crisis in Iraq early in 2003. The American decision to start military action against Saddam divided the European nations. France and Germany were against the war, while eight other countries, including Italy, Poland and Spain, supported the U.S. policy. The statement of the Vilnius 10 nations in favour of the military action was critical in this debate. The Economist noted that Franco-Germany policy has become a minority policy in the enlarging EU.¹⁶

Lithuania's pro-American posture was already visible before the Iraqi crisis. Voting practices in the United Nations and EU institutions reveal the attempt of Central, Eastern and Northern European nations to balance between strategic U.S. and EU interests (see Table 4). Lithuania and the other democracies in the region tend to support the European position on global issues but they stick with the U.S. in transatlantic matters.

¹² Janeliūnas T. "Redistribution of U.S. and Russian Influence in Central and Eastern Europe." Lecture at the seminar "Lithuania After Prague", Vilnius, Institute of International Relations and Political Science, November 29, 2002.

¹³ Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) *Strategic and Operational Implications of NATO Enlargement in the Baltic Region*, 2002, p.1

¹⁴ U.S. Senate. Legislation and Records Home. NATO Expansion Debate. May 7, 2003. <http://thomas.loc.gov/r108/r108.html> [2003 09 01].

¹⁵ Waltz K. "The Balance of Power and NATO Expansion", University of California, Berkeley, Center for German and European Studies, Working Paper 5.66, 1998.

¹⁶ The Economist "Who speaks for Europe?" February 6, 2003.

Table 4. Voting practices in UN and EU institutions (2002)

Issue	USA	Germany, France	Poland, Denmark, Lithuania
Transatlantic issues			
NATO out-of-area operations	Increase	Ambiguous	Increase
EU defence dimension	Against	Support	Against
EU-NATO duplication	Against	Support	Against
Global issues			
Palestinian autonomy	Pro-Israel	Pro-Palestine	Pro-Palestine
Kyoto Protocol	Not ratified	Support	Support
Int'l Criminal Court	Wants exemptions	No exemptions	No exemptions
Sanctions against Cuba	Support	Against	Against
Abrogation of Antibaltic Missile Treaty	Support	Against	Against

Source: U.S. Department of State (2003).¹⁷

After enlargement both Central and Eastern European and Northern European countries will strengthen their positions at the EU level. They will not only form an integrated and dynamic economic region, but will also collect enough votes to veto the EU Council's decisions. According to the Treaty of Nice, the Nordics and Baltics should have 39 votes at the Council, and the Central and Eastern European nations will get 77 votes. Provided Romania and Bulgaria join the EU in 2007, the region's voting power will increase to 101 votes. This is more than enough to form a blocking minority which presently requires 85 votes.

LITHUANIA'S REGIONAL ROLE IN U.S. GLOBAL STRATEGY

From the U.S. global perspective, Lithuania and other countries of the region are not pivotal areas in Europe. Their contribution to the global war on terrorism is limited, their possessions of strategic resources (oil, gas, nickel etc.) are small and in addition they create only a minimal share in U.S. foreign trade.

Lithuania and the other countries of the region must find their niches in U.S. global strategy to become key players. There are two major areas in which countries like Lithuania can make difference to the U.S.:

1. They can add value by joining U.S. efforts to promote democracy and combat terrorism.
2. As EU members, they can influence EU decisions in favour of transatlantic interests.

To achieve these goals, Central and Eastern European and Northern European countries have to expand their regional cooperation. Many formats already exist, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States, Visegrad 4, Baltic 3, Nordic 5, Baltic-Nordic 8, Vilnius 10 and the recently launched E-PINE. Participation in broader formats increases Lithuania's power to actively engage in other regions (see Table 5).

Table 5. Multiplication of Power through Participation in Regional Formats

	Russia,	Belarus Kaliningrad	Ukraine	Central	Anti-Asia terrorism
Northern Europe	large	large	average	small	average
Baltic states	average	average	small	small	small
Vilnius 10	average	small	average	small	average
Lithuania alone	average	small	small	small	small

Source: Larrabee and Asmus (2002).¹⁸

¹⁷ Table was constructed according to voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. U.S. Department of State. "Voting Practices 2002." <http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rpt/2002/vtg/> [2003 09 01].

¹⁸ Larrabee F., Asmus R. *Lithuania's Contribution to Euro-Atlantic Security*. RAND Europe, August 2002.

In developing new regional initiatives two aspects should be considered. Firstly, these new initiatives must not lead to regionalisation of security. Secondly, these new initiatives must not contradict U.S. foreign policy objectives. Therefore, Lithuania and the other countries of the region should follow several principles to make their policy proposals attractive to the U.S.:

- New policy initiatives should lead to the creation of real capabilities;
- They must include Russia, Ukraine, and perhaps in the future, Belarus;
- Financial costs of possible U.S. participation should be low;
- New initiatives should aim at fighting terrorism or spreading democracy to other regions.

Lithuania will have to combine these principles with national priorities. The U.S., as the world's dominant power, and Lithuania, as a small state, naturally have different priorities in the world and Europe. Lithuania will give its attention largely to regional problems; intra-European issues will gain more importance, whereas global issues such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD and global stability will dominate the U.S. agenda.

Table 6. Overlapping U.S. and Lithuanian foreign policy agendas

Interests	USA	Lithuania	Lithuania's role in U.S. strategy
Global	Maintain hegemony; war against terrorism, fight against proliferation of WMD	Has no independent agenda, low priority	Lithuania as U.S. force multiplier
European	Fix Russian borders, strengthen NATO, maintain balance of power, non-militarised EU	Similar to the U.S. but more emphasis on intra-EU issues	Huge opportunities for cooperation in constructing policy towards Russia and coordinating positions on intra-EU issues
Regional	Not high priority, mainly concerning common principles such as democratic values	Democracy in Belarus, demilitarisation and economic development of Russia	Lithuania is interested in involving the U.S. in regional matters in exchange for its support on global policy issues.

The Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis concluded in a similar way by saying that "the United States has exerted a fair amount of political capital to make Baltic membership in NATO a reality. It is now the Baltic States' turn to repay the favour and prove that they are, in fact, members of the Euro-Atlantic family, ready and willing to continue to contribute their resources and personnel to the defence of common interests."¹⁹ According to the IFPA, the Baltic States can do this in three ways.

First, they must continue the serious work of preparing and improving their militaries for operations with the Alliance. Expediting and expanding plans and facilities for Host Nation Support should be a priority in this regard, as should the development of effective capabilities for operating in crisis response scenarios.

Second, the Baltic States must enhance their efforts to reach out to Russia. The confidence that NATO's security guarantee provides should make it easier for them to engage their larger neighbour. Lithuania could serve as a bridge between Russia and the Alliance.

Finally, the Baltic States must recognize that as full NATO members, they will have a meaningful voice in the debates and discussions on key matters of the Alliance's business. They

¹⁹ Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, p.5.

must use this voice to support the transformation of the Alliance so that it would remain a viable defence organisation.

In this respect, areas that involve Russian or Ukrainian participation are especially promising. Examples of such cooperation might be common projects in the Kaliningrad district covering different themes - science, environmental protection or crisis management. In the future, they can be extended to cover even military projects or initiatives.

From a global perspective, Lithuania should enhance its cooperation with U.S. allies in geographically more distant parts of the world. Defence and security related cooperation with South Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), Middle Eastern countries (Israel, Jordan, and Egypt) or South Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan) could have a positive impact on Lithuania's security cooperation with the U.S.

STRENGTHENING THE U.S.-LITHUANIA PARTNERSHIP: LITHUANIAN PERSPECTIVE

Vygaudas Ušackas

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The last few years of Lithuania-U.S. relations have been marked by the historic decisions of NATO enlargement, thus concluding one chapter in the bilateral relationship and building an even stronger foundation for an ever-closer strategic partnership between the two nations in the future. The United States of America played a crucial role in allowing Lithuania and the other six Central European countries to be invited to the 2002 Prague summit to join NATO. On May 9, 2003, the U.S. Senate unanimously ratified the NATO Accession Protocols, thus paving the way for U.S. President George W. Bush's vision of "Europe whole and free, and at peace" to become a reality. Moreover, in the last few years we have enjoyed the unparalleled attention of the White House, the Hill and the American people.

The U.S.-Lithuanian relationship goes back to the beginning of the 20th century. The restoration of the State of Lithuania on February 16, 1918 and its international recognition were closely linked to the principle of self-determination advocated by the twenty-eighth U.S. President, Woodrow Wilson. America was one of the first to recognise the independence of Lithuania. Throughout the brutal Soviet occupation, America lived up to its principles, and never recognized Lithuania as part of the USSR. The tricolour-flag of Lithuania at the U.S. Department of State during the dark years of occupation was conveying the hope to hundreds of thousands of Lithuanians in America and worldwide that the most brutal breach of international law was just temporary and that the independence of Lithuania would one day be restored.

After Lithuania regained its independence in 1990-1991, the U.S. again was one of the first to come and support my country in those difficult times of transition. Political support, military assistance, investments and know-how were major factors in helping Lithuania overcome the Soviet legacy and build a foundation for democracy and free market. First of all, thanks to the hard work of the Lithuanian people, as well as U.S. and Western European support, Lithuania

became a member of the North Atlantic Alliance in the spring of 2004. On May 1, 2004 the 12-star yellow and blue flag of the European Union (EU) was proudly raised at the Embassy of Lithuania in Washington, D.C. As our dreams has come true and we have become full-fledged members of Western institutions, the obvious question have come to mind: What's next? What will be the glue which will hold together otherwise very different countries – Lithuania and the U.S. - in size and in strategic priorities? Is there a danger that having joined the EU, Lithuania's foreign policy decision-making and implementation will totally drift towards Brussels and that Washington D.C. will become just another foreign capital? Will the United States be interested in maintaining its active engagement in the Baltic region when events of the past few years have shifted U.S. attention and resources to other areas of the world? Are there foreign policy issues that could bring Lithuania and its neighbours, on the one hand, and the United States of America on the other, together again and keep them anchored in the Baltic region? How the membership of Lithuania in the EU will affect the bilateral relations and what will be the key areas, which will dominate the bilateral relationship?

"SPECIAL" LITHUANIA-U.S. RELATIONS

It is widely expected that having joined the EU, Lithuanians will become even stronger Europeans; however, we will not become anti-Americans. On the contrary, with our membership in the EU and NATO, the U.S. gains another staunch ally committed to a strong transatlantic relationship. The history of the Lithuania-U.S. relationship and the presence of common interests make us optimistic about the future of close ties between the two countries.

Lithuania and the U.S. are bonded by strong political ties, increasing economic relations, close person-to-person contacts as well as mutual appreciation. The U.S. non-recognition policy of Soviet occupation, U.S. support in regaining and consolidating our independence in 1990 and U.S. leadership in advocating Lithuania's membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions stand as the finest examples not only of "special" Lithuania-U.S. relations, but also as those of the U.S. commitment to defend freedom and liberty around the world.

However, what makes our relationship special is our history and commitment to the shared values of democracy, liberty and the rule of law. Lithuania and the other two Baltic countries have a great history of the promotion and defence of freedom and liberty. We cherish them. Separated from the West in 1945 by the "Iron Curtain", the Lithuanian people nevertheless retained their commitment and belief in the common values of free nations - democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Our experience shows that the course of a nation's history does not only depend on the might of armies, but also on the character of men and women. As U.S. President George W. Bush put it during his visit to Vilnius in November 2002, "You have known cruel oppression and withstood it. You were held captive by an empire and you outlived it. And because you have paid its cost you know the value of human freedom."

The terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001 made us all reassess the criticality of shared values and the necessity of common actions to defend them. Great thinker, visionary and one of the founding fathers of his country, President Thomas Jefferson saw the United States as a great island of freedom in the midst of a world of tyranny. He blessed the Almighty Being for the fact that America was "separated by a wide ocean from the nations of Europe", and he hoped to keep it that way. September 11th changed this conventional wisdom. The United States itself became the battlefield. As the attack was not only against the U.S., but also against our shared values of democracy and liberty, so the response required multifaceted and multilateral efforts.

Therefore, Lithuania along with more than fifty other nations assumed the burden of responsibility for international peace and security in the wider Middle East. Today, about 120 Lithuanian troops stand shoulder to shoulder with American, British, Polish, and Danish soldiers in the operations in Iraq. Our special forces in Afghanistan are often cited as an example of the best integrated unit of any allied country within the U.S. contingent.

Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization spells out the most credible security guarantees of the U.S. to Lithuania. Though Lithuania does not see any military threat from its neighbors, we do see new threats and challenges that the international community is facing in the 21st century, and we are ready to take the responsibility to fight them.

Furthermore, in the last 13 years our two countries managed to lay strong foundations for mutually beneficial cooperation in the fields of commerce, trade and investment. An increasing number of American firms - from Mars/Masterfoods to Coca-Cola, from Kraft Foods and Altria (formerly Philip Morris) to Motorola - are establishing themselves in Lithuania as a springboard to the opening markets of the European Union and a recovering Russia.

Lithuania-U.S. economic relations have contributed to the economic growth in my country. American investment in Lithuania has reached 413 million dollars and the trade between the two countries from January-November 2003 increased substantially. The export of Lithuanian goods to the U.S. increased by 18.5 percent compared with the same period in 2002 and in total numbers constituted 337 million dollars. Imports from the U.S. to Lithuania increased by 69.5 percent, totalling 148 million dollars.

Finally, Lithuania and the U.S. are connected by a "living chain", with approximately one million Americans of Lithuanian descent living in the USA. The moral and political support of Lithuanians in America even during the darkest years of Soviet occupation leaked through the "iron curtain" into their homeland, thus giving us hope that an independent Lithuania was not a question of "whether", but a question of "when." Today, the experience and the contacts of Lithuanian-American businessmen as well as charity foundations are very helpful in promoting the awareness of Lithuania, attracting U.S. investment and increasing trade and tourism.

LITHUANIA'S EU FOCUS AND THE U.S. SHIFT IN PRIORITIES

As of May 1, 2004, the focus of Lithuania's domestic and foreign policy has shifted to Brussels, where important decisions affecting citizens are to be made.

Lithuania's membership in the EU brings profound changes and transformations in the conduct and management of the country's internal and foreign policies. This, in turn, will inevitably affect Lithuania-U.S. relations. Lithuania becomes an integral part of a political and economic union, which has common and/or coordinated policies in almost all fields of public life, ranging from taxation and trade to environment and education. The adoption of the European Constitution will even expand its horizons towards a greater role in foreign and security policy. It will take some time for all sides to get used to the fact that questions, which to date have dominated the Lithuania-U.S. bilateral agenda, will be managed within the complex decision-making of the U.S.-EU framework. As a full-fledged member of the EU, Lithuania will also participate in drafting EU policies and decisions towards the U.S. at the same table with the other 24 member countries. Lithuanian bureaucracy will soon be more greatly exposed to the issues which dominate the EU-U.S. agenda, such as coordinating policies towards the fight against terrorism, cooperation in extradition cases, transport security, genetically modified products (GMO's) and multilateral negotiations within the WTO.

The institutional shift towards the EU requires even greater demand of human, intellectual and financial resources. Each year representatives of Lithuania will have to participate - presenting national interests to shape the common positions of the Union - in over 5,000 meetings of various EU institutions. In the first year of membership in the EU, approximately 500 Lithuanian citizens will join EU institutions and become true Brussels-based "eurobureaucrats".

While in the aftermath of EU and NATO enlargements Lithuania's domestic and foreign policies are bound to lean towards Brussels, it is also important not to underestimate the changes occurring within the U.S. foreign and security policy at large and towards Europe and the Baltic region in particular.

The 1990's saw an unprecedented engagement of the U.S. in the Baltic region due to the complex puzzle of the legitimate aspirations of the Baltic States to restore their sovereignty and to join Western institutions. Initially, it included the U.S. broker role in helping to withdraw Soviet troops from the Baltic States. Later on it was followed by the strategic decision to help Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia join NATO and expand regional cooperation with Russia.

The September 11th terrorist attacks against the U.S. had a profound impact on the daily life of Americans and the superpower's strategic thinking and priorities. The U.S. attention has shifted away from Europe toward those parts of the world, especially to the wider Middle East, where the greatest threats to American security lie.

There is also a growing concern that once the Baltic States have become members of NATO, the U.S. may essentially regard the "Baltic puzzle" as resolved and disengage from the region. Indeed there are signs of this already happening: the Baltic States are no longer receivers of funds from the program of Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED), transmissions of RFE and VOA in Baltic languages have been terminated and American NGO's find greater difficulties in receiving support from the U.S. Government to conduct exchange programs with Lithuania and the other Baltic states. That led some observers to state that the momentum behind the Northern European Initiative has begun to wane.*

While recognising the obvious differences in the national strategic priorities of Lithuania and the USA, it is important to develop a new strategic agenda that will keep the U.S. engaged in the Baltic region. This will ensure the presence of a strategic player, the United States, which working together with Nordic and Baltic littoral countries, including Poland, can help to facilitate the change towards democracy and free market in the immediate neighbourhood of Lithuania and beyond.

