The Unchanging Core: Russian Military Culture Examined through the Ukrainian War

“The measure of a state is how it treats its soldiers.”

Introduction

Approximately 35 years ago, Soviet society entered a period of glasnost, characterized by a newfound openness that allowed for public debate and criticism of pressing social issues. It was during this era that a network of women activists, collectively known as the ‘Soldiers’ Mothers Organization’, emerged as a powerful voice in society. Their mission was to passionately advocate for the well-being of their sons, the Russian soldiers serving within the confines of the Soviet armed forces.

Persistent issues, including the troubling ‘dedovshchina’ (a form of hazing), tragic peacetime fatalities, widespread alcohol abuse, excessive violence, corruption, and other harmful behaviours within the military, continued to afflict the Russian armed forces. These challenges were not mere abstractions; they were vividly exemplified by countless harrowing soldier stories. These narratives served as stark reminders of the enduring and deeply ingrained nature of the Russian soldiers’ predicament.

Imitating the enduring trends observed in Western armed forces, marked by the processes of civilianization, modernization, and professionalization culminating in the formation of what is commonly referred to as the ‘all-volunteer force’, a similar remedy was sought to address the intricate challenges faced by Russian soldiers within the ranks of the Russian armed forces.

The chosen path to address these issues revolved around the concept of professionalization, a paradigm shift that had been under consideration since the 1990s. This transition involved the replacement of the conscription system with volunteer soldiers and the transformation of a massive army into a relatively compact, yet highly technologically advanced and mobile force. It wasn’t until after 2008 – notably following the harrowing experiences of both Chechen wars, marked by excessive brutality, extensive devastation, and a heavy human toll endured by all parties involved, as well as the invasion of Georgia – that substantial reform and modernization of the Russian armed forces gained significant momentum.

Under the leadership of Defence Minister Shoigu, who assumed his role in 2012, the professionalization of the armed forces emerged as a focal point of his widely publicized reform agenda.

Under the leadership of Defence Minister Shoigu, who assumed his role in 2012, the professionalization of the armed forces emerged as a focal point of his widely publicized reform agenda. Even Western observers, captivated by Russia’s remarkable modernization and reform efforts, were left in awe of the transformation of Russia’s military capabilities, often calling it ‘Russia’s military phoenix’, symbolizing not only rebirth and renewal but also the emergence of a new and potent strategic challenge.

As we mark 600 days in the midst of conflict and closely examine the behaviour of Russian soldiers in Ukraine, a critical juncture is upon us. The time has arrived to delve into the depths of Russia’s reform and modernization endeavours. In this unfolding narrative, we aim to unveil the essence of ‘Ivan’s War’ on Ukrainian soil. This inquiry poses compelling questions: can we truly decipher the unique contours of their military culture and, consequently, discern a distinct Russian way of war?

Ivan’s War in Ukraine: Mobiks, Volunteers, and Convicts

It is widely acknowledged that Russia is grappling with a structural manpower issue. This situation reveals that Russia’s military involvement in Ukraine is more a product of hubris and miscalculation than rational decision-making. Russia’s military ambitions often appear to outpace the number of personnel available for deployment, requiring the Kremlin to delicately balance its operational necessities with public approval of its actions in Ukraine.

As a result, a perpetual improvisation process unfolds to ensure an adequate presence on the frontline. This improvisation includes tacit mobilization, intensified recruitment efforts to attract new volunteers, and even the recruitment of convicts from Russian prisons.

In practice, the Russian frontline is manned by a diverse combination of ‘mobiks’ (mobilized soldiers), ‘kontraktniki’ (professional soldiers), and convicts. This amalgamation is less conducive to orchestrating complex, combined operations, and it doesn’t align with the vision of Russia’s ‘New Look’ military. The implications of this composition become evident in the way Russian military operations are conducted in Ukraine, often reminiscent of practices from the 1990s and early 2000s.

This situation is reflected in sporadic yet systematic witness reports, as revealed by intercepted telephone communications and social media posts. Russian soldiers and their families often voice complaints about the circumstances under which they serve. Soldiers state that, immediately after reporting for duty, they are sent to the battle zone without much preparation or training. Arriving at the frontline, they have no clue about small group tactics, let alone the mission they are supposed to accomplish.

