Russian attacks and advances in Ukraine make it increasingly uncomfortable for NATO to stand passively on the sideline. NATO remains unlikely to take steps toward Ukraine’s accession but is now considering taking over the coordination of weapons supplies and training and creating a dedicated fund to sustain them long-term.
Coordination and financing are the two main potential Ukraine-related deliverables that are being negotiated among allied nations leading up to the Washington Summit.
Towards the Washington Summit in July 2024, NATO is moving forward with the planning of a greater NATO role in providing military aid to Ukraine. According to Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, NATO has tasked the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to elaborate a proposal for a NATO-coordinated arms supply and training framework, which ideally would be underpinned by a financial commitment to make supplies enduring and more predictable. Coordination and financing are the two main potential Ukraine-related deliverables that are being negotiated among allied nations leading up to the Washington Summit.
Coordination of Military Aid
Involving NATO in the coordination of weapons and training for Ukraine would, for the first time, give it a role in Ukraine’s war effort against Russian aggression. Lethal support for Ukraine would be a qualitative upgrade for the alliance, which thus far has confined itself to the provision of non-lethal support via advisory or trust funds. It would give NATO an indirect role in keeping with its wording that it is not a party to the war, but nevertheless one that goes beyond merely tending to its own deterrence and defense while Ukraine fights alone against an increasingly capable Russia on the battlefield.
The discussions about an expanded NATO role in Ukraine come in the midst of growing anxiety in Europe and Canada about a possible return of Donald Trump to the White House and what that could mean for the U.S. commitment to Ukraine. A $60 billion military aid package was stalled several months in the U.S. Congress because of Trump-influenced Republican resistance. This confirmed suspicions that the United States cannot be fully counted on to supply Ukraine, and that it falls to the Europeans to build the capability to compensate for the eventuality of missing U.S. contributions. From this perspective, a NATO-coordinated framework for weapons and training would be an improvement over the U.S.-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group (Ramstein format) as the current framework for NATO and non-NATO states.
An institutionalized NATO role does not, in itself, guarantee a steady flow of weapons for the years to come, but it does guarantee that someone will be in charge of the coordination of the delivery of lethal aid if the United States’ leadership fails.
An institutionalized NATO role does not, in itself, guarantee a steady flow of weapons for the years to come, but it does guarantee that someone will be in charge of the coordination of the delivery of lethal aid if the United States’ leadership fails. Moreover, an institutionalized role may have a significant psychological effect on both NATO and Ukraine. It would put NATO’s prestige on the line and make Ukraine’s ability to prevent Russian breakthroughs and victory a credibility issue for the alliance itself. It may thus also bring a much-needed boost for Ukraine amidst reports of deteriorating morale on the frontlines and intensified Russian air attacks against civilian infrastructure seemingly intended to break the domestic will to continue the war effort.
There are so far mixed indications as to whether NATO could agree to a coordinating role by the Washington Summit. The concern that it would confirm Russia’s narrative of being at war against not only Ukraine but also NATO continues to predominate among certain members. Hungary said that it is opposed to ‘proposals that might draw the alliance closer to the war or shift it from a defensive to an offensive coalition’. The United States’ initial reaction was that it considers continued American leadership (via Ramstein) essential to keep the pro-Ukraine coalition together.
On the other hand, important countries like Germany, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Belgium voiced support for an expanded NATO role. Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski declared that agreement was already reached for a NATO Mission for Ukraine, by which members would be able to use NATO’s coordination, training and planning capabilities to support Ukraine in a more coordinated way. Although unclear whether it would operate inside or outside the country, agreement on a NATO Mission for Ukraine suggests progress that may result in a positive decision at the Washington Summit.
Financing of Military Aid
The politically far more complicated aspect of the proposal for military aid to Ukraine is, however, the adoption of a five-year $100-billion fund to be administered by NATO. It includes the idea that the alliance’s 32 members will contribute to the $100 billion in the same proportion as they finance NATO’s shared budget, namely based on their gross national incomes. The intention with the fund is to secure Ukraine a substantial and more long-term financial commitment against not only changing domestic moods in the NATO countries but also Russia’s war of attrition.