* The institutional expression of the NEI remains a U.S.-Baltic Charter which was signed by the Presidents of the United States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania on January 16, 1998. Until 2001 it served not only as an excellent framework to help Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to prepare and join the Alliance, but also provided a practical mechanism to coordinate Baltic-U.S. bilateral military and economic cooperation.

On the other hand, as the U.S. increasingly focuses on security beyond Europe, Lithuania needs to show how it can contribute to the broader security agenda of the U.S., particularly with respect to the promotion of democracy and stability in the wider Middle East.

In both strategic directions Lithuania will be more successful if, working together with other countries, it manages to create a platform that can function as a force multiplier, making them more attractive strategic partners for the USA.

NEW AGENDA

When Lithuania was struggling on its way to EU and NATO, bilateral relations with the U.S. were primarily aimed at gaining U.S. support for our membership aspirations. Since Lithuania has become a member of these organizations, our international status changes either. Lithuania and the U.S. are linked not only politically, but also through the legal ties of allies. However, this doesn't automatically guarantee continuation of U.S. interest in Lithuania and the Baltic region at large. Therefore, the relations between our nations will continue to be effective and successful only if they are dynamic and reflect a comprehensive set of political, economic and cultural issues.

Political Framework of Cooperation

As mentioned above, despite the differences in national strategic priorities, Lithuania and the U.S. could work together on specific projects aimed at promoting democracy, stability and security both within and beyond Europe.

Therefore the new Lithuania–U.S. political and security agenda might include two parallel and mutually reinforcing tracks: first, to continue and enhance Lithuania's contribution to the global war on terrorism, and second, to project stability and security in the immediate neighbourhood and beyond.

With regard to the first task, Lithuania will have to be pro-active and try to find its role in the broader U.S. foreign security policy agenda. It will be imperative to continue active involvement in the antiterrorist coalition, including its military and civilian contribution to security forces in Afghanistan, reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq and eventually in other places where U.S.- or NATO-led operations might unfold in the future, including the wider Middle East.

There might not be sufficient capacity and resources for a small country to sustain its involvement militarily in every future mission. However, it would clearly be in the interests of Lithuania, especially in terms of its efforts to pursue and maintain an enduring partnership with the U.S., to have a so-called "niche", be it military or civilian, representation in those activities. Indeed, I think that Lithuania's practical contribution to the U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq could be broadened to a wider political scale. The experience of Lithuania in getting rid of an authoritarian regime and of building democratic institutions and free market economies might be well employed in the wider Middle East.

By being a committed and credible ally sharing the burden of building stability and democracy in the wider Middle East, Lithuania would also most definitely advance its bilateral agenda with the U.S. One may observe a common interest here since the United States needs allies supporting its agenda and (however modestly) helping in their efforts to fight terrorism.

Obviously, NATO is likely to further evolve so it can be a natural and highly useful instrument, especially for Lithuania's military involvement in various operations. However, given its size and limited resources, Lithuania will also need to explore regional and bilateral frameworks within and outside the Alliance. Working together with partners will increase Lithuania's weight both in NATO and in Washington, D.C.

This leads me to the second track of Lithuania's new agenda, namely projecting stability and assistance cooperation to the East. Undoubtedly, there will be a certain shift in Lithuania-U.S. security cooperation: from the U.S. support for Lithuania's security needs to the coordination of

support for projecting and expanding security and stability in the immediate Lithuanian neighborhood and beyond.

Currently Lithuania shares its experience in political and economic transition to democracy and functioning free-market economy with interested partners in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and in such regions as the Trans-Caucasus, Central Asia and the Adriatic Sea.

We continue to share our experience of reforms and continue to support democracy, free enterprise and development projects in the Kaliningrad region of Russia.

In pursuit of a critical dialogue with Belarus, Lithuania is interested in maturing the seeds of civil society as it will contribute to democratization and rule of law in that country. Lithuania often provides a venue for training seminars and conferences of the Belarusian democratic opposition and journalists.

Working in cooperation with countries in the region such as Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and others, Lithuania is well-positioned to assist and facilitate Ukraine's pro-Western choice and European vocation in times of turbulent developments of a country in transition. We are eager to share with Ukraine our lessons learned and experience gained thanks to the integration process into the EU and NATO.

We have offered our experience of transformation and democracy building to Georgia; Lithuania finances the training of Georgian officers in the Baltic Defence College and in the Military Academy of Lithuania.

All these projects pursued by Lithuania reflect the spirit and the goals of a newly launched U.S. initiative in Northern Europe - e-PINE (enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe). We think that continued U.S. engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region and beyond has a stabilising effect; therefore, we applaud this new U.S. initiative which will enhance partnership in the region and breathe a new quality into the earlier U.S.-North European Initiative and the U.S.-Baltic Charter. Lithuania believes that e-PINE initiative creates unique opportunities to boost regional cooperation beyond traditional stereotypes, thereby expanding the geography of the democratic neighbourhood of the region, and also serving as an anchor for U.S. involvement in the Baltic region and beyond.

With one foot in the Baltic region and the other in Central Europe, Lithuania often finds great commonality of views with Poland, Germany and other countries when dealing with challenging issues over the nearest neighbours such as Belarus, Ukraine and the Kaliningrad region. Therefore, flexibility and openness of other e-PINE countries will be required so as to make the best use of the expertise and assets of other nations beyond the traditional framework of Nordic-Baltic countries.