Russian tactics appear to rely on what may be called “meat grinder tactics”, involving the sending of soldiers wave after wave in counteroffensives or leaving them on their own in defensive positions without adequate support.

In some cases, Russian tactics appear to rely on what may be called “meat grinder tactics”, involving the sending of soldiers wave after wave in counteroffensives or leaving them on their own in defensive positions without adequate support. Unit rotation or relief from battle duty also seems to be problematic, resulting in battle fatigue, refusal to follow orders, and even instances of local mutiny. The response of officers to these challenges tends to be predictable: silence, denial, insults, threats, or even execution.

Adding to this already challenging situation, soldiers sometimes seem to lack basic necessities such as clothing, food, water, or shelter, which can lead to outbursts of anger, with some soldiers asking, “Are we just cannon fodder?”

This composition, marked by low morale and weak leadership, not only results in a high acceptance of manpower losses but also has repercussions beyond the battlefield. The brutal and violent behaviour exhibited by Russian soldiers towards the local population in Ukraine is often exacerbated by high alcohol consumption. This behaviour has been observed in locations such as Bucha and elsewhere, with reports of theft, torture, rape, and murder occurring without repercussions or sanctions. This may not be surprising, given the situation, which in Russia is often qualified as ‘bespredel’ (‘lawlessness’ or ‘arbitrariness’).

Furthermore, as soldiers return home after their frontline service in Ukraine, reports emerge of acts of violence and murder committed by convicts who have earned their freedom in return for their frontline service. Additionally, incidents of soldiers suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have been documented. As the Kremlin’s decision to invade Ukraine appears to backfire, a looming ‘Afghanistan syndrome’ reminiscent of earlier times in Russia becomes increasingly apparent.

The Russian Paradox

The Russian military culture, characterized by a high tolerance for suffering and violence, proves to be an enduring and persistent trait of the Russian military organization.

The Russian military culture, characterized by a high tolerance for suffering and violence, proves to be an enduring and persistent trait of the Russian military organization. Indeed, the problems reported and studied in the 1990s and early 2000s are nearly identical to those observed in Ukraine today. In this sense, it should not surprise us. However, the issue is that we – both the expert community and laypeople – often find ourselves surprised. It seems we’ve been drawn in by Russia’s modernization and reform debate, its prowess displayed in numerous large-scale exercises and military interventions in Ukraine (2014), Syria (2015), Kazakhstan (2021), as well as the Kremlin’s increasingly confident strategic communication and sophisticated misinformation campaigns. Therefore, it is crucial to reflect on our research and understand what we’ve missed since 2008.

It is of paramount importance to take note of this specific military culture. Horrifying and revolting as it may be, it is crucial to familiarize oneself with it in a dispassionate, almost stoic way, as it is of utmost importance to comprehend our self-declared opponent. More importantly, however, we should refrain from drawing the wrong conclusions from this depiction.

Firstly, we must understand that most of the traits of Russian military culture and the behaviour of Russian soldiers in the combat zone and beyond are the result of Russia’s structural problems. Indeed, structural problems often underlie cultural ones. As such, Russian military culture can be approached as a mirror of Russian society and as the result of the Kremlin’s policies over the last three decades. In this sense, it is quite telling that the soldiers’ mothers’ organizations, as described in the introduction as agents of change during the glasnost period in the Soviet Union, no longer exist in the form in which they emerged in the late 1980s and mid-2000s. Currently, they are coopted or merely disqualified as foreign agents.

We may scorn Russian military culture and Russia’s way of warfare, yet we have to deal with it. The fundamental question remains: are we up to the task?

Secondly, it’s crucial not to underestimate the Russian military based on this depicted culture, especially in the current stage of attrition warfare. In this test of will and endurance, of manpower and steel, it is often the party that disposes of the largest resources, the most audacity, and the (brutal) will to sacrifice and suffer that may prevail in this competition. Therefore, we may scorn Russian military culture and Russia’s way of warfare, yet we have to deal with it. The fundamental question remains: are we up to the task? This necessitates self-reflection and hard work.

Coda

Russian military culture is a culture of pain and suffering, a glorification of an ideal that has only existed in propaganda and revised history books, and one that can only be maintained by the harsh and arbitrary hand of the state. It is morally dreadful, intellectually absurd, and tragically flawed. Unfortunately, it is resilient and effective to the point where we resist it with all our might.