Publications

Russian attacks and advances in Ukraine make it increasingly uncomfortable for NATO to stand passively on the sideline. NATO remains unlikely to take steps toward Ukraine’s accession but is now considering taking over the coordination of weapons supplies and training and creating a dedicated fund to sustain them long-term.

The presidential and parliamentary (Legislative Yuan, 立法院) elections of the Republic of China (Taiwan) took place on 13 January without any major intrigue. Out of three candidates, Lai Ching-te (賴清德), the vice-president of outgoing President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), was elected President of Taiwan.

Lithuania is internationally recognised as a frontrunner in combating Russian information attacks. This is due to the country’s extensive experience of navigating complex relations with Russia – an authoritarian neighbour known for leveraging propaganda and disinformation to achieve its political objectives. The evolution of the sophisticated countermeasures in Lithuania is therefore informed by a history of direct engagement and the necessity to create innovative and effective response strategies.

Control of the information domain has become a crucial element of a country’s national security and strategic strength, particularly in an era characterised by geopolitical uncertainties. In this global context, the manipulation of information to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations and to achieve specific strategic objectives has become increasingly prominent, especially when analysing autocratic regimes. These regimes often employ disinformation as a key non-kinetic activity conducted against Western liberal democracies.

On its 75th anniversary, NATO has seized the opportunity to update its policy on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), a commitment that was made during the Vilnius Summit in 2023. A greater focus on deterrence and collective defence is a necessary update as the last iteration of the policy, released in 2018, did not fully articulate how WPS principles would be integrated into this core NATO task.

Threats to the southern flank do not represent such a direct, military, and imminent threat to NATO as Russia does on the Eastern flank, but they do endanger the security of NATO member states and regional partners as recognized in NATO’s Strategic Concept adopted in Madrid in 2022. Despite that recognition and the Alliance’s desire to pay equal attention to every threat in its 360° strategy, the eastern flank deserves much more attention in NATO’s planning than the southern flank.

Irrespective of the outcome of the European elections in June, the new political cycle for 2024-2029 will present the EU with a set of acute yet long-term challenges: Russia's war against Ukraine and its broader confrontation with the West, systemic competition between China and the US, the growing fragmentation of the global economy, accelerating climate change, and the technological transformation. The decisions made by the new EU leadership may thus have consequences for the next several decades of European and Lithuanian security, prosperity, and development.

As we mark 600 days in the midst of conflict and closely examine the behaviour of Russian soldiers in Ukraine, a critical juncture is upon us. The time has arrived to delve into the depths of Russia’s reform and modernization endeavours. In this unfolding narrative, we aim to unveil the essence of ‘Ivan’s War’ on Ukrainian soil. This inquiry poses compelling questions: can we truly decipher the unique contours of their military culture and, consequently, discern a distinct Russian way of war?

Institutions and organizations researching and monitoring the informational policies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are observing a dramatic increase and expansion in the regime’s efforts to shape and influence the global information space.

NATO allies need to pay close attention to and learn from the war if they are serious about building up their own EDT capabilities. Specifically, NATO allies should draw three distinct lessons from the war so far. These are not about specific weapon systems, such as which drone has been the most promising, or how to integrate autonomy in the fighting process. Rather, they are more fundamental lessons and changes that the increasing use of new technologies have caused or enabled.

The issue of Moldova’s reintegration came to the fore again after the authorities in Chisinau began the transposition of the new Customs Code, starting in January 2024. The political focus of this exercise is on the Transnistria region and is a first attempt to improve economic integration with the rest of Moldova.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a defining moment for European security. It has been an attempt to introduce a new paradigm in European security with brutal military force in line with Moscow’s interests. Russia, together with China, aims to undermine the European and international order that was created and led by the US after the end of the Cold World War. Russian goals were presented in form of two draft treaties that included three major demands in December 2021.