Securing credible and practical bilateral and regional cooperation between Lithuania and the U.S. will also require greater financial commitments from both governments to make the U.S.-Baltic Charter and e-PINE related projects a reality.

“It's the economy, stupid”

Borrowing from the Clinton-Gore campaign slogan in 1992 - “it's the economy, stupid” - the questions of investments, trade, and tourism should gain greater importance as we advance Lithuania-U.S. relations. Though Lithuania and the U.S. differ in size, and are separated geographically by thousands of miles, we have become more interdependent in the age of information and knowledge economy. The expansion of the EU will further facilitate and speed up this process; therefore, distance and size become less relevant in today's world. Indeed, the business community in Lithuania and America, sharing the same free market values, seek the best business conditions in both countries.

Certainly Lithuania's membership in the EU and NATO along with the country's strong economic performance provides new opportunities for American business and investment in Lithuania. As of the 1st of May, 2004, Lithuania has become a part of a 450 million-consumer

market. With strong pro-American sentiments and a well-educated and still not an overly expensive labor force Lithuania is becoming a springboard for American business in the EU. Moreover, Lithuania's proximity to the recovering markets of Russia and Ukraine and the knowledge of languages and culture make Lithuania a natural partner for American business to the East as well. Not surprisingly, we have already witnessed an increased number of Americans doing business in Lithuania. Finally, according to the July 19th, 2003 issue of *The Economist*, Lithuania has the fastest growing economy in Europe, which makes the country very attractive to Americans who are eager to trade or invest with Lithuanian partners.

On the other hand, the increasing number of Lithuanian researchers and trade representatives are rediscovering the 290 million-strong American market. Lithuanian business community now enters the very competitive American market with a stronger sense of self-confidence, which was missing during the early years of Lithuanian independence. On the other hand, this trend obliges Lithuanian business and government both to be innovative and more aggressive while exploring the vast opportunities of the U.S. market.

One of the results of efforts towards the reinvigoration of Lithuanian economic diplomacy in the U.S. is the foundation of the American Lithuanian Economic Development Advisory Council (ALEDAC), which gathers prominent Lithuanian-Americans from businesses and charities. Members of ALEDAC are helping us to promote the awareness of Lithuania, as well as investment, trade and tourism between the two nations. Their expertise and broad contacts provide an important tool for Lithuanian economic diplomacy.

We do strongly believe that greater consolidated efforts are needed to make Lithuania appear on the map of American tourists. The market of U.S. travelers to Lithuania to date is considered "a secondary market" because of a rather small number of U.S. visitors to Lithuania every year. Lithuania is still poorly represented in various tourism shows and U.S. magazines. Recently, however, we have noticed promising signs of greater outreach by the appropriate Lithuanian government agencies on the one hand, and U.S. press and tourist agencies on the other. Lithuania's membership in the EU as well as excellent economic performance draws the attention of the U.S. daily newspapers and business magazines. *The Sophisticated Traveler of the New York Times*, *the Boston Herald*, *the Chicago Sun-Times*, *Business Newsweek* and others name Lithuania as a "hot spot" to visit. Indeed, many Americans who have visited Lithuania find that this small Baltic country is probably still the best kept secret in Europe. As the *Boston Herald* put it in its September 21, 2003 issue "this beautiful and fascinating place [Lithuania] in Eastern Europe is about to become as touristy and expensive as the rest of Europe. But not yet. Go now, before everyone else discovers it!"

It is also worth mentioning that the opening of the Klaipeda Seaport Passenger Terminal in May, 2003 has provided new possibilities for American tourists. Since that time cruises have increasingly become one of the popular means for tourists to visit the Baltic States. In March of 2004 the Klaipeda State Seaport authority together with the Klaipeda City Municipality tourism department presented tourist attraction spots of Lithuania at the International Exhibition and Conference Serving the Cruise Industry in Miami, Florida.

We have every reason to believe that through greater awareness about Lithuania, interest from U.S. travel journalists and everyday visitors will continue and grow. It is important for the Embassy and Lithuanian Tourism Department to strengthen our outreach efforts in presenting Lithuania's beauty and hospitality to U.S. business travel associations, tour operators and journalists.

CONCLUSIONS

“Special” Lithuania-U.S. relations have been formed historically and naturally; the U.S. has always been an advocate of our freedom and independence. The U.S. played a crucial role in Lithuania being invited to join NATO. Through the accomplishment of two major goals - Lithuania’s membership in the EU and NATO - we are opening a new chapter of bilateral relations, with broader possibilities and even better opportunities to advance and strengthen the relations between our two countries.

A new agenda along with new objectives and challenges will guide the Lithuania-U.S. partnership in the future. Its mutually supportive elements should include: greater efforts to boost trade, investment and tourism, coordinated actions in political and military fields to deal with dangers and risks to international security as well as regional projects to facilitate the advancement of freedom and democracy beyond Lithuania’s borders.

I am sure that both countries are ready to advance this new agenda of two passionate champions of democracy and freedom - Lithuania and the United States of America.

THE DILEMMAS OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AFTER EU ENLARGEMENT AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR LITHUANIA

Ramūnas Vilpišauskas

HISTORIC DATES AND MOVING TARGETS

The year 2004 will become one of the key historical dates for Lithuania and most other European countries. The enlargement of the EU (and the continuous expansion of NATO) symbolises the most important step in the unification of Europe which for half a century was divided by force. For Lithuania and other countries of the region which regained their independence at the beginning of 1990s accession into the EU (and NATO) have been the two most important policy priorities. These priorities not only directed their foreign policy towards strengthening relations with the democratic countries of transatlantic community but also played an important role in structuring and sustaining domestic transition reform efforts.