In warfare reminiscent of World War I, Russia fires five times as many artillery shells as Ukraine because it is not required to ration its resources as much. Estimations that as many as 70 percent of the Ukrainian war casualties stem from artillery and rocket fire shows the significant disadvantage that Ukraine has vis-à-vis a militarily superior enemy. Ukraine’s material deficit is thus taking a toll on its manpower resources as well. Ukraine recently passed a new mobilization bill to expand conscription and tighten enforcement because of casualties and the need to relieve war-weary troops rotated in to and out from many times from the frontline. Greater certainty about adequate supply of weapons reduces the odds that Ukraine loses a war of attrition on manpower in which Russia can draw on a significantly larger population.
The proposed NATO fund may contribute to discouraging Russia’s belief that it can attrite Ukraine and industrially outproduce its supporters, but it is unlikely to be a game-changer.
The proposed NATO fund may contribute to discouraging Russia’s belief that it can attrite Ukraine and industrially outproduce its supporters, but it is unlikely to be a game-changer. It is not certain that $100 billion over five years is what it takes for Ukraine to maintain its defensive lines against Russia, which has transformed into a war economy and is planning to spend seven percent of its GDP, or $109 billion, on defense alone in 2024. $100 billion spanning five years fall short of the $125 billion each year (0.25 percent of the NATO GDP) which the Estonian government has estimated it takes to set up transatlantic defense against the Russian threat and to allow Ukraine to resume counteroffensives by 2025.
A potential adoption of the fund at the Washington Summit hinges on the ability to solve at least four hurdles. The first is whether NATO members are willing to commit to the proposed pooling of financial resources. Several European countries, including Germany, refuse joint borrowing for defense (as was the case for the Covid-19 pandemic recovery). In the United States, major budgetary decisions ultimately lie not with the President but with the Congress, as the current military aid to Ukraine testifies to. The second concerns the NATO-EU relationship, given the fact that the European Commission recently proposed a €100-billion Defense Fund to ramp up production on the continent. NATO’s proposal of a similar amount of money earmarked for Ukraine may compete with the EU’s growing defense ambitions. The third is that above-average contributors to Ukraine likely would perceive the NATO fund as an ‘equaling-out’ mechanism, whereby below-average contributors should pay more to better overall reflect their economic size. This holds the danger that above-average contributors would not agree to the NATO fund as a share of economic size. The fourth is whether resistance to the idea of a NATO fund for Ukraine from Hungary and Turkey could be parried with the possibility of opt-outs for individual members.
If consensus cannot be found, NATO members may have to land on a compromise, whereby, e.g., the alliance administers a limited, voluntary fund for weapons supplies that is reminiscent of the existing NATO trust funds.
NATO membership
While coordination and financing of military aid will be the main potential deliverables of the Washington Summit, the question of Ukrainian NATO membership continues to be a topic of intense debate within the alliance and among security policy experts. Unfortunately for Ukraine, the summit is unlikely to bring it closer to membership due to the circumstance of moving frontlines and ongoing hostilities. The historical record suggests that NATO enlarges only to consolidate a geopolitical situation, not to actively create a new one. The vast majority of NATO members remain unwilling to take active steps to change the geopolitical status quo because they fear this could bring them into a direct war with Russia. Although French President Emmanuel Macron recently said that he does not rule out sending troops to Ukraine, the fact that Western countries are willing to defend Israel but not Ukraine against air attacks testifies to continued unwillingness to take a direct fighting role against Russia, even if only defensive.
The prospect of Russia winning a war of attrition may be the straw that makes NATO agree to take over the coordination and (some of) the funding of the military aid.
Conversely, Russia’s relentless attacks with the declared purpose to take the major cities of Kharkiv, Odessa, and Kyiv make it increasingly uncomfortable for NATO to stay behind its protective shield while keeping refusing to play any role to help Ukraine’s defense. The prospect of Russia winning a war of attrition may be the straw that makes NATO agree to take over the coordination and (some of) the funding of the military aid. NATO may be able to take these steps forward in the realization that halting Russian revisionism on its own eastern border later will be much costlier than halting it now in Ukraine. The fear of escalation by providing Ukraine with weapons has proven exaggerated over the past two years, and Russia anyway seems to care little about the facts in its justification of Ukraine being a broader conflict with NATO and the West. A Ukrainian military defeat would put NATO under serious duress, whereas making the (after all) moderate military investment in Ukraine with no loss of own soldiers yields a high security payoff for the alliance. This should be the understanding underpinning how NATO leaders in Washington formulate their support for Ukraine.