Europe’s Contribution to NATO’s New Defense

The policy debate about NATO’s burden sharing tends to focus on European members’ reluctance or failure to meet the two-percent-of-GDP minimum defense spending target. Redressing the transatlantic budgetary misbalance is indeed warranted because of the possibility of a re-election next year of Donald Trump or a like-minded Republican candidate, who would use Europe’s under-spending as an argument for reducing or withdrawing U.S. support for NATO and Ukraine.

Equal attention should, however, be devoted to European allies’ material contribution to NATO and if that would allow them to assume the lion’s share of its conventional defense and deterrence. The issue is not only about the alliance’s internal cohesion but also about its objective ability to repel Russian aggression (while retaining its crisis-management readiness) as the United States – no matter who occupies the White House – is bound to balance China in the Indo-Pacific and Iran in the Middle East. The 2017 and 2022 U.S. defense doctrines state the preparedness to fight (and win) only one war against a great power war while only deterring another at any given time. Europe needs to fill the gap.

The NATO Force Model adopted last year roughly prescribes 300,000 troops ready for high-readiness deployment within one month, and an additional 500,000 for deployment within six months. NATO further decided that ‘up to brigade-size’ forces could be placed on the border with Russia. This is a serious preparation for the eventuality of war with Russia but the Vilnius Summit did not specify the implementation of these goals other than putting in place new regional defense plans, investing in advanced and interoperable capabilities, and creating a so-called Allied Reaction Force. The policy discussion needs to focus on the European contribution, specifically (i) defense investment and (ii) defense planning.

The European allies should invest their defense budgets in building military ‘muscle,’ i.e. conventional fighting power, rather than ‘nervous system

First, the European allies should invest their defense budgets in building military ‘muscle,’ i.e. conventional fighting power, rather than ‘nervous system,’ i.e. the capability to trace the enemy’s positions and capabilities. Discussions about European defense and space collaboration (Permanent Structured Cooperation, European Defense Fund) tend to obscure the fact that Europe is unlikely to replace the U.S. strategic enablers and situational awareness capabilities (C4ISR) within the foreseeable future.[1] It is hard to imagine any European capital, even Paris, in favor of a transfer to a European nervous system because they will see it as an abandonment of U.S. leadership in NATO, especially as far as the integrated command at strategic level (SACEUR) is concerned. From both a military and political perspective, therefore, the Europeans should focus on building NATO’s muscle to defend against Russia.

NATO’s new deterrent requires more robust and less mobile brigades and divisions whose capabilities interoperable across all domains (sea, land, air, cyber, and space). This is a clear change from the lightly armed infantry forces that NATO relied on for its preexisting ‘tripwire’ presence on the eastern border or its crisis-management operations such as Afghanistan. The degradation of Russian land power in Ukraine gives the Europeans breathing space to expand their military capability and adapt their industries to the attritional warfare that plays out in Ukraine.

The Europeans should divert their budgets to the build-up of combat-ready ground troops, armor, artillery, and combat aircraft, where they relatively easily can expand their existing capabilities. They should give priority to acute gaps in air and missile defense, drones, long-range fires, strategic airlift, and ammunition production,[2] also with a view to future donations to Ukraine. The EU has proven a viable forum through which the European allies can finance the increase in their ammunitions production and their donations to Ukraine.

Second, the European allies should explore enhanced defense planning without traditional overreliance on the United States. European allies generally support the NATO Force Model but many face significant challenge in integrating their national policy and capability development into NATO’s three new regional defense plans.[3] NATO will require its allies to build up stockpiles and equipment and to plan for European troop formations for territorial denial. This is crucial for the preservation of allied unity during a security crisis, as opposed to having to take a political decision to liberate seized territory against a nuclear-armed opponent. Reinforcements from Western Europe would have to travel more than 1,000 kilometers to reach wartime positions, which means that delay comes at the risk of loss of territory.[4]

The new in-place forces in the Baltic States with a British-led battalion in Estonia, a Canadian-led brigade in Latvia, and a German combat brigade in Lithuania narrow the deterrence gap but do not completely close it

The regional defense plan for Central Europe, which includes the Baltic States, seems to be the most salient to counter Russian ambitions to restore parts of its Tsarist territory. The new in-place forces in the Baltic States with a British-led battalion in Estonia, a Canadian-led brigade in Latvia, and a German combat brigade in Lithuania narrow the deterrence gap but do not completely close it.[5] NATO should, therefore, leverage the growing German and Polish force projection capability. Germany aims to increase its active armed forces to 200,000 and to contribute 30,000, or ten percent, to the high-readiness NATO Force Model. Poland aims to increase its armed forces to 300,000 and is much further ahead in procuring new battle tanks, artillery, combat airplanes, and air defense systems that are necessary for the land warfare conducted in Ukraine.

Only the bigger European countries can provide combat-ready brigades and command-and-control and logistical enablers

The regional defense plan for Northern Europe, which stretches from the Arctic to the Gulf of Finland, would logically revolve around the United Kingdom, which will retain a limited presence also in Estonia. The regional defense plan for Southern Europe, which stretches from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, would center on France and perhaps Italy. Only the bigger European countries can provide combat-ready brigades and command-and-control and logistical enablers, but the smaller countries can complement them with mechanized or artillery units, or with host facilities for those that share a border or sea with Russia.[6] Finally, it falls to the EU to increase funds for military mobility throughout Europe, essentially to improve infrastructure for moving heavy weapons and large troops amounts eastward.

The United States will continue to play an indispensable role as NATO’s military nervous system and obviously for its nuclear deterrence. Given the demographic, economic and technological superiority, it is otherwise embarrassing for the European countries if spending (minimally) two percent of their GDPs do not result in the capability to fight Russia. The policy debate about burden sharing after the Vilnius Summit should now come full circle, whereby the Europe aims to assume the lion’s share of NATO’s conventional deterrence.