Ukraine’s NATO Membership Quest: a Closing Window of Opportunity?

The NATO summit undeniably constituted the focal point of Lithuania’s political agenda in 2023. It can be argued that the big part of the nation became actively engaged in fervent deliberations, which revolved around inquiries into the Alliance’s role within the framework of regional security, strategies for fortifying NATO’s Eastern flank, and above all, the prospect of extending a promise of NATO membership to Ukraine in Vilnius. Arguably, the question of Ukrainian membership in NATO revived not very old memories of Lithuanian own successful accession to the transatlantic community and how Lithuania had managed to use a narrow window of opportunity when Russia was at its weakest and the US was at its strongest at the nineties.

Prior to the summit, expectations on Ukraine were boosted by a seemingly increasing line of supporters for the Ukrainian membership on an international stage. A vigorous debate ensued regarding delineating a clear membership perspective for Ukraine. An increasing cohort of influential policymakers, including Ian Brzezinski, Alexander Vershbow, and Anders Fogh Rasmussen, passionately advocated Ukraine’s accession to the Alliance. Ian Brzezinski and Alexander Vershbow asserted that the Vilnius summit should “begin the process of completing a Europe whole and free where Ukraine has to be fully integrated within the transatlantic community, including as a member of NATO” and for this to happen, it is essential to “move beyond the ambiguous formula regarding Ukraine’s NATO membership enunciated at the 2008 Bucharest summit” [1]. Even France, which for a long time, including the Bucharest summit, was skeptical regarding Ukraine’s prospects in NATO, changed its position and seemingly endorsed the membership perspective. During his meeting with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg at the Elysée Palace in Paris Emmanuel Macron announced “We will have to define a path to give shape to Ukraine’s prospect to join NATO, which we opened up in 2008 in Bucharest.” [2].

The only substantial difference from Bucharest was removing the MAP requirement, instead offering to review the “progress on interoperability” through the Annual National Programme.

Along with the narratives supporting Ukrainian NATO’s perspective, some perspectives exhibited a degree of reservation and caution. Justin Logan and Joshua Shifrinson, in their Foreign Affairs article “Don’t let Ukraine join NATO”, argued the contrary. According to them, a potential Ukrainian membership contradicted US interests, as it might have created high escalation risks in a tense international environment. They urged “the US should accept that it is high time to close NATO’s door to Ukraine”[3]. Similar reservations were trending in Berlin. In his meeting with Romanian Prime Minister Ion-Marcel Ciolacu just before the summit, German Chancellor Olaf Scholtz was quite explicit: “Nobody can become a member of a defensive alliance (NATO) during a war”[4]. Apprehensions associated with the potential for escalation have exerted significant influence on the decision-making process within both the United States and Germany and were the main reason that in a communique of 31 member states, wording on the Ukrainian membership perspective was somewhat lukewarm: “We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree, and conditions are met.” [5]. In essence, the wording did not differ much from the lines of the Bucharest communique:” NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO,” [6] which has failed to provide a concrete membership perspective. The only substantial difference from Bucharest was removing the MAP requirement, instead offering to review the “progress on interoperability” through the Annual National Programme. Also, the NATO Ukrainian Council to involve Ukraine in direct coordination with NATO was established. Seemingly, the main message from Vilnius for Ukraine was that military aid is essential and membership could wait with the war still going on.

Following the summit in his concluding press conference NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg affirmed: “We have just conducted a historic NATO Summit.” [7]. But was this summit a historic one? John Deni, for instance, argued that “not every NATO summit can be a historic landmark”, and the Vilnius summit could not even remotely compare to the previous milestone gatherings such as London in 1990, Madrid in 1997, or Wales in 2014. Although it has possessed considerable potential, it has managed to mostly kick “the can down the road” [8]. Arguably, the absence of a clear membership perspective in Vilnius deprived this summit of the opportunity to achieve this status. Furthermore, it appears that the prospects of Ukraine joining NATO are diminishing in general sense.

As the second year of the war in Ukraine is coming to an end, the fatigue starts hitting. Financial Times argues that in the US, “sufficient pre-approved funds remain to sustain Kyiv for about five more months.” [9]. The US is in the midst of an electoral battle, and the question of aid for Ukraine has already become the dividing line between the two potential candidates. The increasing debt and declining public support for Ukraine will likely affect future debates. In a recent CNN poll, 55% of Americans said that the US Congress should not authorize additional funds to support Ukraine, and only 48% said that the US should do more to support Ukraine (it was 62% in the summer of 2022) [10]. If the US will start to linger, Europeans will need more funds. Europe has unequivocally surpassed the United States in pledged assistance to Ukraine, as the toral commitments from Europeans are now twice as big [11]. Nevertheless, it remains to be observed what will be provided and when, and how enduring the political determination to support Ukraine will persist. The substantial reduction of financial and military end will have a decisive effect on Ukraine’s ability to continue fighting.

The relatively recent experience of the Baltic states illustrates that the most effective transformation of countries occurs when EU membership is accompanied by NATO security assurances.

The question is, what will happen next? Will there be negotiations and peace agreements? Although Ukraine and its supporters are dismissing any negotiations for a moment, all wars end in negotiations and peace agreements at some point. A dwindling military support may signal that the options for moving forward on the battlefield have run out. If peace is achieved, NATO membership will inevitably return to the agenda. What are the options to ensure Ukraine’s security? Since the beginning of the war, various alternatives have been discussed, ranging from the Israeli case, porcupine strategy, and bilateral or multilateral security guarantees. One of the options presented by Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Andrii Yermak in “The Kyiv Security Compact” argue for the combination of several strategies [12].However, all of them have one drawback: they are expensive. NATO membership is relatively the cheapest alternative, and based on historical examples, it deters Vladimir Putin the best.

A. Rasmussen has recently proposed that Ukraine might join NATO but be stripped of the territories occupied by Russia [13] This discussion might be renewed in a forthcoming NATO Washington Summit. However, it is still unclear, will it be acceptable for Ukraine and NATO members. The perspective of the EU membership is being discussed increasingly loudly as a possible alternative to NATO. It is undeniably important as eventually it opens the door to necessary reforms, the rule of law and economic well-being. Only prosperous and well-governed Ukraine could become resilient against potential future interferences of autocratic regimes such as Russia. Still, the EU does not provide hard security guarantees, which are also necessary for well-being, reforms, and to boost investment in Ukraine. The relatively recent experience of the Baltic states illustrates that the most effective transformation of countries occurs when EU membership is accompanied by NATO security assurances. Therefore, even though there is no clear path for membership defined in the Washington summit, Ukraine has to continue pursuing its quest for NATO membership. And it must do so while Russia remains comparatively weekend, and Western unity and resolve are strong. With the commencement of the new political season in the US and Europe, coupled with the progressively worsening global security situation, this window of opportunity may be closing soon.