Russia, together with China, aims to undermine the European and international order that was created and led by the US after the end of the Cold World War.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a defining moment for European security. It has been an attempt to introduce a new paradigm in European security with brutal military force in line with Moscow’s interests. Russia, together with China, aims to undermine the European and international order that was created and led by the US after the end of the Cold World War. Russian goals were presented in form of two draft treaties that included three major demands in December 2021.
The first demand was about putting the post-Soviet space de facto under Russian control, with the priority of controlling Ukraine. The second demand was aimed at creating a buffer zone in Central and Northern Europe, making the countries in the region prone to Russian pressure. The third demand was to push the United States out of Europe by withdrawing US nuclear weapons from European military bases.
All this would mean a shift to a great power concert on the continent, limiting the sovereignty of small and medium states in Central and Northern Europe and giving Russia a veto power in European foreign and security affairs. The outcome of the Russian invasion of Ukraine will, from Poland’s perspective, determine whether Russia will further pursue or bury its neo-imperial ambitions.
NATO’s adaptation
The Russian aggression against Ukraine shifted the focus of the Alliance to its northeastern flank and made NATO strengthen its collective defence posture. In the new Strategic Concept from 2022, the allies defined Russia as the most significant direct threat to their security. Deterrence and defence were made a priority. NATO obliged itself to develop forces, capabilities, plans, and infrastructure, including for high-intensity warfare against peer-competitors. The allies also put a greater emphasis on the role of nuclear deterrence due to Russian aggressive nuclear rhetoric.
The most important change to NATO’s posture is a partial return to the defence planning processes and structures implemented during the Cold War. At the summit in Vilnius, the allies agreed upon three regional defence plans: the north (covering the European Arctic and North Atlantic), the centre (covering the Baltic Sea region and Central Europe) and the south one (covering the Mediterranean and Black Sea region). These plans will form the basis for the development of allied military forces, capabilities, and exercises.
However, no change to the concept of stationing NATO forces on the eastern flank was decided. Permanent rotational presence of battalion-sized battlegroups on the eastern flank was maintained, with allies exercising their ability to quickly expand them to brigade-sized forces. At the same time, two of these battlegroups – in Lithuania and in Latvia – should increase to a brigade in a few years, due to the bilateral arrangements of the two countries with Germany and Canada.
Beyond the plans to strengthen military posture in Central and Northern Europe, the accession of Finland, and hopefully soon Sweden, to NATO changed the strategic landscape in Central and Northern Europe. The membership of both countries sets clear boundaries between NATO and Russia, and prevents Moscow from taking advantage of their non-alignment (e.g. by occupying parts of their territories like Gotland or the Åland Islands) to conduct possible military operations in the wider region.
Poland’s political and military interests in the Alliance
From Poland’s perspective, in order to achieve sustainable peace in Europe, Russia needs to be defeated, Ukraine has to become part of Euro-Atlantic structures, NATO must live up to its defence plans, and the allies need to invest in the implementation of these plans.
From Poland’s perspective, in order to achieve sustainable peace in Europe, Russia needs to be defeated, Ukraine has to become part of Euro-Atlantic structures, NATO must live up to its defence plans, and the allies need to invest in the implementation of these plans.
First, the Kremlin’s strategic defeat in Ukraine includes not only a military failure. The best way to curtail Russian ambitions in Eastern, Central and Northern Europe would be to integrate Ukraine in both the EU and NATO. Ukraine being left outside the Western structures in the in-between zone would only mean protracted crisis and conflict in Eastern Europe. Russia would repeatedly attempt to subdue the country, and might be willing to strike against NATO countries in the future if they see a window of opportunity. If there is no consensus for Ukraine’s membership now, the goal should be to bring the country politically and militarily closer to the Alliance step by step.
