Technological change in the war in Ukraine – what lessons for NATO allies?

Introduction

For Ukraine’s deputy prime minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, the equation for Ukraine’s victory is clear:  “The courage of Ukrainians + technology = the key to Ukraine’s future victory”, he noted in April 2023. For him, the war between Russia, which invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, and Ukraine, which has been defending its people and territory since then, is a “technology war”.

Of course, the war is not all about technological change. Some of the most urgent demands – and most heated debates with supporters – have been about the delivery of tanks, artillery ammunition, and aerial defence systems. Among the most useful aerial defence systems have been the German anti-aircraft gun tank Gepard, which the Bundeswehr had phased out in 2010. ‘Dragon’s teeth’ anti-tank obstacles – something most Europeans associate with the second world war – are making a reappearance.

Technologies which NATO calls emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) – artificial intelligence, space-based capabilities, but also cyber and drones which are a bit more established – are playing an important role in the war in Ukraine, and specifically in Ukraine’s defence against the Russian military.

But technologies which NATO calls emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) – artificial intelligence, space-based capabilities, but also cyber and drones which are a bit more established – are playing an important role in the war in Ukraine, and specifically in Ukraine’s defence against the Russian military. Ukrainian civilians inform their armed forces of Russian advances by logging sightings of military vehicles in apps. Drones are in the sky 24 hours a day, streaming back images of troop movements and attacks. According to Fedorov, cloud services “basically helped Ukraine survive as a state”.

NATO allies need to pay close attention to and learn from the war if they are serious about building up their own EDT capabilities. Specifically, NATO allies should draw three distinct lessons from the war so far. These are not about specific weapon systems, such as which drone has been the most promising, or how to integrate autonomy in the fighting process. Rather, they are more fundamental lessons and changes that the increasing use of new technologies have caused or enabled.

Lesson 1) Private companies are providing decisive capabilities – and in some areas are the only ones able to do so

Private, mostly civilian, technology companies have provided crucial systems and services to Ukrainians and their armed forces throughout the war. The most visible roles for these companies have been in the field of internet connectivity (Starlink/SpaceX), and in cloud computing and cyber (Amazon, Microsoft, Google). Other companies have provided hardware such as drones (DJI), or software to improve legacy systems.

“Starlink is indeed the blood of our entire communication infrastructure now”, Fedorov said in an interview. Thousands of terminals that link to satellites of the US company SpaceX are in use in Ukraine, providing secure communications to the military as well as to the government and the public. Amazon helped Ukraine move data to the cloud in the first days of the war. This included the provision of ‘snowball’ devices – suitcase-sized computer storage units – to help store data, as well as room in the cloud. By December 2022, Amazon had helped move some 10 petabytes of data – equivalent to at least twice the contents of the US Library of Congress. This included crucial information such as the country’s land registries. Google has helped place Ukrainian websites under a ‘cyber umbrella’, protecting them from denial-of-service attacks. But not only the big US technology firms have been playing a role. Of the tens of thousands of drones that populate the sky over Ukraine, a high number are initially civilian systems, produced by the Chinese drone maker DJI. DJI suspended operations in both Russia and Ukraine early into the war – but has been unable to control the use of its drones.

NATO countries have to take note of the change in the balance of power between the private sector and the state. Private companies are providing services that are crucial to the war effort, and for many of these services it can be questioned whether states would be able to provide them in their stead.

NATO countries have to take note of the change in the balance of power between the private sector and the state. Private companies are providing services that are crucial to the war effort, and for many of these services it can be questioned whether states would be able to provide them in their stead. While working with commercial providers can sometimes be a good way to get products and services quickly and more cheaply than the public sector may be able to guarantee, relying on the private sector can also create vulnerabilities. Earlier this year, SpaceX reported that it had taken measures to limit Ukrainian military use of Starlink, arguing that the intention had never been for the service to be used for offensive military purposes. The New York Times revealed in July that, at times, the Ukrainian armed forces changed their operations because of Musk’s decisions on when and where internet connectivity via Starlink was available.

NATO members should therefore clearly define which capabilities they are comfortable buying from private firms, and in which areas they should be developing their own capabilities. Also, to guarantee smooth cooperation with the private sector, NATO members should regularly include commercial systems, equipment, and even actors in their military exercises. They need to learn from Ukraine how new, off-the-shelf systems can be integrated into the military with minimal bureaucracy and immediate impact. The Ukrainian government appears to have been particularly successful in dealing with private companies, creating relationships that they have been able to rely on during the war effort. NATO can learn from these experiences.