However, completion of the accession process and the official extension of membership status to Lithuania create new challenges for policy makers. Some of them are related directly with the fact that the main priorities of the transition reforms have been achieved and therefore there is a need for new goals which can be achieved by using membership in the EU and NATO. This requires a qualitatively new political thinking and abilities from the country's policy makers. What used to be the goals have become the policy instruments. Another group of challenges originates from the external environment, such as the changing nature of the EU and NATO which has taken place partly due to the accession of new members and related institutional reforms and partly due to other shifts in the international system such as new threats to international peace.

The "transatlantic rift" or the disagreements on a number of issues between the USA and European countries, in particular France and Germany, have been probably among the most debated recent trends in world politics. These disagreements on issues ranging from import duties on steel, agricultural subsidies or emission controls to intervention in Iraq and the role of international institutions have a direct bearing on Lithuanian foreign economic and security policy and create new dilemmas. Formal accession into the transatlantic and European organisations, in addition to economic and political benefits, also creates important responsibilities. In the face of disagreements between members of the transatlantic community, Lithuanian policy makers will often confront difficult choices as the case of intervention in Iraq demonstrated. To some extent these dilemmas were present even before the war in Iraq, for example, during the process of accession into the World Trade Organization when Lithuanian negotiators found themselves between the conflicting demands of U.S. and EU representatives.

Accession into the EU itself not only implies very concrete changes in economic policy such as increased import duties which create costs for American producers, but also locks in broader integration patterns which will increasingly bind the country with other EU members, in some cases distancing it from its strategic partner on the other side of the Atlantic. It is argued in this essay that Lithuania's accession into the EU and NATO formalises the asymmetric interdependence of the country with Europe and America: the high and increasing importance of trade and investment relations with the EU and high reliance (dependence) on the provision of security from a NATO dominated by the U.S. This asymmetry of interdependence originates from the characteristics of the country (its size and openness) and the international system (dominance of the U.S. in the world). However, recent events in the international system, debates on the relevance of NATO, emerging European defence policy and disagreements between America and some EU members might alter this asymmetry of dependence by making Lithuania more dependent on the provision of security by the EU.

Although this might seem like a natural development, taking into account the relative intensity of economic relations between Lithuania and the EU, it poses questions regarding the military capacities of the EU (or rather its member states regarding low spending on defence), different approaches of the U.S. and European countries towards Russia - still regarded as a potential source of instability in Lithuania and finally the historically important relations between Lithuania and the U.S., with the latter being the strongest and most consistent supporter of Lithuania's independence and its accession to NATO. These issues are discussed below.

THE DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS OF EU ACCESSION

Every enlargement of the EU has posed questions regarding the effects of adopting common norms on the economic relations of new members with outsiders. The EU is a customs union with a common external tariff and other harmonised trade policy instruments. Moreover, common product standards and other non-tariff barriers play an increasingly important role for exporters and investors from the third countries. During the process of enlargement some of these issues are settled by using the instruments of the WTO (compensatory payments for the increase in import duties), others are a matter of bilateral talks.

Already during the process of accession into the WTO, which has taken about 6 years and has been quite closely coordinated with the European Commission, Lithuanian negotiators have had to deal with the issues which cause disagreements between the EU and the U.S. As the Deputy Director General for Trade from the European Commission noted speaking about the Baltic States' accession into the WTO, "the U.S. delayed the completion of these negotiations by many months, insisting (a) on obligations that were known to go beyond those of the EU (thus creating a potential 'debit' situation to be compensated in the future), and (b) attempting, in the specific case of the audio-visual sector, to extract concessions which would result in different obligations from those of the EU, with the same result."¹ Thus, in some cases, only because it had a perspective of future membership in the EU, Lithuania became a hostage of trade conflicts between the EU and U.S. while negotiating accession into the WTO.

Accession into the EU requires new members to align their foreign trade policy with the one of the EU. In the case of Lithuania (as well as other Baltic States, in particular Estonia, but differently from other Central European countries) this implies a slight increase in conventional (MFN) import duties for imports of industrial products from the U.S. and other members of the WTO with which the EU does not have preferential agreements². As a result of this there will be some trade diversion in Lithuania's trade with the U.S. Partly because imports from the U.S. in recent years constituted only three percent of Lithuania's imports, the trade diversion will be rather insignificant³. The majority of the country's trade has for half a decade been with the EU, accounting for 40-50 percent of Lithuania's foreign trade turnover (or over 60 percent if new member states are included).

Although the impact of the non-tariff barriers is more difficult to estimate, different product standards (such as safety and other technical standards for automobiles) are also likely to make imports from the U.S. to Lithuania more expensive. In the long term, this will create incentives for replacing products imported from the U.S. with products produced in the EU or the countries which have preferential trade agreements with the Union. Two factors might slow down or even reverse this trend – further liberalization of trade in WTO negotiations or conclusion of a long

¹ Abbott, R. EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Economic Relations, presentation at the conference "Europe's continuing enlargement: implications for transatlantic partnership", John Hopkins University, Washington D. C., 22 October -2001.

² There have been several studies conducted which provide a comparative analysis of import regimes for industrial and agricultural products of Lithuania and the EU. They can be found on the web sites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy and the former European Committee under the Government of Lithuania.

³ Overall U.S. trade with new member states of the EU from Central and Eastern Europe amounts to only less than 1 percent of U.S. foreign trade turnover.

debated transatlantic free trade agreement. The latter agreement might eventually be agreed on because the EU and the U.S. are each other's most important trade and investment partners. As has been recently argued, the economic relationship between the U.S. and Europe "is by a wide margin the deepest and broadest between any two continents in history – and it is growing closer"⁴. If the transatlantic economic integration is facilitated by the removal of tariffs to trade, it would compensate for the discriminatory effects of EU enlargement.