At the same time, NATO needs to further strengthen deterrence and defence vis-à-vis Moscow. In the conventional domain, after agreeing to the strategic shift in collective defence posture, the allies need to work on swift implementation of the regional plans and on structural changes to the Command and Force Structures by investing in the agreed military capabilities, by providing high-readiness forces to fill in NATO defence planning, and by staging large-scale exercises to be able to execute the plans if needed. The allies should also finally denounce the NATO-Russia Founding Act, a document that prescribes limitations on allied military presence in Central Europe. There should be no temptation to come back to NATO’s cooperative stance towards Russia without a deep political change in the country – i.e. without hopes of finding an arrangement on future European security with Moscow.
From Warsaw’s perspective, it is equally important to strengthen NATO’s nuclear deterrence. The allies agreed at the summit in Vilnius to update the nuclear planning and to modernize nuclear capabilities. From Poland’s perspective, this should open the way to certifying Polish F-35 jets as dual-capable aircraft for nuclear sharing arrangements. This would be the way out of the controversial debate about the basing of US tactical nukes in Poland, while at the same time allowing the allies from the eastern flank to actively join the nuclear sharing programme.
With Russia attempting to challenge the European security order, there can be no comeback to past policies of prioritizing economic growth and social cohesion over security.
All this means that the European allies need to invest heavily in the reform and modernization of their armed forces. With Russia attempting to challenge the European security order, there can be no comeback to past policies of prioritizing economic growth and social cohesion over security. 2% of GDP should be the bottom line if NATO is to quickly react to contingencies in Central and Northern Europe.
Investments in Poland’s national defence
Strengthening deterrence and defence within NATO and implementing the central regional defence plan forms the basic layer of enhancing Poland’s security. Beyond that, Poland has decided on substantial investments in their own military capabilities. Poland’s military expenditure from budgetary and extrabudgetary funds reached 3.9% of GDP in 2023. It will remain high in the years to come as 3% of GDP for defence was enshrined in the Homeland Defence Act adopted by the Sejm in 2022. More than a half of the $30 billion spent on defence in 2023 was invested in arms and military equipment. The current plans for the modernization of the Polish Armed Forces until 2035 will cost $133 billion. Even if there is a correction in both military procurement plans and expenditure, Warsaw will still spend big on defence.
The goal is to prepare the Polish Armed Forces for a more difficult security environment in the future, with an unknown degree of US military presence in Europe. The speedy implementation of the procurement programmes reflects a conviction that there might be a need for an enhanced regional military posture as soon as 2026/2027, in order to deter and defend against a resurgent Russia. The lack of understanding of the changes in the security environment on part of the Western European allies and the slow investments in their armed forces is an additional factor. Moreover, there is the need to quickly replenish the military equipment that was delivered to Ukraine from operational units of the Polish Armed Forces.
Poland therefore primarily invests in land forces capabilities like the heavy armoured vehicles (a.o. US and South Korean tanks), long-range artillery and air defence systems, as well as in the Air Force with the purchase of new fighter jets (F-35 multirole combat aircraft and FA-50 light combat jets), airborne early-warning planes (Saab 340), among others. The Navy, the Territorial Defence Forces and the Cyberspace Defence Forces will also get a share of the modernization budget. The procurement process will be accompanied by an increase in military strength. Expanding their current size of ca. 160,000 up to 300,000 soldiers will probably be not possible, but there will be an effort to cross the 200,000-threshold through combining different forms of military service.
The strengthening of national capabilities has been accompanied by continuous efforts to keep and increase the US military presence in Poland in terms of troops (currently up to 10,000 soldiers) and command structures (V Corps Headquarters-Forward). Furthermore, there is a conviction that regional cooperation and coordination need to be enhanced. In 2023, this was demonstrated by the synchronization of the year’s biggest military exercises in the Baltic Sea region – the Polish Anakonda with the Swedish Aurora and the US Defender 23. As the northeastern flank allies will be the first responders to a crisis or conflict situation, there is a need for more information exchange, coordination, and cooperation across the Baltic Sea region on top of what NATO has been doing so far and will be implementing in the future.