Lesson 2) Technology has enabled and motivated individuals to take part in the war effort

Among the most striking aspects of the war in Ukraine related to new technologies is how they have enabled and motivated the involvement of individuals. Inside Ukraine, civil society and individuals have been highly involved in the war – and their involvement is often directly linked to new technologies. Already before the 2022 invasion, the hobbyist drone unit Aerorozvidka was founded – a group of individuals interested in drones who, by now, have built their own drones and are working with the Ukrainian military. Ukrainians send tips to the military regarding advances of Russian forces and incoming Russian missiles through apps or Telegram chatbots. The Ukrainian government has created a website and app where people can testify on Russian war crimes.

It is not only civilians in Ukraine – who have little choice as to their involvement in the war – who have been involved in the war efforts. New technologies have also made it possible for individuals abroad to play an active role. Ukraine’s resistance has attracted thousands of foreign fighters from around the world. Independently of their location, people were able to appreciate the situation in Ukraine – also thanks to myriad drone videos and satellite imagery posted on social media. Technology has allowed those who cannot or will not go to Ukraine to nevertheless support the war effort from afar. A multitude of international crowdfunding efforts support Ukraine’s troops. They are organized via social networks, allowing money to be sent via platforms such as PayPal, and have primarily collected funds to buy new tech equipment such as drones and Starlink terminals.

This development is extremely relevant for NATO countries, which are democracies with a free and open internet, where public opinion matters. An engaged citizenry is an overall positive development, but it can add to polarization, be instrumentalized by opponents, or lead to pressures that could hamper international diplomacy. NATO members should be proactive and establish mechanisms to coordinate and make use of civilian volunteers who can boost capacities. One promising example is to cultivate individuals’ involvement in cyber defence, in order to engage individuals who might otherwise conduct cyber vigilantism with little positive impact on military strategic goals. The idea of using civilians as an intelligence resource might also be an option. Here, again, NATO can learn from Ukraine which has been exceptionally good at positively directing individuals’ engagement. The Ukrainian leadership has been impressive in adopting the light, sarcastic tone of the internet in its own communications on social media platforms, all the while never losing sight of the severity and tragedy of the situation.

Lesson 3) Quality and quantity matter

The western approach to military technology has for years been ‘quality over quantity’. To counter the numerical advantage of its opponents – most importantly, historically, the Soviet Union – NATO put its efforts on developing better and more sophisticated weapons. While this logic still holds to some extent – think of the debate around Western tanks and aircraft which have shown their superiority to Russian systems – the war in Ukraine has been a reminder that quantity can have a quality of its own. Or, as former Estonian president Kersti Kaljulaid succinctly put it: “there is no point in having one fancy weapon if the enemy has 10,000 non-fancy ones.”

With Ukraine planning to manufacture 200,000 drones over the next year, and Russia aiming to build 6,000, it appears that even ‘fancy’ weapons now need to be procured in high numbers.

The war has called into question Western military-industrial capacities, with Ukraine at times using more artillery rounds in a month than all European manufacturers can produce in an entire year. And even new technologies have appeared en masse: Russia has used hundreds of kamikaze drones to saturate and overwhelm Ukrainian air defences. One recent study estimated that Ukraine loses up to 10,000 drones per month – most of them non-hardened civilian systems. With Ukraine planning to manufacture 200,000 drones over the next year, and Russia aiming to build 6,000, it appears that even ‘fancy’ weapons now need to be procured in high numbers.

Europeans would be well advised to consider the acquisition of higher numbers of more expendable systems. Here, working with the private sector could be beneficial. Governments should devise plans to ramp up production, possibly relying on commercial abilities. The ease of replacing systems or parts needs to become a higher priority.

Conclusion

For NATO, Ukraine’s use of new technologies, as well as the way the government works with the private sector and utilizes civilians’ competences, is something to learn from.

Hopefully, technology combined with the courage of Ukrainians is indeed the key to Ukraine’s victory, as Mykhailo Fedorov states. For NATO, Ukraine’s use of new technologies, as well as the way the government works with the private sector and utilizes civilians’ competences, is something to learn from. At the same time, NATO members need to rethink their relationships with the private sector – strengthen it where needed, and invest in alternative solutions where deemed necessary. Finally, the Western strategy of counting on technological superiority over adversaries with numerical advantages may have to be reconsidered. Less shallow arsenals and higher procurement numbers will be needed in the future.