Finally, there are also some issues related to American investors' rights in Lithuania after EU accession as a result of amending the bilateral investment treaty between the U.S. and Lithuania to make it compatible with the EU internal market rules. There had been some concerns expressed by American companies in Lithuania regarding the preferences granted to them by Lithuanian authorities. However, these concerns did not create major disputes and in significance do not compare to general regulatory barriers faced by businesses in the country. Although there have been significant American investments in Lithuania, reaching 8.6 percent of total FDI as of October 2003, in recent years investments originating from the EU, in particular the Nordic countries, have reached a share of 60-70 percent of total foreign direct investments. While membership in the Single market will most likely have a positive effect on direct investment from other members of the EU, it could be that being part of a 450 million consumer market might also attract additional outside investment, including American origin, willing to take advantage of access to the Single market and comparative advantages in Lithuania. Early adoption of the euro, currently scheduled for 2006-2007, could also encourage U.S. investments in Lithuania.

THE EU - STILL AN ECONOMIC GIANT AND MILITARY DWARF?

Growing economic integration between Lithuania and the EU is a result of several factors: geographic proximity, removal of barriers to trade and movement of factors of production, patterns of specialization. The EU is not only a customs union, it is also one of very few examples of the creation of a common market and a monetary union (among twelve of its members). Most of the preparatory measures undertaken in Lithuania in order to join the EU have also been in the area of economic exchange. Only a few issues touched upon the "high politics" of foreign and security policy, including Russian transit to and from the Kaliningrad region. This relative focus on technical matters of regulatory rules while ignoring other areas (with the exception of budgetary matters in so far as they were related to sectorally - farming - and regionally - the Ignalina nuclear power plant - concentrated groups of society) seems to reflect the nature of the EU with its supranational regime in regulatory matters and intergovernmental cooperation in security and defence issues. Most reforms in the military apparatus of Lithuania and in security aspirations have been related to preparations for NATO membership. It is through the latter that regular contacts with the U.S. have been maintained. Lithuania's support for U.S. actions in Iraq should also be seen not so much as an expression of support for the military actions but rather as a sign of solidarity with the country which supported the dissident movement of the Lithuanian community during the period of Soviet occupation when most West European governments tried to appease the Soviet Union, and which insisted on accepting Lithuania and other Baltic States into NATO⁵.

However, the changing nature of both the EU and NATO might change this balance of cooperative relations among members of the transatlantic community. Since the end of the Cold War there have been many debates about the relevance of NATO⁶. Although the enlargement of

⁴ Hamilton, D., Quinlan, J. A Common Interest in Prosperity, Despite the Rhetoric, FT.com site, 17 November 2003. As they further argue, "what is perhaps most striking is that economic integration [between the U.S. and the EU] strengthened further in the present year of political disintegration".

⁵ Similar argument on Poland and other acceding EU members' support for U.S. actions in Iraq is made in Geremek, B. Some remarks on Transatlantic Convergences and Divergences, Center for Transatlantic Relations, and Sikorski, R. Losing the New Europe, Washington Post, 7 November 2003.

⁶ For one of the more recent overviews of the arguments for and against NATO's existence see Howorth, J. ESDP and NATO. Wedlock or Deadlock? in Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 38, no. 3, 2003, p. 235-254.

the Alliance and its role in Kosovo seemed to give NATO a new mission, its relevance was again questioned after the September 11 events, in particular the disagreements among its members on the need for the war in Iraq and for providing Turkey with security guarantees if it found itself threatened during the operation. Currently the Alliance is clearly searching for redefinition of its operational model, and with participation in Afghanistan ongoing, its focus might increasingly move “out-of-area”.

At the same time, there has been an intensification of debates in Europe on the common defence policy (so far rarely backed by actions). Sparked by the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and perceived inability of the EU with its Common Foreign and Security Policy to deal with instability in its neighborhood, the European Security and Defence Policy moved onto the EU agenda in 1999. It was then decided to create the 60,000-strong rapid reaction force, which might eventually replace NATO, to deal with similar conflicts around the EU. It should be noted the decision-making rules in this area were strictly based on the intergovernmental model, with each member state having a veto right. The forthcoming enlargement of the EU strengthened the concerns about the effectiveness of decision-making in the EU. More than an increase in the number of group members the heterogeneity of interests raised additional concerns as evidenced by the reaction of J. Chirac to the support of acceding countries for U.S. actions in Iraq. It is this context which helps one to understand the debates on the EU foreign minister and structured cooperation in the area of defence foreseen in the draft EU constitution (so far not adopted).

HISTORY, SUBSIDIES AND “HIGH POLITICS”

The potential for structured (enhanced) cooperation in the area of defence (and the position of the EU foreign minister) might create difficult dilemmas for Lithuania and other new members. First, this might result in a group of large member states, potentially joined by a group of mostly federalist-minded EU countries, making the decisions without due regard to the interests of others. The experience of Lithuania’s negotiations with the EU on the Russian transit regime during accession negotiations provides some basis for the caution. Statements made by the leaders of some large EU member countries urging the respect of Russian interests during the process of enlargement could be interpreted as pressure on Lithuania to give in to the demands of Russian authorities, who formally were not even part to the accession negotiations. Eventually, despite statements to the contrary, the European Commission did agree to modify the *acquis communautaire* in order to accommodate the interests of Russian authorities by agreeing on a new type of facilitated transit regime. This experience in the context of memories going back to the times of Soviet and Tsarist occupation provides the grounds for a cautious attitude towards a structured military cooperation led by France and Germany⁷.

Second, with the current ambivalent attitude of the U.S. towards a stronger political role of the EU in world affairs, the participation of Lithuania in the potentially enhanced cooperation projects of the EU might contradict U.S. interests. Though for a long time the U.S. encouraged the EC/EU to strengthen its political role and capacities, the actual developments are now regarded with suspicion by many in the U.S. administration. Of course, the rhetoric of the EU regarding its military role is still not matched by the required funding. According to some experts, meeting the ESDP headline goals might amount to 60-100 billion euro over next 10-15 years in addition to its annual operational costs of 7-33 billion euro, or some 2.3-2.8 percent of GDP⁸. Taking into account the current budgetary difficulties of Germany and France in meeting the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact as well as the overall public skepticism towards increasing expenditures on defence, creating credible EU capacities might prove challenging. However, the

⁷ “French-German motor” supported by Belgium and Luxembourg was behind the recently advanced idea of a structured cooperation in the defence area. With the renewed support of Great Britain, this idea was discussed during 2003 and gained more credibility though even after reassurances that it would not duplicate NATO, was still regarded with suspicion by some in the U.S.

⁸ Muller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G. The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making System on the European Union, in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, no. 7, 2002, p. 281.

debates on this issue and the division of tasks between the EU and NATO are going to continue and the new members will eventually have to take sides.

Many analysts predict that after EU enlargement there will be more pro-American countries such as Poland that will strengthen the Atlanticist coalition⁹. Lithuania is likely to be among those “instinctive Atlanticists” who signed the Vilnius group declaration. However, it has been extensively shown that in the EU reluctant countries are influenced through package deals and payments on the side. Therefore, it remains to be seen if the potential budgetary favors can influence economically less developed new members to support EU initiatives which might not be welcomed by the U.S., or to restrain them from supporting the U.S. in its operations either unilaterally or through international institutions. To be sure, current budgetary difficulties of the major net payers to the EU budget and the increase in the number of net recipients after enlargement will limit the potential for traditional payments on the side. However, issue linkages could still be used as negative incentive, in particular during the reform of the common agricultural policy and adoption of the new financial framework of the EU for 2007-2013. In such cases the dilemmas of Lithuania and other new members could be phrased as follows: will the demands of domestic lobbies outweigh foreign policy and security concerns? In other words, will agricultural subsidies be able to buy the support of new members in “high politics” areas?

The history of American and European relations demonstrate that under conditions of significant external threat (the Soviet Union) the transatlantic community was able to maintain stable and good relations without letting them be disturbed by disagreements on agricultural subsidies, import duties and other trade related matters. Also, as the history of the EC illustrates, cooperative efforts do not spill over so easily from the matters of economic regulation and trade to the issues of security and defence. A relatively short history of transition reforms in Lithuania seems to provide grounds for arguing that security priorities determine economic policy decisions. However, when “everyday politics” rather than historical decisions are being made, short-term domestic interests might prevail. At that time the members of a coalition of “instinctive Atlanticists” might join the coalition of “calculating protectionists”. Payments on the side and socialization of the elites from new member states into EU institutions might gradually change their pro-American preferences, particularly if the EU continues to base many of its projects on competitive comparison of itself to the U.S. (“become the most competitive economy in the world”, as the main goal of the Lisbon Strategy puts it; meaning more competitive than the U.S., making the euro a global currency, etc.). However, it is still too early to forecast that such a change in preferences might spill over from the common trade policy area to security and defence issues which are based on a different mode of decision-making.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

Simultaneous accession into the EU and NATO and the changing nature of these organizations create new important challenges for Lithuanian policy makers. Remaining a good ally of both the U.S. and partners in the EU when their preferences diverge might sometimes be a difficult task. It is still too early to make predictions on the basis of popular surveys regarding the similarities of societal values with the ones prevalent in America and Europe, because Lithuanian society is still in the process of transition, which takes longer than the reform of economic and political institutions. On the one hand, the experience of transition reforms makes some groups of the population prone to take risks, making them similar to the Americans. On the other hand, a still very strong attachment to the paternalistic state as evidenced by popular surveys might actually be reinforced by socialising with societies from European countries with extensive welfare conditions.

⁹ See Grabbe, H. Shaken to the Core, in *Prospect*, May 2003, p. 12-13; Zaborowski, M., Longhurst, K. America's proteze in the East? The emergence of Poland as a regional leader, in *International Affairs*, vol. 79, no. 5, p. 1009-1028.

With regard to the role of international institutions, on which currently the attitudes of the U.S. administration and many EU member states diverge, Lithuania might also have difficulties choosing between unilateralists and multilateralists. The official policy of Lithuania has been in line with the multilateralist approach. This seems to be understandable taking into account the size of the country (small countries are seen as favoring and benefiting more from multilateral institutions) and the historic experience of being occupied by European powers. On the other hand, historical evidence might be interpreted differently (for example, the role of the League of Nations). Besides, if not for the strong push of the U.S., the prospects of Lithuania's accession into NATO would have been questionable. The unilateral actions of the U.S. might still be supported by Lithuania if they are directed at liberating nations from oppressive regimes, only because of the historical experiences of the country.

Finally, the search for the solutions between different policy choices most often is going to take place during the everyday politics of coalitions. In the area of economic interests a number of factors ranging from supranational decision-making procedures to easier potential for payments on the side and issue linkages would probably push the Lithuanian policy makers closer to the position of France and other protectionists, which often conflict with the U.S. In the field of security and defence matters the challenges are going to be the most complex. Although it is in Lithuania's best interest to have a well-functioning NATO and the U.S. firmly interested in European affairs and its neighborhood, the emerging EU defence structures create the potential for duplication, especially in the face of disagreements between members of the transatlantic community. Together with the new threats, this is likely to facilitate directing the attention of the U.S. to other regions of the world. It will take both imagination and skill from Lithuanian policy makers and diplomats to ensure that these changes do not leave Lithuania less secure and less integrated in the transatlantic community.